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ABSTRACT
CHANGING ENERGY FUTURES: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO
THE ADOPTION OF ENERGY ALTERNATIVES IN NEW HAMPSHIRE
by
Mark Diffenderfer 
University of New Hampshire, May, 1990
In an attempt to develop a comprehensive approach to 
the study of the adoption of energy systems, this disserta­
tion first critically examines a variety of approaches to 
this phenomenon, including market models of adoption, the 
adoption of innovations literature, and the social psychol­
ogy of attitudes and behavior. Market models are seen as 
generally reductionistic and the argument is made that they 
fail to take into consideration a variety of non-cost con­
siderations. The assumption here is that while price con­
siderations play a role in this process, decisions are also 
affected by values and attitudes which are not directly in­
corporated into market models. A general model of adoption 
is developed which incorporates situational variables, de­
cision factors, and individual characteristics.
This model provides the basis for an analysis of data 
obtained through a survey of homeowners in the state of New 
Hampshire. Respondents in the survey are separated into 
three basic groups: those who have actually made an active
decision to purchase an energy system (adopters), those who 
have thought about purchasing a nonconventional system and 
then decided against such a purchase (aware nonadopters) 
and those who have never thought about purchasing any sort 
of energy system (unaware nonadopters).
The model is used in six different logit comparisons: 
centralized versus decentralized adopters; aware non­
adopters versus, first, solar adopters and, secondly, wood 
adopters; all nonadopters compared to all adopters; and un­
aware nonadopters compared to, again, solar adopters and 
then wood wood adopters. While the results vary for each 
comparison, generally they demonstrate that: a) demographic 
variables do not help us to understand the differences be­
tween these groups; and b) while some type of price consid­
eration plays a role in these analyses, non-cost considera­
tions like a desire to be independent or the amount of ex­
posure to alternatives are also very important in helping 
us to understand this process.
CHAPTER 1
ENERGY AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM 
Introduction
Our contemporary history is filled with examples of 
environmental problems. Much of what we once took for 
granted has become increasingly problematic. Clean air, 
clean water and abundant food supplies have been replaced 
by smog, acid rain, toxic pollution of our land and drink­
ing water, mercury and dioxin-laden fish, PBB-riddled 
cattle, and periodic energy shortages. The increasing pub­
lic concern about these issues has not been readily trans­
lated into solutions. Political debate has consistently 
broken down into opposing camps, in particular, those who 
favor increased regulation of the market and those who want 
to free up the market and give more incentives to economic 
growth.
The environmental movement, in turn, has become more 
diverse. There has been a growing realization that these 
problems call into question some of the basic underlying 
assumptions regarding the relationship between our politi­
cal and economic systems. This theoretical formulation has 
led to a call for more radical reforms which challenge 
basic property rights -- in particular as they pertain to 
air and water pollution -- and the social organization of
production, including the distribution of the costs and 
benefits associated with the methods of industrial produc­
tion currently found in both capitalist and socialist 
economies. But the movement has been unable to decide on 
strategies, as reflected in the perpetual conflict over 
whether to make changes by working within the political 
system or to demand more radical transformation of the 
political and economic systems of modern states. Some in­
dividuals prefer the moderate reforms of the environmental 
lobbyists, arguing that we can't afford to wait for more 
radical reforms. Other people tend to support the ideology 
and strategy associated with Green politics. Still others 
work outside of the system with groups such as Greenpeace 
or Earth First or propose the more radical changes associa­
ted with bioregionalism.
This dissertation is designed to be an exploratory 
study of the spread of what are variously called ap­
propriate, decentralized, or nonconventional technologies. 
This is a phenomenon which challenges one of the basic 
tenets underlying our process of industrialization -- the 
centralized control and distribution of energy. While this 
centralization can be seen in varying degrees, the tendency 
in the post World War II United States has been to rely in­
creasingly on forms of energy which are controlled, either 
in their price or in their marketing, by large corporations 
and utilities. We all recognize the monopolistic control 
of electricity production by public utilities, but we fre-
3quently fail to recognize the variety of ways that other 
forms of energy are centrally controlled. For example, 
while home heating oil may appear to be a decentralized 
form of energy {there are a lot of distributors in every 
region), its price is determined more by large corporations 
through their control of the amount of oil that is refined 
than it is by local levels of demand (which are relatively 
inelastic) or the competitiveness that might exist between 
local distributors.
During the past decade or so, there has been a notice­
able expansion in the use of decentralized energy tech­
nologies. The growth of this movement is the product of a 
variety of forces operating on both the macro level of so­
cial systems and the micro level of individual decisions. 
This dissertation will focus on the latter, examining the 
variables which seem to be important in helping us to un­
derstand the decisions made by individuals regarding the 
type of home heating systems they will use. These subjec­
tive decisions are based on expectations, values, and emo­
tions as well as rational considerations. But these fac­
tors are also constrained by the institutional and cultural 
framework within which decisions are made.
Much of the emphasis of the contemporary environmental 
movement has been devoted to an examination of the rela­
tionship between energy and production. The concern has 
been with the environmental impacts of production, the 
spiral of increasingly greater levels of production and
4consumption, and the social costs of that production. As a 
central part of this examination, the movement has become 
increasingly concerned with the centralized control of en­
ergy and has begun to look for ways to facilitate the 
spread of decentralized technologies. Such diffusion is, 
naturally, dependent upon a variety of considerations, many 
of which will be examined in this dissertation.
This emphasis, however, has not always been prevalent 
in the movement. To fully understand the importance of en­
ergy issues to the movement in general, we must look at the 
historical development of environmentalism in the United 
States. The next few sections are intended to give a brief 
■summary of the movement, not necessarily in terms of its 
strategy but in terms of the evolution of one ideological 
wing of the movement: the appropriate technology movement.
The purpose is to show the growing awareness of the cen­
trality of energy issues to the movement as a whole, the 
way that a focus on alternative technologies has enabled 
the members of the movement to address criticisms that have 
been leveled at environmentalists, and to provide a basis 
for understanding the argument about the importance of en­
vironmentally benign energy systems to the future of our 
society. In this way we can place the individual decisions 
made by homeowners into a larger social context.
5From Conservation to Environmental Reform
Frequently, when we think of environmentalism we tend, 
to equate it with conservation. Certainly this is under­
standable. America has a long history of environmental 
concern, and the environmental movement is indebted to the 
conservation movement for its intellectual roots, its early 
leaders and organization as well as the resources which 
were necessary for its initial mobilization (Morrisson, 
1980). But the movement has always been, and remains 
today, much more complex and more diverse in its orienta­
tion.
To begin to understand the early development of the 
movement, we need to examine the historical context that 
gave it birth. We need to look more closely at the larger 
social changes that have led to increased environmental 
degradation.
During the first 50 years following the establishment 
of the United States, the prevailing political philosophy 
was Jeffersonian in nature. Agriculture was seen as the 
foundation of the country's wealth. The American vision 
was of a nation of small farmers, each independent from 
the others, thus facilitating the psychological and econom­
ic independence which were prerequisites of democracy.
On the other hand, there was a growing recognition of 
the importance of manufacture. States were often eager to 
create a climate that was favorable to economic expansion.
6But, at the same time, they "found 'manifestly erroneous' 
the notion that individuals should be left alone, that the 
people individually, and not the government, 'are the 
judges of the interests, and consequently should be allowed 
to regulate them unobstructed'" (Handlin, 1969). The state 
would play a role in every part of the economy. It would 
abet commerce and industry as long as the activity was in 
the public interest, but it would also regulate the indus­
try, especially through periodic inspections, to make sure 
that interest was not abused. (Of course, such practices 
also added prestige in foreign ports so that products sold 
better.)
During the next 50 years, the trend was toward a 
greater extension of governmental rights to private indus­
try in order to advance the public good (Handlin, 1969).
But there was also a healthy fear that if corporations were 
allowed to develop and roam the country at will, then they 
would become vast trusts for the accumulation of wealth. 
This in turn would undermine political participation and 
decision making. Thus, a variety of laws were enacted to 
limit this power. These included attempts to place limits 
on the amount of real property that a corporation could 
own, the amount of time that they could exist, as well as 
the number and types of enterprises in which they could be 
involved. At times, the states made the corporations sub­
ject to periodic audits. All of these regulations were 
based on the recognition that while corporations were
7necessary to advance the public interest, they were also 
real actors in the political and economic realm which, by 
nature, lacked any conscience. They might, then, use their 
power and influence to undermine democratic processes and 
to limit competition in the economy (Berle, 1957).
These restrictions were subsequently abandoned. To 
facilitate the westward expansion via the railroads, it was 
necessary that companies be allowed to purchase vast tracts 
of land and, in order to assure adequate payback, that they 
be allowed to exist for long periods of time. Without 
this, no private individuals would risk the investment that 
was needed.
This led to a general trend of increased privatization 
of environmental resources and property rights. Individu­
als and corporations were granted ownership of, or ceded 
property rights to, vast tracts of public lands. As a 
result, resources were depleted with no concern for future 
needs or for the impact on the environment as a whole.
In response to this, two distinct conservation move­
ments arose. The first of these, which is most often 
identified with Gifford Pinchot, argued that our wilderness 
areas and natural resources were a public heritage and 
these resources should be placed in trust with the federal 
government acting as steward to assure that these resources 
be used for the greater public good. Their vision of a 
"public” was similar to Burke's (incorporating many genera­
tions) and they felt that the long term interests of the
8society were being undermined by a short-term profit 
motivation that was leading businessmen to plunder the en­
vironment. This overconsumption of resources threatened 
the long-term well-being of the nation (O'Brien, 1983).
They believed further that the public interest could some­
how be objectively determined by a scientific and adminis­
trative elite in the employ of the federal government 
(Andrews, 1980)
On the other hand, there was a small group of people 
concerned with preserving the pristine beauty of the natu­
ral environment for its own sake. These preservationists 
believed that much of our lands should be set aside for 
their aesthetic value and the appreciation of future gener­
ations. Their concern was not with facilitating future 
production. Rather, they viewed the environment not simply 
as a means of subsistence for modern people but as some­
thing to be enjoyed in its own right. (O'Brien, 1983)
Such diverse views of the environment quite obviously 
placed the preservationists and the conservationists at 
odds. This points to a basic fallacy in the approach of 
the conservationists since it is impossible to identify a 
single, unitary public interest (Andrews, 1980). Further­
more, while Pinchot recognized that the gravest threat to 
the environment was the alliance between business and the 
government, it seems idealistic to assume that bureaucratic 
administrators could be made less subject to political 
pressure or to the exercise of power and influence by cor-
9porations or that scientific neutrality and objectivity 
could be maintained. Eventually, each of the bureaucracies 
charged with protecting the public interest developed 
political ties with the corporations which stood to gain 
the most from the exploitation of these resources.
The majority of the political battles were won by the 
conservation wing of the movement. This gave the environ­
mental movement of the pre World War II era a distinctly 
conservative tone, oriented toward the use of natural 
resources for long-term production and, notably, the build­
ing of dams for electrical power. (In fact, the last major 
battle fought between Muir and Pinchot was over a dam pro­
posed for the Hetch-Hetchy Valley in Yosemite.)
The movement at this time did not possess a radical 
orientation, despite Pinchot's recognition of the col­
laboration between politicians and businessman. There was 
no attempt to confront the existing political and economic 
system. Rather, many of those involved in the movement 
came from the political and economic elite. The "public 
interest" was served through a sort of bureaucratic 
logrolling of the interests of these elite.
By the 1960’s there was an increasing recognition that 
our current practices were having serious negative reper­
cussions on the environment. The publication of Rachel 
Carson's Silent Spring (1962) heightened the awareness of 
the general public to the extent of environmental problems, 
especially the effects of DDT on the food chain. At the
10
same time, there was a growing realization among environ­
mentalists that there could be no assurance of action on 
the part of the federal government- The government was 
doing little to ameliorate the problems in our urban areas, 
the negative impacts of industrialization, or the in­
tensifying issues surrounding the outdoor environment.
There was heightened distress over air and water pollution 
and an accruing disquietude over such issues as pesticides, 
open spaces, wildlife, and soil preservation (Andrews,
1980).
A variety of factors led to the coalescence of this 
awareness into an environmental movement. The political 
climate of the 60's was of prime importance. Idealistic 
youths of the post-Kennedy era were looking for ways to 
change society. They began to focus on the fact that while 
people were increasingly able to afford the time and ex­
pense necessary to enjoy the environment, they found their 
endeavors to be increasingly less rewarding. The other 
factor was the growing tendency on the part of the judicia­
ry to insure that all interests, not just economic claims, 
were evident in administrative decisions (Andrews, 1980). 
The latter was characteristic of decisions in the civil 
rights and the women’s rights issues as it was of environ­
mental decisions.
At the core of this movement were people who were well 
aware of the role that power plays in political decisions, 
including many young lawyers who were inclined to use liti­
11
gation to prevent undesirable courses of action. The ad­
vantage of such a strategy was that even if it failed it 
still served to enhance the availability of information and 
to draw media attention.
These core activists were convinced that voluntary 
participation would never lead to solutions to our environ­
mental problems. They recognized that federal agencies 
(e.g., the TVA, the Soil Conservation Service, the Bureau 
of Reclamation, and the Army Corps of Engineers) were a 
fundamental part of the dilemma. The ability of these 
bureaucracies to carry out their agenda was directly depen­
dent upon their ability to exclude a variety of actors and 
interests from decisions.
The enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) on January 1, 1970 provided a valuable tool for 
these activists. By requiring federal agencies to consider 
non-monetary consequences and to make complete documenta­
tion of all impacts available to the public, it extended to 
all interested parties the ability to challenge the un­
derlying assumptions and goals of the agencies involved 
(Andrews, 1980).
At their best, these administrative reforms allowed 
environmentalists to halt some of the most abhorrent en­
vironmental practices (e.g., the use of DDT) and to chal­
lenge potentially harmful policies. The conflictual nature 
of this approach inherently involved compromises. In­
creased costs of goods, fewer jobs, lower levels of produc-
12
tion, reduced energy efficiencies, etc. were all seen as 
the price which had to be paid to protect the environment. 
Success in this endeavor depended upon continued public 
support for these trade-offs. This necessitated that en­
vironmentalists be able to offset the information dis­
seminated by corporations; information that was intended to 
sway public opinion in the reverse direction. Following 
the 1973-74 oil embargo, the associated entrenchment of 
stagflation changed the context of this debate.
Energy and the Environment
Even prior to 1973, the environmental movement had 
been increasingly susceptible to claims made by its op­
ponents that this was an elitist movement, consisting 
primarily of members of the upper class who were un­
concerned with the regressive impacts of environmental 
legislation (Morrison, 1980). Environmentalists were pic­
tured as being more concerned with scenic beauty than dams, 
more worried about oil spills than offshore oil develop­
ment, as being for "planned scarcity" (Schnaiberg, 1980), 
all of which tended to raise prices of essential goods and 
impose disproportionate costs on the poor and working 
class. Environmentalists, it was argued, are pro-nature 
and anti-people. While such arguments may or may not have 
reflected the views of the "silent majority", they made 
political victories more difficult.
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Following the Arab oil embargo, the subsequent debate 
over energy policy seemed to break down into two camps: 
those who saw certain limits to growth versus those who 
favored continued expansion, or what Schurr has referred to 
as the limitationists and the expansionists (Schurr, et al, 
1979). The expansionists' point of view was essentially 
that progress in the industrialized world is identified 
with the increased consumption of material goods. This 
consumption has been tied to vastly expanded use of energy. 
The use of wind, water and wood has been replaced by a 
reliance on fossil fuels to maximize the efficiency of the 
production process (which might be connected by some with 
to the marginal productivy of capital) since in the period 
following World War II industrialists felt (without any 
empirical support) that it was cheaper to rely on tech­
nological innovation than it was to continue to rely on in­
creasingly expensive labor. Our continued growth was de­
pendent upon our ability to find additional fossil fuels. 
Finite limits to these fuels was not a major consideration. 
Over the long run, science and technology would be able to 
develop new energy systems long before supplies were 
depleted or became prohibitively expensive.
The limitationists' view is based on the assumption 
that the world's resources are finite and for that reason 
it is impossible to imagine continued consumption at the 
present rate. To do so would inevitably lead to un­
acceptable consequences. We must, they argued, begin to
14
limit growth, in particular the conspicuous consumption of 
the affluent minority in the industrialized world. This 
approach drew strength from the first report to the Club of 
Rome by Dennis and Donella Meadows, The Limits to Growth. 
Their computer simulation of the world system found indus­
trial growth to be the most de-stabilizing of all the 
world's problems -- greater even than population -- since 
it affects so many variables in their model: natural 
resource usage rate, the availability of capital, pollu­
tion, etc. They further argued that we are living in a 
golden age and saw little hope that the developing coun­
tries of the world would be able to attain the standard of 
living enjoyed by the West. They also pointed out the in­
herent tendency of capitalism to expand exponentially, 
resulting in eventual overshoot and collapse unless we be­
gin to limit the forces of growth.
There are a few critical differences that divide the 
two camps. First of all, there is the question of how long 
our current rate of growth can continue. Expansionists be­
lieve that science and technology can find new resources 
and develop new energy systems indefinitely. Limitation­
ists feel that growth cannot continue and that it is neces­
sary to critically examine our entire process of produc­
tion.
The second difference concerns the consequences of 
growth. Expansionists argue that the negative consequences 
of growth are far outweighed by the benefits and that many
of the negative consequences are subject to amelioration. 
Furthermore,' even the attempts to control some of the more 
blatant consequences of growth may have severe negative 
repercussions, such as the loss of jobs and economic 
decline. The limitationists believe that continued growth 
at our present rate can only result in the collapse of our 
entire system.
The third issue has to do with whether or not growth 
can lead to greater distributive equity. Expansionists 
presume that continued growth is a prerequisite to the ex­
tension of the good things in life to the majority of the 
world's population. Limitationists argue that you cannot 
deduce the welfare of individuals from aggregate statistic 
of production. Such indicators do not tell us the way in 
which the goods produced are distributed among the world's 
population. The extremely high levels of production that 
we have experienced since World War II, they would argue, 
have benefited a small minority of the world's population 
at the expense of the vast majority in the less developed 
countries.
Finally, there are differing views of the relationshi 
between people and nature. The expansionist viewpoint is 
person-oriented. Nature is a source of the commodities 
necessary for a better life. Limitationists feel that 
people are a part of nature. They take for granted that 
people should preserve nature, not just exploit it.
Dunlap and VanLiere (1978) see evidence of a paradig-
16
matic shift in our cultural view of the relationship be­
tween humans and nature. In the past, growth and progress 
have proceeded apace under what they term the Human Ex- 
ceptionalism Paradigm (HEP). This approach envisions hu­
mans as unique because of their culture. Culture can vary 
more quickly than biological systems, giving people an 
evolutionary tool that puts them apart from and above na­
ture. Culture has become a tool -- some might say an 
ecological niche -- and cultural accumulation allows prog­
ress to continue unabated. The New Environmental Paradigm 
(NEP) sees humans as simply one more species in the biotic 
community and recognizes that because of the links between 
ecosystems, there is no way to anticipate all of the con­
sequences of our interactions with nature. NEP is a view 
of the world as a finite biological and physical system 
which places constraints on economic growth and progress.
There is another, even more fundamental dichotomy in 
our views of nature which bifurcates even environ­
mentalists. According to Schnaiberg (1980) there are two 
differing meanings of "the environment". The first, the 
most common, is to simply regard the environment as a home. 
It i s ■this conception which lies at the heart of our con­
cerns with "fouling our own nest" or of discussions of 
"spaceship Earth". This is the approach which bolstered 
the environmental movement prior to 1974. It is difficult 
for anyone to be against a desire for clean air or clean 
water. This definition gave the movement a broad con-
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stituency. It could easily cut across class lines. But an 
approach of this sort, while important, is superficial.
A more fundamental perception of the environment sees 
it as a basis of subsistence for the society. Such an ap­
proach forces us to consider all of the impacts which our 
methods of gaining sustenance will have on the environment, 
in terms of both environmental additions and depletions 
(Schnaiberg, 1980). This is an inherently more radical 
critique since it forces us to question the most fundamen­
tal aspects of productive and consumptive activity. Since 
energy m  one form or another (including labor) is funda­
mental to all modes of production, we shall elaborate on 
Schnaiberg's point by turning to an examination of the re­
lationship between energy and production.
Energy as a Basis of Social Production
Concern with the relationship between energy and 
society has a long history. Many theorists have concerned 
themselves with the importance of energy for society and 
for production. Spencer (1972), Cottrell (1955), Mumford 
(1966), Odum (1971) and others attempted to focus attention 
even prior to the oil embargo. Following the crisis, how­
ever, the debate began to focus on the ways in which energy 
use has affected society.
Commoner (1976) argues that our economic and environ­
mental difficulties are. inextricably intertwined with ener­
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gy use. By relying on the first law of thermodynamics -- 
that the energy of the universe is constant -- as a basis 
for determining efficiency, we tend to focus on considera­
tions such as the amount of heat lost over distance, in­
sulation, etc. We have thus developed a blatant disregard 
for the second law of thermodynamics which informs us that 
while this energy may be constant, it does not necessarily 
exist in a usable form. Since the entropy of the universe 
is constantly increasing, while all of the energy in the 
universe exists it is increasingly, on average, in a more 
unorganised state. From the standpoint of the evolution of 
the universe we do not have to worry about attaining a max­
imum state of disorder in the near future. But from the 
perspective of societal systems of production, we must be 
concerned about the continued availability of energy 
resources in the near future. Once used, they are no 
longer available for further use even though they techni­
cally exist in some form. From this latter point of view, 
the most important consideration is that energy resources 
be matched to the task at hand in order to reduce the 
amount of waste (heat).
All physical systems in the universe are subject to 
these laws. Ecosystem production (the relationship between 
communities of organisms and their physical environment) is 
mediated by flows of energy through the system. As eco­
systems change their environmental structure from simpler 
to more complex systems, their growth slows and they tend
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towards a more stable, steady state where further growth is 
permitted only to the point where it offsets any surplus 
subsistence base. In fact, many systems grow to only about 
half of the potential limits of their physical environment. 
In this process of ecosystem production, materials circu­
late through the system of production within the limits im­
posed by the availability of energy.
Economies, societal systems of production, apparently 
-- but only apparently -- violate these basic laws. To the 
extent that human production systems are able to operate 
across ecosystems, rather than within them, they can appear 
to offset this tendency towards entropy. Yet human systems 
are still dependent on flows of energy and nutrients.
The key to this disparity is to be found in the way in 
which ecosystems and economies use their surplus. In 
ecosystems this surplus would be limited to the additional 
physical resources that would be available to additional 
populations. In economies, this surplus would include both 
physical resources and capital. As opposed to ecosystems, 
economies return only a portion of their surplus to in­
creased consumption. The rest is funneled into tools and 
machines in order to increase the efficiency of production 
and the available surplus. This greater productive capac­
ity and the rising expectations of consumers leads to ex­
ponentially increasing production (Schnaiberg, 1980).
Commoner (1976) sees this process as the basis of 
stagflation. Attempts to increase productivity in the
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post-war economy have been dependent upon our use of tech­
nology. Increased reliance on this technology has dis­
placed labor, thus contributing to unemployment. At the 
same time, since this machinery is dependent upon energy, 
the cost of goods produced must continue to increase as 
long as this energy is derived from non-renewable 
resources. In addition, the use of fossil fuels to genera­
te this energy results in additions to the environment
which are increasingly detrimental.
While this analysis may be only a limited explanation 
of stagflation, it at least illustrates a growing awareness 
of the pervasive effects of energy. Energy is the central 
driving force of production. Matter alone is not suffi­
cient for production. It must be acted upon in some way. 
Energy is both a mediator of these transformation as well 
as a commodity in its own right. But the environmental 
withdrawals and additions that are associated with the ex­
traction, transformation and disposal of materials in­
evitably meet the upper limits of any particular 
ecosystem. At these limits, either production must be
limited or new ecosystems must be tapped. Even so, there
are still upper limits to the thermal carrying capacity of 
the biosphere.
This exploitation of ecosystems for production leads 
to water pollution, toxic pollution, acid rain, smog, 
global warming, and a host of related problems. Our view 
of the earth as a "home" leads to meliorative attempts to
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may more accurately be regarded as a bundle of rights, as­
sociated with these rights are obligations, primarily the 
obligation to leave that property in a usable condition for 
future generations. Capitalism, and to a certain extent 
socialism, have lost sight of the fact that economies exist 
to serve people. Capital and real property are social 
creations which exist to facilitate labor in the production 
of sustenance, not simply to further the accumulation of 
private capital (John Paul II, 1981; McPherson, 1977). 
Liberal democracies have tended to protect the rights of 
capital at the expense of labor and have tended to place 
less emphasis on the obligations which the ownership of 
capital entails.
A segment of the environmental movement has focused on 
this more radical critique of contemporary society. To the 
extent that environmentalists can demonstrate the dysfunc­
tional nature of the centralized ownership and/or control 
of energy systems -- furthering inflation, unemployment, 
environmental degradation, conspicuous consumption -- then 
they are directly undermining the legitimacy of these means 
of production.
Our concern here is not to attempt to place greater 
blame on either socialism or capitalism for environmental 
degradation. The fact is that in both systems, decisions 
regarding the generation and allocation of resources are 
arrived at through bureaucratic organizations -- the one 
governmental, the other private. The nature of these deci­
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sions varies greatly both between socialist and capitalist 
societies as well as among various socialist or capitalist 
societies. For example, the Soviet Union has demanded 
sacrifice from workers and consumers and has devoted much 
of its surplus to furthering production by building up its 
industrial base. On the other hand, China has, until 
recently, devoted a much larger share of its surplus to so­
cial welfare and attempts to raise the standard of living. 
On a world-wide scale, however, the argument has been made 
that equivalent levels of industrialization have generally 
resulted in similar levels of environmental degradation, 
both in terms of additions and withdrawals (Schnaiberg, 
1980) .
The point here is that we assume greater control by 
consumers in these decisions when they are made in market- 
oriented polyarchies. We all too often assume that since 
corporations must market products, they market what people 
will buy. But as Lindblom (1977) points out, this assump­
tion is much too simple. There are a variety of factors 
the undermine this principle. Customers, for example, may 
be incompetent to choose, they may be hoodwinked, or the 
market may be rigged. We shall elaborate on this Chapter 
2. For now, let us consider how market systems, like other 
forms of economic organization, ultimately put decisions 
into the hands of a few individuals who are able to ex­
ercise a great deal of discretion in what they produce. 
While they are concerned with what people will buy, the in­
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centives built into the system encourage them to resolve 
such questions in terms of private profits rather than in 
the public interest. Lindlom argues that decision makers 
exercise discretion over a number of important areas: 
whether products will be dispersed by a few large firms or 
many small ones, the organization of the workplace, the 
types of technology employed, etc. Thus, major decisions 
are removed from the political agenda.
Of equal importance to the notion that markets are not 
popularly controlled is the question of just how much popu­
lar control actually exists in polyarchies. A host of lit­
erature in the social sciences attests to the influence of 
a corporate elite on political process (Mills, 1956; Dom- 
hoff, 1967,1983; Kolko, 1962). One need not assume any 
sort of conspiracy among the governing class, nor should we 
get bogged down in discussions of how many elite decision 
makers exist. To argue with Kolko's figure of 2500 top ex­
ecutives by adding the top executives of the next four cor­
porations in each sector of the economy (thus raising the 
number to 4000) misses the point. The fundamental issue is 
also a basic sociological insight, as reflected in the work 
of Mosca, Pareto, Michels, Weber, and others. This is the 
understanding that in any complex system, the proximate de­
cisions are made by only a few'people (Lindblom, 1977).
The correct question is whether or not these individuals. 
are subject to polyarchic controls.
In all market-oriented polyarchies, business has a
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privileged position. Political leaders grant incentives to 
business that are denied to other organizations. And exec­
utives bring a number of assets -- economic and organiza­
tional —  to the support of parties, interest groups, and 
electoral activities. Thus the processes are far less dem­
ocratic that they appear. Not only do businessmen win when 
there are conflicting interests, they are able to shape 
these interests in the first place. The privileged posi­
tion of business is legitimated through the media, the edu­
cational system, and other socializing institutions.
We shall elaborate on these points in Chapter 2. The 
point here is that much of the environmental literature 
misses the central argument regarding the expropriation of 
property and the distribution of costs and benefits associ­
ated with energy use, in particular the allocation of 
scarce resources. The distribution of scarce goods will 
always result in a political battle. Theorists since Plato 
and Aristotle have recognized this fact. But more con­
temporary theory has assumed that the growing surplus asso­
ciated with industrial society would eliminate scarcity. 
Even Marx was optimistic about the ability of industri­
alization to eliminate poverty as long as the relations of 
production were altered. Such assumptions were easier to 
make in a time of resource abundance. But when even the 
air and the water of the planet have become scarce 
resources then we must recognize the changing nature of 
this controversy.
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In reaction to this, a branch of the movement has de­
veloped an even more radical critique of contemporary 
society. What Devall (1980; Devall and Sessions, 1985) 
refers to as the deep ecology movement has drawn on the 
works of Gary Snyder, Theodore Roczak, Murray Boochkin and 
others in an attempt to develop a radical transformation 
of social organizations and values. More recently, this 
has evolved into bioregionalism, a movement designed to 
have regions live within their available resources (Sales, 
1985). While it is a radically different metaphysical and 
epistimolgical framework, it has not developed a political- 
economic plan. This is a drawback for any movement and has 
characterized many of the discussions regarding the chang­
ing paradigms in modern society. But it is a serious fail­
ing because what we face is a real political battle over 
the distribution of scarcity -- a battle in which wealth 
and income lend some people an upper hand.
The publication of a variety of work in the post 
crisis era led to a new emphasis on the development of "ap­
propriate technologies" as a solution to this fundamental 
problem. E. F. Schumacher's Small Is Beautiful (1973) pre­
sented to the developed countries a lucid framework for the 
advancement of these technologies.
From an entirely different perspective, the second 
report to the Club of Rome by Mesarovic and Pestel (197 4) 
mounted a telling critique of the Meadows' earlier study. 
Their criticisms were founded partly on the assumption that
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it was possible to change from the exponential type of 
growth exhibited by economies today to a more organic 
growth. Again the focal point was the extent to which pro­
duction was based on renewable resources. They were aware, 
however, of the political dimensions of this process. They 
argued that the change was not possible without reductions 
in the disparities of wealth between the developed and the 
less developed countries. Without greater equality, there 
would be conflicts between the users and the suppliers of 
the world's resources as well as conflicts between short­
term and long-term interests.
Morrison (1980) points out that environmental issues 
were never the primary concern of the appropriate tech­
nologies movement. However, technologies which degrade 
ecosystems are inherently unacceptable. The adoption of 
this framework by environmentalists provided a means of ad­
dressing the economic, political and social issues associa­
ted with development on a global basis. Implicit in this 
approach is a radical critique of contemporary systems of 
production and distribution, both capitalist and socialist.
Amory Levins' Soft Energy Paths (1977) illustrates the 
essence of this critique. Associated with different energy 
technologies, both hard (capital-intensive, centralized, 
environmentally degrading) and soft (labor-intensive, 
decentralized, and environmentally benign), are energy 
paths -- the institutional frameworks and values which tend 
to support a certain type of technology. Lovins argues
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that the values necessary for a switch to a soft energy 
path currently exist. What is needed, he says, is to begin 
substituting one type of technology for another.
The problem with this approach is that Lovins has 
missed the most critical aspect of this problem. In the 
first place, there is not much question about the existence 
of values which tend to support either of these tech­
nologies. The real question is, more accurately, whether 
or not those values which might support centralized energy 
systems are deemed more or less important than those which 
support the decentralized technologies. People had a vari­
ety of values all at the same time. But these values may 
often come into conflict. Values of democracy, indepen­
dence and innovation may actually compete with other values 
more closely associated with capitalism.
More importantly, Lovins underestimates the political 
nature of this debate. The soft technology movement is at 
its core a challenge to the existing power structure. To 
argue that we can merely begin to substitute one technology 
for another ignores the fact that what we face is actually 
a political battle. The change to soft technology calls 
for a radical transformation of the means and the relations 
of production in the industrialized world since the 
bureaucratic organization of production rests upon central­
ized control of the means of production, including the pro­
duction of energy. This control is legitimated through the 
existing relations of production as well as through appeals
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to values rooted in the basic fabric of society. It is 
perpetuated through the legal system, the media, the educa­
tional system and other supporting institutions. This con­
trol facilitates the extension of property rights to in­
clude the determination of acceptable limits of additions 
and withdrawals.
Lovins, however, seems to be assuming one of two 
things: either politicians will begin to make policies 
which will facilitate the development of soft energy tech­
nologies and lead to increased rates of adoption, or as the 
grass roots adoption of soft technologies proceeds, the 
market will begin to grow leading to increased power and 
influence for the manufacturers of decentralized systems 
who will then force the political system to respond with 
additional incentives.
The issue here is whether we are going to continue to 
base policies on the assumption that markets operate to 
meet values expressed in terms of price or whether we are 
going to develop a more comprehensive view of behavior. 
While these models offer a certain rigor and elegance while 
their postulates hold, they inevitably fail to explain the 
complexity of human interaction and decision processes. 
Moreover, they almost insure that the needed alternatives 
will not be fully developed until "rational" decision 
makers perceive a greater potential for profit from these 
alternatives than from charging much higher prices for an 
increasingly scarce commodity.
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What we need is a theoretical framework broad enough 
to include a wide variety of variables pertinent to adop­
tion yet specific enough to allow us to make some fundamen­
tal determination of the needs for future energy policy.
We must be aware a) of the subjective nature of the deci­
sion to adopt any alternative, including people's expecta­
tions, values, and emotional and rational motivations; b) 
of the fact that these subjective variables are constrained 
by the institutional framework; and c) that individuals who 
are in positions of power will frequently use their ability 
to control rewards and sanctions to both encourage the 
adoption of those alternatives which least threaten their 
position and to perpetuate a value system which supports 
the existing institutional framework.
Synopsis
As we can see from this brief history, production in 
industrial society is inextricably tied to forms of energy 
use. The environmental movement has increasingly realized 
the importance of the way in which we use energy not only 
for quality of life considerations but also for the impacts 
which different forms of energy have on the environment.
The solutions to this problem are inherently politi­
cal. The focus of this political struggle has been primari­
ly on the most obvious, most degrading forms of energy sys­
tems —  nuclear, coal, and oil —  through attempts to stop
the building of new plants or to install pollution control 
devices on older plants. But these are only stop-gap 
measures. In the meantime, the attempts to advance 
alternatives have been stifled because so many people con­
centrate on the need to find substitutes for the large, 
centralized fossil fuel plants rather then finding ways to 
reduce the need for those fuels in the first place. The 
individual homeowners who end up using this fuel have been 
ignored because the turn-over in new homes is so slow that 
they seem to offer little hope over the short-term.
On the other hand, there are many alternatives that 
can be incorporated into either new or old homes. Such 
alternatives reduce our need for centralized production of 
energy and thus would make alternatives like co-generation 
more viable. This dissertation will focus on the way in 
which people's purchases of alternative, decentralized en­
ergy systems (active or passive solar designs, wood stoves, 
windmills, etc.) is influenced by their attitudes, values, 
and demographic characteristics. In addition, we will ex­
amine some the role of price factors, information, habit 
and other market-oriented variables to determine the rela­
tive impact of markets on the adoption process.
In order to begin to understand what variables might 
affect people's decisions, we will next, in Chapter 2, look 
at the variety of explanations of consumer behavior in 
markets. Following this, Chapter 3 examines the sociologi­
cal and social-psychological literature to determine what
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types of considerations would be appropriate to include in 
our model. In Chapter 4 we will explore the findings of 
numerous studies on the use of energy.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are the methodology chapters. 
Chapter 5 will lay out the research design of this dis­
sertation. To gather data on consumer behavior, a survey 
of homeowners was conducted in the state of New Hampshire. 
Chapter 6 will begin to explore the data for any basic dif­
ferences between those people who choose to install energy 
alternatives and those who opt for more traditional sys­
tems. In Chapter 7 we will develop logit models which will 
allow to see which variables in this study help us to un­
derstand the difference between adopters and non-adopters. 
Finally, Chapter 8 will make some conclusions about the 
viability of the general model presented in this disserta­
tion versus the traditional models of behavior explored in 
Chapters 2 and 3. We will also show how this study en­
riches our understanding of this form of behavior over the 
studies examined in Chapter 4.
CHAPTER 2
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO ADOPTION 
Introduction
Despite the important role which energy plays as a fa­
cilitator of social action and interaction processes, 
sociologists have traditionally paid it scant attention 
(Klausner, 1978). While this changed following the second 
oil price increase of 1979-80, most research efforts have 
been relegated to a diverse group of social scientists, 
engineers, physicists, and economists conducting largely 
uncoordinated research. The result has been a haphazard 
approach to the study of energy decisions which has been 
theoretically limited and, at times, unsophisticated. The 
problems which we face are not just technological or even, 
in the final analysis, economic. They are essentially so­
cial and political problems. Thus it would seem that 
sociology, and systems theory in particular, can potential­
ly provide a more focused approach to the study of energy 
decisions. It should help us to understand the complex in­
teractions of people making decisions in on-going social 
situations.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First of all, 
we shall examine three theories which attempt to explain 
consumer behavior and some of the problems with those ap-
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proaches. Since the adoption of home energy systems is es­
sentially a form of consumer behavior, these should give us 
a great deal of insight. Secondly, we shall look more 
closely at the sociological literature to see what types of 
variables we might look for to more fully explain behaviors 
which take place within social systems.
Markets
Exchange in markets is generally seen as a "more ef­
fective" mechanism for allocating goods and services to 
meet people's needs than the central planning that occurs 
in non-market economies. Without markets, someone must de­
cide the complex issues involved in any economy: what
should be produced, how resources should be allocated by 
the society, what price should be charged for various 
goods, etc. In a market these decisions are all made by 
individuals acting to further their own interests (Lind­
blom, 1977).
Since individuals freely enter into these exchanges, 
they pay prices for goods that reflect their value trade­
offs, their interests. In economic terms, the prices that 
accurately reflect people’s interests are efficiency 
prices. They reflect an individual's appraisals of the 
marginal utilities of goods. While in theory efficiency 
prices can be established by either markets or by authority 
systems (bureaucracies), this is much more easily ac-
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complished by markets. The price must inform both buyers 
and sellers of the costs at which goods and services can be 
provided. Prices which do not accurately reflect the costs 
—  i.e. the alternatives foregone —  are known as arbitrary 
prices. Such prices may deter, but not necessarily pre­
vent, producers from becoming involved in exchange.
It is possible to extrapolate from these individual 
exchanges to an ideal situation. If you imagine that in 
free exchanges each individual (both buyer and seller) en­
ters into exchange only because it is advantageous, then 
both individuals increase their satisfaction levels. Under 
appropriate conditions, a situation can be reached in which 
all mutually advantageous exchanges —  and only those ex­
changes —  are conducted. Such a situation is referred to 
as a Pareto optimum.
Given such an optimal situation, it is easy to see why 
markets are much more desirable than authority systems for 
increasing satisfaction levels in any society. The problem 
of course, is that we are seldom given such a situation. A 
variety of conditions make it impossible to attain op­
timality.
In order for such a condition to be attained, people 
must be free to enter into exchanges, there must be a large 
number of producers with no few so large that they can con­
trol market activities, these producers must be manufactur­
ing homogeneous products, and both buyers and sellers must 
have complete knowledge of market activities.
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In the real world there are many divergences from 
these prerequisites. If we look at markets as existing in 
3 areas —  labor, consumption, and production —  we realize 
that the extensive inequalities that have developed between 
producers and consumers, between producers, and among con­
sumers prevent markets from reaching a Pareto optimum. For 
example, laborers are not always free to enter into ex­
change relations with producers. In many situations, given 
the relative lack of alternatives they must sell their 
labor at a price determined by the producer. Furthermore, 
negotiations are not carried on constantly since this would 
be too costly.
Perhaps more important for our analysis, the variety 
of options open to consumers is limited through a host of 
processes. There may be little competition between pro­
ducers as a result of monopoly or, in less extreme cases, 
the domination of markets by a few producers. Furthermore, 
it is literally impossible for consumers today to be aware 
of the variety of market activities, including cost and 
quality of goods marketed or purchased.
The externalities associated with production also imp­
ly uncounted costs. The uncounted costs lead to arbitrary, 
not efficiency prices. Market systems are not able to deal 
with these problems. (Of course, authority systems have 
historically ignored such problems).
In addition, production decisions are often influenced 
by investment in research and development, taxing policies,
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and import/export quotas and tariffs, all of which are the 
product of political decisions and are thus outside the 
realm of market forces. They can alter market activities, 
investment in production, etc. (The extent to which these 
political decisions are democratic is an entirely different 
matter.)
Finally, optimality may not be attained because of 
consumer incompetence. Consumers are seen as being ra­
tionally motivated because to gain something they must give 
up something else. This leads us to a consideration of the 
basic theories of consumer motivation. To fully understand 
the behavior of markets we must move back and forth between 
macro level and micro level theories. In the next section, 
we begin to examine why individuals behave the way that
v
they do in economic realms.
Models of Consumer Behavior
There are three fundamental ways to explain consumer 
behavior. The first of these views the consumer as 
sovereign, as independently making decisions based on his 
or her values, and as being the driving force of produc­
tion. The second, which we shall call here the manipulated 
consumer, sees the consumer as subject to the influence of 
advertising and other corporate activities. The final 
view, that of structured consumption, sees consumer behav­
ior as being a reaction to the alternatives that are made
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available by a particular form of production. Certainly 
these are ideal types. Reality probably lies somewhere in 
between these different points of view. But before we try 
to develop a synthesis it is probably best to examine each 
of these in turn.
Consumer sovereignty. The basic assumption of neoclassical 
economic theory is that consumers, under budget con­
straints, act rationally to maximize the subjective utility 
associated with their behavior. People’s economic choices 
are motivated by a desire to gain something. But the indi­
vidual must act rationally because in order to gain some­
thing of value one must give up something else. Scitovsky 
points out that unless one is rich, it is impossible to 
fully satisfy all of your needs. The consumer must see to 
it that "any extra dollar [spent] on one thing yields as 
much satisfaction as if [spent] on another. If this were 
not so, a little rearrangement of spending patterns could 
yield more satisfaction at no cost" (1976:4) Not only is 
this the "cornerstone of economic theory and a faithful 
description of rational choice...[it is] the basis for our 
expectation that market prices correctly reflect what con­
sumers want..." (1976:10). Supply and demand schedules are 
the statistical outcomes of these aggregated decisions. 
Production levels in market soc-ieties should theoretically 
be geared to these schedules.
In this perspective, purchases will not be made by
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consumers unless those purchases satisfy some basic need. 
Needs, in turn, are regarded as always existing. Sales in 
the market occur because the demand for a product, rooted 
in these basic needs, exists or is at least latently await­
ing activation.
This approach to decision making has been formalized 
in Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEU). According to 
Simons (1981) there are a number of assumptions which un­
derlie this theory. SEU assumes that decision makers have 
a well defined set of alternatives from which to choose, 
that they have a well defined utility function (i.e., that 
they can hierarchically rank all of their wants or needs 
and assign to each a specific valuation), that they can as­
sign a joint probability distribution to all future sets of 
events, and that the decision maker will select the 
alternative which will maximize the expected outcome in 
terms of the utility function.
Information about consumers can be inferred: a) if we 
assume that consumers make choices in order to maximize a 
utility function, and b) if we can assume a form for that 
function (Dinan, 1987). The specific form of that utility 
function will be affected by the discount rate —  the will­
ingness of a consumer to invest in, e.g., energy conserva­
tion technologies. The discount rate reveals the rate of 
return which a consumer feels is necessary in order to un­
dertake an investment in conservation (Dinan, 1987). A 
lower rate indicates a willingness to invest. We shall
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return to this issue later.
There are a number of criticisms leveled at this ap­
proach. First, as Dinan (1987) points out, consumers do 
not necessarily make choices in a manner consistent with 
the theory -- i.e., they do not necessarily compare all 
alternatives based simply on the expected utility. They 
may, instead, come to their decisions by comparing goods 
one dimension at a time rather than by comparing the entire 
unit.
Goods should be seen as bundles of properties or char­
acteristics. As Lancaster (1979) argues, consumers are 
only interested in goods because they possess properties or 
characteristics which the consumer finds desirable. It 
used to be assumed that the utility of a good was a simple 
product of the addition of all of the characteristics of 
the good. But you can only assume linearity and additivity 
of traits when goods are divisible —  i.e., when they can 
be consumed in any quantity. Additivity assumptions are 
inappropriate when goods can only be consumed in fixed 
sizes; when they are indivisible.
This presents certain problems for this approach since 
a recognition of this difference makes decision more dif­
ficult. For divisible goods, consumers only need to know 
the quantity of characteristics per unit. However, for in­
divisible goods, consumers need to know the ratio of char­
acteristics (Lancaster, 1979). This assumes a complicated 
calculus on the part of the consumer.
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When the consumer subjectively decides that all of the 
available alternatives offer different, and valued, charac­
teristics, then he or she will probably select only a sub­
set of all the possible traits for comparison. If the to­
tal number of options is too large, the consumer may over­
react and attempt to minimize the number of traits to be 
considered and select the first alternative which meets 
some minimum standard. The degree of active reasoning in­
volved, or the extent of the search for information, will 
thus be subject in part to the amount of product differen­
tiation.
A second factor leading to what market researchers 
refer to as extended problem solving is the salience of the 
purchase; the degree to which the purchase reflects on 
one's self image or the amount of social pressure, both of 
which may raise the amount of involvement in the decision 
process. Finally, extended problem solving necessitates 
sufficient time to seek out information. Of course, all of 
these factors —  involvement, differentiation, and time 
pressure —  are present to greater or lesser degrees.
Thus, decision making which is a product of these factors 
runs the gamut from a total lack of active reasoning (for 
routing decision making) to extended problem solving.
Individuals are also likely to seek out information if 
there is a perceived risk involved. More contemporary 
elaboration of SEU theory recognizes that people make deci­
sions under conditions of uncertainty. Risk will be higher
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if: there is a high price; the length of the commitment 
(such as a house purchase) is long; the purchase is con­
spicuous —  i.e., it is more visible or there is social 
pressure to make the right decision; there are greater 
potential harmful effects; or the decision will have im­
pacts on subsequent decisions.
Other conditions affect the desire to seek out in­
formation. If information appears to be readily available, 
consumers are more likely to attempt to incorporate it into 
their decision. Finally, a person's confidence in his or 
her decision making ability has an impact. If a consumer 
is confident that he or she can judge or evaluate brands, 
then they are more likely to seek out information.
Market research points out that all of this is 
mediated by personality characteristics, family roles, and 
demographic variables. Personality traits would include 
open-mindedness, cognitive capacity, or the confidence in 
one's ability to control the environment. Family role 
structures would incorporate such variables as one's con­
cern for the welfare of a spouse or children or sex (women 
search more for durable goods than men). Demographic char­
acteristics include age, permanence or transience, etc.
At some point the marginal utility of additional in­
crements of information is reduced. The added costs of ac­
cumulating more data will add little to the reduction of 
risk. Therefore, it is no longer rational to seek out in­
formation. Alternatively, information overload may inhibit
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buying by leading the consumer to disregard pertinent in­
formation.
While these considerations make SEU a more compli­
cated, more elaborate approach, there are still numerous 
problems. In the first place, these models assume that 
price always measures both scarcity and value, but price 
cannot distinguish between "natural" effects on supply (or 
demand) and those that arise from policy. In other words, 
price may reflect a relationship between supply and demand, 
but it does not take into consideration the fact that ei­
ther of these may reflect a variety of government policies 
rather than any absolute resource depletions. This does not 
pose a problem for markets, but it raises important issues 
with regard to the development of energy substitutes, since 
it is entirely possible for policy decisions to keep price 
at a lower level than it might otherwise be, given the 
real levels of scarcity.
In addition, differential funding for research and de­
velopment, primarily the result of political decisions, af­
fects the ability of different market sectors to compete 
with each other. Many of the externalities associated with 
production, especially with regard to centralized energy 
systems, are not recognized by the market. We also cannot 
rely on the market to allocate goods in socially optimal 
fashion.
This approach also assumes that on the macro level all 
of the information which people need is available. There
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is an additional assumption that all values can be ex­
pressed in terms of price. Values which cannot be ex­
pressed in such a manner are irrational and pose a threat 
to the market.
Simons elaborates upon the fundamental weakness of 
this model. Can we assume, as SEU does, that a decision 
maker, in one comprehensive view, can contemplate the con­
sequences of a wide variety of alternatives over all pos­
sible future states of affairs and that he or she can as­
sign a preference to all of these possible outcomes? Is it 
logical to assume that a decision maker has reconciled or 
balanced all conflicting values and incorporated them into 
a utility function? Can we also assume that all values can 
be expressed in terms of price? Furthermore, should we 
simply finesse, as SEU does, the origins of values as well 
as the way in which information, upon which people rely to 
develop their preferences, is disseminated?
In summary, the consumer is seen as having an ordered 
structure of preferences, and she enters into market rela­
tions with the intent of maximizing outcomes. But can we 
argue that this takes place independently of investment de­
cisions made by producers? Do prices reflect merely the 
values of consumers or are many price factors outside the 
realm of consumer activity? For example, to what extent 
are purchases made by producers subject to the constraints 
of consumers? Certainly such activity affects price, but 
at the very least it is subject to market forces other than
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consumer values as reflected in their purchase. The next 
sections begin to address the more relevant questions of 
how much sovereignty exists and to what degree preferences 
are structured.
Manipulated consumption. Market researchers argue that 
consumer influence and persuasion is a socially legitimate 
activity because the consumer sets the agenda for the 
entire process and is ultimately free to make his or her 
own choices. For example, one text argues:
"...a purchase will never be made unless un­
derlying needs (or motives) are activated. Buying 
action is stimulated only when an alternative is 
viewed positively in terms of need satisfaction.
The marketer cannot create the basic need."
(Engel, et al., 1986: 53)
On the other hand, Lindblom (1977) argues that ac­
tivities in markets have become increasingly susceptible to 
the decisions of bureaucracies. Admittedly there is a cir­
cularity in markets that is difficult to deny. Consumers 
are not buying things that they do not want. Similarly, 
producers cannot produce goods without some consideration 
for what people desire. At the same time, producers cannot 
be subject to the vageuries of consumer whims. To a certain 
extent, they must try to convince consumers that their pro-
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duct is somehow more desirable than others. Frequently, 
though, advertising has a more pervasive, more insidious, 
role.
Advertising can be seen as playing a dual role. The 
first is to give consumers information to persuade them to 
purchase one product over another. In this way, advertising 
is filling a role that is absolutely essential for markets 
to operate. Of course, the accuracy of this information is 
often questionable. Misleading of consumers through prac­
tices of omission is frequent, especially given the com­
plexity of modern industrial societies.
The second role of advertising, however, may be to 
create a need where none exists. The proliferation of triv­
ial goods reflects this tendency. Of course, such persua­
sion has limited success. The fact that 80% of new products 
fail demonstrates that consumer wants are finite.
But the net effect of advertising is the creation of a 
consumer culture (Ewen, 1976). Rosenberg (1976) argues that 
there has been "a radical transformation of attitudes 
towards consumption and savings". This is reflected in the 
recent explosion of consumer debt and the low percentage of 
savings in the United States.
According to Lancaster (1979), it is generally assumed 
that the variations in taste and preferences are real and 
are important because consumers believe themselves to be 
better off when they have a product which fits exactly their 
ideal means of meeting a need. Problems arise when three
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conditions are present: when there is variety in prefer­
ences, when there is potential variety (depending on tech­
nology) , and when there are economies of scale of produc­
tion. Problems occur because a change which brings ef­
ficiency, in the form of lower prices for the consumer, by 
reducing variety introduces problems of equity by making 
some people better off while making others worse off.
Scitovsky’s (1976) lucid analysis of the consumer cul­
ture explores the psychological dimensions of this 
phenomenon. He says that since economists see people as the 
final arbiter of their own fates, they have ruled out as a 
logical possibility any conflict between what a people 
choose to get and what will satisfy them. Economists be­
lieve that: 1) consumers are free to follow their own 
tastes, independent of others, and 2) that the market can 
accommodate consumer tastes all of the time.
The first statement, he says, ignores the fact that 
tastes can be influenced by "example, custom, suggestions, 
consistently change by...experience, modified by changing 
prices and the availability of some satisfactions and the 
unavailability of others" (1976:5). Moreover, even our 
ability to derive satisfaction may be culturally influenced.
Regarding the second point, he views the market as a 
voting machine, a plutocracy, where the rich rule by virtue 
of having more votes. But this is offset by the economies 
of scale evident in modern industrial societies —  a sort of 
mob rule where the mob is able to get what it agrees it
48
wants. Certainly advertising acts to promote this agree­
ment. But individuals also find their tastes well catered 
to if they are "conformist enough to share them with mil­
lions of others" (1976:10).
The problem, he says, is that people have competing 
needs. He consolidates the motivational forces identified 
by some behavioral psychologists —  relief of discomfort, 
stimulation to relieve boredom, and the pleasures that can 
accompany and reinforce both —  into two areas: want satis­
faction (relief of pain) and pleasure. Economists do not 
distinguish between the two in their central concept of con­
sumer satisfaction. Satisfaction is simply inferred from 
purchases. The problem is that the net effect of mass pro­
duction is the reduction of novelty leading to a reduced 
ability on the part of consumers to meet their real needs 
for stimulation. Furthermore, advertising, in conjunction 
with education and other socializing agents, convinces 
people that what they want is comfort. Since products which 
increase comfort are also what are most available, then what 
appears to be positive, comfort-seeking behavior may be a 
simple response to the types of products made available 
through mass production.
Scitovsky extrapolates from this to a critique of our 
economic measures of well being. Stimulus-related products 
typically provide satisfaction to more than just the con­
sumer. Comforts, on the other hand, do not usually carry as 
many external benefits and frequently generate negative ex­
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ternalities through greater reliance on industrial technol­
ogy. Thus, the consumption of a comfort product as opposed 
to a stimulus product, if they are priced the same, may pro­
vide the same amount of satisfaction to the consumer but 
they do not necessarily provide the same total satisfaction 
to the society. Therefore, statements that a rising GNP 
demonstrates a net gain in satisfaction is a logical leap 
that requires that we assume a Pareto optimum (and the asso­
ciated prerequisites: competition, a free flow of informa­
tion, free entry into exchanges, etc.). In addition, many 
of the indicators of satisfaction {self-sufficiency, work 
satisfaction, etc.) are non-economic and unmeasured. Values 
other than those measured in the market are considered to be 
of less significance (Cottrell, 1955).
In a somewhat analogous criticism, Lasch (1978) argues 
that many patterns of consumption are a product of narcis­
sism in contemporary society. Narcissism, in the Freudian 
sense in which Lasch employs the term, implies not self-love 
but self-hate. To satisfy feelings of worthlessness, people 
consume more, identify with famous figures, etc. Since his 
analysis traces these feelings of lack of self-worth to the 
fact that individuals have ceded control over their lives to 
bureaucracies, it nevertheless points out that consumption 
is affected by cultural considerations.
This, then, leads us back to the basic point. To what 
extent are consumers sovereign actors in markets? Scitovsky 
says that they are free to choose from among a basket of
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goods but that they are not able to choose what those goods 
will be. Similarly, Schnaiberg (1980) argues that we cannot 
see the behavior of consumers as autonomous from the discre­
tionary investment and production decisions of industrial 
bureaucracies.
Furthermore, besides the direct manipulation of con­
sumers through production decisions in conjunction with ad­
vertising and the creation of a consumer economy, there are 
other factors which structure consumption for groups of con­
sumers. Ewen (1976) points out (in keeping with the 
Weberian view of power) that consumption is a major factor 
in class stratification in contemporary society. While this 
adds credence to Scitovsky*s argument —  since mass produc­
tion is designed to give the masses the products of the 
wealthy which they so covet —  it also leads to our final 
view of consumer behavior.
Structured consumption. The radical view goes beyond an 
analysis of either consumer or producer sovereignty to exam­
ine the structural factors which constrain both the market 
and the consumption capabilities of individuals. According 
to Gintis this view incorporates two assumptions:
"the choice set of socially feasible options 
in the areas of work, technology, and public 
policy...is constrained to those compatible with 
the reproduction of the social relations of capi-
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talist production [and]...observed consumer behav­
ior in capitalist society is a rational reaction to 
the structure of available alternatives for social 
activity open to the individual." (1972: 267)
Let us focus for a moment on one major constraint on 
consumer action, that of income. Scitovsky's view would be 
that wealthier consumers tend to exercise a disproportion­
ate influence on patterns of production since they are pro­
duct innovators and they shape the consumer aspirations of 
the other classes. The radical view, however, would hold 
that since the income of the masses is wage income, it is 
determined by the class relations of production, something 
well outside of the realm of consumer sovereignty 
(Schnaiberg, 1980). This theory holds that "the basic 
spheres of social activity...are alienated in the sense 
that their historical development does not reflect even the 
manifest preferences of individuals affected by their oper­
ation" (Gintis, 1972:210).
In the neo-classical tradition, exchange values are 
primarily determined by use values (given certain con­
straints of resources and technology). According to this 
approach, since exchange values influence the process of 
investment and the resultant production capacity, they be­
come "essential determinants of use values" (Gintis, 1972: 
275) .
Gintis goes on to describe the two mechanisms which he
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sees as bringing capacity development into line with the 
prerequisites of capitalist reproduction: associative and
cybernetic patterning. Both of these operate through the 
structure of available alternatives. The first refers to 
the fact that people derive satisfaction from those things 
to which they are consistently exposed. Individuals also 
"prefer" those goods and services which are highly avail­
able (and thus have a low exchange value).
But, Gintis continues, individuals are also goal 
oriented creatures. They are capable of "conscious pro­
grams of self-development", by which he means activities of 
an educational nature. These activities, however, are 
limited both by the costs of acquiring skills or knowledge 
as well as by the "expected future structure of 
availabilities". Thus, once again, people’s preferences 
are shaped by the relative availability of goods.
While this cybernetic patterning is a crucial concept, 
Gintis's approach seems too limited. The argument which he 
makes fall short of a traditional Marxist approach. While 
individuals are creatures of habit and goal-oriented, they 
are also creative. A cybernetic approach must imply not 
only that individuals regulate behavior to accomplish norm- 
atively prescribed goals, but that they can also set goals. 
While the social situation may set the objective conditions 
under which decisions are made, we must also be aware that 
subjective interpretations also have importance.
This has not been the concern of traditional, "offi-
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cial", Marxist analysis. Traditionally it has been assumed 
that objective conditions determine consciousness, and 
there has been a dismissal of the concern over false con­
sciousness. True class consciousness would inevitably 
arise out of objective structural conditions. The early 
Frankfurt school, however, called this assumption into 
question. The rise of the interventionist state, the in­
creased rationalization of social institutions, and the 
reification of consciousness would all hinder the develop­
ment of class consciousness. For our purposes, this points 
to a need to examine more fully the ways that subjective 
interpretation of situations can be affected by social in­
stitutions and culture. To an extent, this is the strength 
of the adoption of innovations framework.
The Adoption of Innovations
The focus of the adoption-of-innovations research has 
centered primarily on: a) the psychological character­
istics of people who adopt at different stages (Rogers, 
1962; 1983); b) where adopters get their information, i.e., 
the relative impact of the media, of models, or of personal 
communications at different stages of the adoption process 
(Rogers, 1962; 1976; Singh and Pareek, 1965); and, more 
recently, c) the impact of values (e.g., profit motivation 
versus environmental concern) on adoption (Pampel and Van 
Es, 1977).
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In all of these analyses, the theoretical perspective 
of Rogers and his associates forms the basic approach. 
Rogers regards adoption as goal-oriented behavior, which 
involves effort, and which takes place in situations that 
are normatively regulated. Adoption also has four key ele­
ments: an innovation, communication, in a system, over
time. The adoption process is also a mental process.
While cultural norms may constrain innovativeness, all 
adoption still involves a decision-making process in which 
individuals must observe and analyze behavior, decide on a 
course of action, take it and then analyze the con­
sequences .
This process is broken down into a number of stages. 
The first stage of this process involves awareness. Fol­
lowing the development of interest in an innovation, people
will seek out information. They will then evaluate the in­
formation to determine whether the advantages outweigh the 
disadvantages. The trial stage follows the evaluation of 
the innovation and, if it is successful, frequently results 
in adoption.
Rogers sees awareness as a fairly passive stage of the 
adoption process. It is frequently the result of an acci­
dent. This is more likely to be true of innovations of 
farm technology than it is of the adoption of technologies 
designed to avert scarcity. In the latter cases, it would 
seem that emotions are important arousers of interest.
While impersonal information is important at the
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awareness stage, personal communication, involving two-way 
exchanges, are more important at the evaluation stage.
Such personal communications are to influence behavior as 
well as ideas. They seem to be more important in overcom­
ing apathy or outright resistance. There is also, accord­
ing to these studies, little evidence that lack of knowl­
edge affects adoption. Rather, selective exposure (result­
ing from past experiences, values and psychological charac­
teristics) has an effect upon the relationship between 
awareness and adoption. Innovators, for example, have more 
favorable attitudes toward new ideas.
A variety of other factors also influence the adoption 
of innovations. The perception of some advantage relative 
to other types of technology is very important. Relative 
advantage includes more that just initial cost. It should 
also include the length of the payback period, tax incen­
tives which may alter cost considerations, etc. Adoption 
is also affected by a number of other factors: the degree
of compatibility with the adopters’ values, the complexity 
of the technology (how difficult it is to understand and 
use), and the amount of risk (economic, physical, mechani­
cal, or social-psychological uncertainties) perceived as 
being associated with the innovation. The extent to which 
an innovation may be tried on a limited basis (divisibil­
ity) or the extent to which the results can be disseminated 
easily (communicability) also effect the rate of adoption 
(Rogers, 1972; Shama, 1981).
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While the perception of advantage is important, rela­
tive advantage may also be emphasized by crisis. In addi­
tion, the perceived seriousness of the need can also be an 
indicator of advantage.
Rogers sees this process as proceeding from the top 
down. The first innovators are truly venturesome individu­
als, but the early adopters who come after them are the 
opinion leaders in the community. Coming from higher 
socio-economic backgrounds, they frequently adopt innova­
tions in an attempt to increase their status in the com­
munity. Rogers envisions a two-step flow of communication. 
These early adopters are influenced by change agents 
(professionals who act as communication links) and then in 
turn these opinion leaders influence the rest of the com­
munity. Following these early adopters, the early majority 
adopters tend to adopt in a very deliberate manner, seeking 
out as much information as they can find and going through 
a very elaborate decision process. The late majority adop­
ters are individuals who were at first very skeptical and 
wait to see how well others do with the innovation. Final­
ly, there are the laggards, people with very traditional 
orientations who are extremely hesitant to try something 
new.
As successful as this framework has been in explaining 
the adoption of innovations, it still has its drawbacks and 
its critics, especially with reference to solar energy in­
novation. Shama (1981) points out that while the diffusion
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theorists see solar innovations as simply another service 
which is provided to consumers, social change theorists 
feel that it is an expression of changing American values. 
The latter argue that Americans, in the face of increasing 
inability to meet material needs, are opting for a simpler 
lifestyle. Shama argues, though, that the diffusion liter­
ature provides a valuable framework for policy makers and 
that early research can facilitate the adoption process.
Foster (1973) enumerates the variety of cultural and 
social barriers which might impede the diffusion of innova­
tions. Traditionalism, ethnicity, pride, modesty, reli­
gion, etc., may all hinder adoption. Social barriers like 
group solidarity, public opinion, factionalism, vested in­
terests, or competing loci of authority (family, political 
structure, etc.) may retard diffusion. Finally, caste, 
class, political structure or other social structural char­
acteristics may hinder the spread of innovations. But 
seldom are these characteristics specifically addressed in 
the adoption of energy technologies.
Rogers also takes into consideration a number of meth­
odological and theoretical weaknesses found in adoption 
studies, pointing out why they have developed and providing 
some solutions. The first of these is the fact that re­
search on innovations tends to have a pro-innovation bias. 
Most research assumes that the innovation should be dif­
fused. For a number of reasons, a bias of this type is un­
derstandable: historically we have studied those innova­
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tions which were profitable; the act of innovation is laden 
with positive values; the research has often been funded by 
change agents; and successful diffusions can be studied 
retroactively (Rogers, 1983).
However, this bias limits the range of studies that 
are undertaken. We frequently ignore the study of ig­
norance of innovations, underemphasize the rejection of in­
novations, overlook reinvention, and ignore the anti­
diffusion programs that often develop to prevent the spread 
of bad diffusions. As a result, we know more about: a) 
rapidly diffusing innovations than about slowly diffusing 
innovations; b) adoption than rejection; and c) continuance 
rather than discontinuance (Rogers, 1983).
To solve this problem, it is necessary that we conduct 
studies at more than one point in time. This would allow 
us to learn more about the long-term consequences of any 
innovation. Secondly, we must exercise caution in selec­
ting innovations and do more comparative studies; we must 
look, e.g., at other innovations that have failed in the 
same context as the one that succeeds. Next, we must be 
careful not to assume that an innovation is right for 
everyone all of the time. For some people, rejection may 
be a rational decision. We must be cued in to the particu­
lar needs and problems of individuals that are peculiar to 
their situation. Fourth, we must examine the broader con­
text of innovation: how decisions that something should be 
diffused are made; how policies affect diffusion; how in-
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novations are related; and how it was decided to conduct 
the research and development. Finally, we must also in­
crease our understanding of motivations for adoption or 
non-adoption (Rogers, 1983).
The second major criticism of diffusion research 
pointed out by Rogers is the bias toward blaming individu­
als when diffusion proceeds slowly. The tendency, critics 
point out, is to side with the agency promoting the innova­
tion. To an extent, this is evident in the types of vari­
ables that are employed. While some may look for system 
failure —  e.g., the amount of contact between change 
agents and adopters —  the majority of variables —  educa­
tion, income, mass media exposure, etc. —  are designed to 
measure the success or failure of the individuals within 
the system, not the system itself. This is also evident in 
the fact that blame is often placed on "laggards" or "late 
adopters", people who are seen as irrational, dogmatic, 
resistant to change. The problem may as readily be seen as 
a system problem —  e.g., a self-fulfilling prophecy creat­
ed by the failure of change agents to contact potential 
laggards.
Again, there are a variety of reasons for this prob­
lem. To a degree, the individual blame bias is picked up 
by researchers from change agents. On the other hand, re­
searchers may feel that there is nothing they can do to 
change the system, so why not focus attention on the indi­
vidual. Individuals are more accessible and, if the indi-
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vidual is the unit of response (to an innovation), then 
perhaps they should be the unit of analysis.
Solutions to this problem primarily involve caution in 
setting up your research design. Keep an open mind about 
the causes of success or failure. Be sure that all partic­
ipants are involved, including potential adopters. Final­
ly, more structural variables should be included. Who owns 
and controls the research and development industry? Who 
controls communication systems? Such inquiries will vastly 
broaden our understanding of the success or failure of the 
diffusion process (or the evaluation of an innovation).
Rogers also deals briefly with a few other problems 
evident in the literature. Studies primarily rely on re­
call data. Such information will vary with the innovations 
salience, with the length of time that elapses between the 
adoption and the study, and with individual differences 
such as education, memory, etc. To compensate, researchers 
should rely more upon field experiments, longitudinal panel 
studies, archival records, and case studies.
Another weakness is the fact that many studies fail to 
show how the socioeconomic benefits of diffusion are dis­
tributed. Very often, new innovations widen the gap be­
tween groups in the society.
Finally, many studies have been conducted in the de­
veloping countries, but the assumption is usually made that 
the process of diffusion will still be the same as in the 
industrialized countries; that it will follow the same S-
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shaped curve despite the lower education, income, etc. of 
the citizens of Third World nations. Studies also assume 
that nations must pass through the same process of develop­
ment as the industrialized nations. The dominant paradigm 
of western development has maintained that economic growth 
takes place through industrialization and urbanization with 
capital-intensive, labor-saving technologies and central­
ized planning. Accordingly, problems of development lie 
with the developing nations rather than with the system. 
Researchers must attempt to understand the socio-cultural 
systems within which adoption takes place.
This leads us to a consideration of the apolitical na­
ture of this approach. On the one hand, it tends to not 
take into consideration the conflicting norms in any 
society. On the other, it fails to see that policy may 
reflect these conflicts of interest. This is partly a pro­
duct of its failure to take social structural conditions 
directly into account. For example, norms are deemed im­
portant (since they constrain innovators and influence the 
evaluation stage of the adoption process) but they are not 
usually explicitly included in the analysis.
Lauer (1977) expands on this by pointing to the fact 
that adoption may be hindered not only by social barriers 
but also by conflicts of interest. He says it is not 
enough to simply argue that increases in communication may 
create confusion. Rather,
"we need to take more account of conflict and
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contradiction within social systems. A system 
does not simply have norms that favor innovation 
or norms that favor the status quo; systems may 
contain diverse and conflicting norms because 
they have diverse groups with conflicting inter­
ests... we must recognize the existence of con­
flicting interests, so that the innovation which 
will be advantageous to some will be dis­
advantageous to others." (1977: 173-174)
Finally, this framework fails to apply directly to 
the adoption of energy technologies. For innovations which 
entail a large initial investment, trialability is im­
possible. The only means by which people can try out an in­
novation is vicariously. This makes modeling (which here is 
used to refer to the observation of the behavior of others) 
and information much more important at every stage of adop­
tion than it might be for other forms of innovation.
The following sections develop a more flexible approach 
to human behavior, one which falls somewhere in between the 
idea of manipulated consumption and structured consumption 
but draws heavily on the adoption of innovations framework. 
This synthesis will view actors as creative interpreters in 
established, regulated, structured social situations.
First, however, we will digress briefly for a sociological 
explanation of how those structures arise.
Chapter 3
SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO DECISIONS 
Introduction
The previous chapter explored the issue of decision­
making from the perspective of market research and econom­
ics as well as through the viewpoint of the diffusion of 
innovations. In this chapter we will first look at the 
elements of sociological theory which seem to be necessary 
if we are to enlarge upon these previous frameworks. Fol­
lowing this, we will consider the micro level theory con­
cerning attitudes and behavior from a more sociological 
perspective. Finally, we will present a preliminary model 
of the approach to be used in this dissertation.
Toward a Sociological Model of Decisions
Since the starting point of our analysis must be an 
on-going social system, we must first examine exactly what 
is meant by this term. Societies are bounded systems of 
interacting individuals. The action possibilities of these 
actors are constrained by rules and regulations. It is 
conceivable that there could be as many different modes of 
behavior as there are situations in which people interact.
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That this is not the case is indicative of the fact that 
behaviors become, to some extent, stereotyped, or con 
strained, by the rules of the society. Thus, certain modes 
of behavior, linked to particular situations, become ex­
pected and repetitive. They become recognized by individu­
als as the most common patterns of behavior or standards, 
conformity to which may be enforced through the use of pos­
itive or negative sanctions. When these repetitive modes 
of behavior are found to apply to different populations 
over time, i.e. when they become relatively invariant and 
independent of the specific actors, we refer to social 
structure.
The most prevalent, permanent and organized of these 
repetitive modes of behavior are institutions. They are 
systems which structure or organize human action. They 
consist of sets of social relationships which link actors 
having common goals to particular issues or activities.
They guide behavior through the development of a division 
of labor, patterns of decision making, and the distribution 
of resources —  along with the associated rights and 
privileges —  among actors (Baumgartner, et al., 1977).
The development of a given order is the result of a 
variety of macro-level structuring factors. These include 
the material conditions of the society (geography and tech­
nology) as well as the cultural and ideational conditions, 
which influence the types of activities which are accept­
able and the rewards or outcomes of action. These may be
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seen as simply inherent in the system or as the result of 
the deliberate planning and action of individuals. Human 
action and its indirect consequences may lead to the 
restructuring of the society.
The control of resources is crucial to this last fac­
tor. Unequal control over resources may grant individuals 
or groups a disproportionate ability to structure their en­
vironment. This control may result from a variety of fac­
tors: environmental considerations may make crucial
resources more available to one group than to another, nat­
ural capabilities may be unevenly distributed, the norma­
tive structuring of the system may grant structuring capa­
bility to some actors to assure the efficient functioning 
of the system, or conflict may result in the achievement of 
unequal control by one group.
In any event, this initial difference in resource con­
trol is cumulative, i.e. it offers further opportunity for 
additional control. The inequality allows some actors the 
ability to take advantage of new opportunities, to prevent 
or control attempts by other actors to gain control, and to 
generally structure themselves and their surrounding en­
vironment in such a way that they can facilitate the at­
tainment of their goals.
This power amplification may be especially effective 
when these initial differences can be turned into meta­
power. This concept refers to the ability of individuals 
to manipulate or change the matrix of behavioral expecta­
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tions —  the "rules of the game" —  as well as the distri­
bution of resources, rewards, and the overall cultural 
orientation. This is not the same as power. The Weberian 
sense of power refers to the ability of actors to influence 
actors within a given institutional framework. Meta-power 
is the ability to actually structure the framework within 
which action takes place (Baumgartner, et al. 1977).
Lukes (1974) discusses three different views of power. 
The first, one-dimensional power, refers to the actual ex­
ercise of power where individuals or groups are seen as 
having the ability to win our over others in political con­
tests because of the resources that they bring to the 
situation. The two dimensional view of power goes beyond 
this behavioral approach by recognizing that attempts by 
the powerful to control decision-making are not necessarily 
limited to actual political contests but may be evidenced 
through nondecision-making, "a decision that results in 
suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge 
to the values or interests of the decision-maker"
(1974:18).
The three-dimensional view sees the exercise of power 
as more insidious. It prevents people "from having 
grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and 
preferences in such a way that they accept their role in 
the existing nature of things" (1974:24) thus maintaining 
the bias of the system. In addition, this bias is 
maintained "not only through a series of individually
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chosen acts, but also, more importantly, by the socially 
structured and culturally patterned behavior of groups, and 
practices of institutions" (1974:22).
The ability of actors to use any initial advantage to 
attract other actors and resources away from the less ad­
vantaged in order to structure the institutional framework 
is limited by a number of factors. These might include: 
the extent to which there is an increasing surplus avail­
able, the legitimation of differential accumulation in in­
heritance rules, the development of consciousness and orga­
nization or control over resources by weaker actors, pat­
terns of immigration or emigration, and by the availability 
of alternatives or the development of new and important 
resources.
Of course, we still need some means of understand­
ing how this process operates on the micro level. We need 
to know how rewards influence behavior, how people arrive 
at decisions, etc. Simons (1981) argues for an alternative 
to SEU theory which he refers to as bounded rationality.
He says that while people are certainly motivated to fill 
needs, they are not capable of consistently maximizing 
their behavioral outcomes. Bounded rationality is a means 
by which people with our mental capacities are able to ar­
rive at decisions. The mechanisms of this approach include 
1) some way of focusing attention, 2) a means of generating 
alternatives, and 3) a capability of acquiring facts and 
drawing information. It is to a model of this type —  a
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sociological model —  that we now turn.
Symbolic Interaction and Social Learning
In order to emphasize the constructive, emergent na­
ture of human action, Shibutani (1968) employs symbolic in­
teraction as the basis of a cybernetic approach to motiva­
tion. In symbolic interaction, the objective reality of 
the external environment constrains human action, but indi­
viduals selectively perceive that environment and their 
reactions are creative responses to the subjectively 
meaningful aspects of that environment.
Mead's (193 4) basic unit of analysis is the act. In­
dividuals respond to an on-going environment by actively 
interpreting the situation and acting toward others on the 
basis of that interpretation. The first stage of the act 
is to be found in an impulse, a lack of effective integra­
tion with or adaptation to environmental circumstances. 
Sensory cues play an important part in redirecting and 
channeling activity. Not all cues are perceived, however. 
Perception is highly selective and may be a function of the 
impulse (Shibutani, 1968) as well as a person's values.
Mead argues that any activity or object is approached 
with a set of expectations, which may also affect our per­
ceptions. The development of these expectations is, to a 
large extent, the result of our interaction with others and 
with our environment. The process of role playing and role
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taking work to increase our understanding of these expecta­
tions. The process is facilitated by the use of language 
which allows us to anticipate the responses of others.
In Mead's analysis, there are many similarities to the 
social learning of Bandura (1962:1977). This might not be 
readily apparent since Bandura is so interested in the role 
of reinforcers, as were Watson and other classical behav- 
iorists, theorists who espouse theoretical frameworks which 
are strongly criticized by Mead. But Bandura is not inter­
ested in reinforcers in the traditional way. In classical 
Stimulus- Response theory, reinforcers act "backwards" to 
strengthen response.
Singleman (1973) points out that the concept of self, 
which includes the organized responses to the expectations 
of others, is complementary to the concept of social rein­
forcers. More importantly, individuals do not have to be 
reinforced for their own behavior in order to learn. They 
may also learn from the experience of others. Rewards may 
act, then, to facilitate learning anticipatorily. As with 
Mead, attention may be shaped by values or needs. Per­
ceived rewards do not strengthen behavior directly but 
serve as cues for proper behavior.
Bandura believes that learning is a more complex pro­
cess than we are frequently led to believe. Due to the na­
ture of many studies of learning, in laboratories with rats 
and pigeons, we have come to equate learning with response. 
However, it is also dependent upon an individual's imaginal
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and verbal rehearsing. A model's response to cues leads to 
internal images which may be called upon even in the ab­
sence of rewards. Social agents are important sources of 
patterns of behavior. By observing the outcomes of other's 
actions, people may vicariously learn behavior. They de­
velop hypotheses concerning proper behavior. But the 
model's behavior must be within the perceptory and motor 
capacity of the observer. Verbal labels act to facilitate 
this process (Shaw and Costanzo, 1970).
Mead also says that on the basis of our expectations, 
we develop hypotheses. These are tested and their validity 
or invalidity is established through manipulation. 
Hypotheses which prove to be valid will be stored in our 
memory (meaning). The meaning of any object is the manner 
in which people are predisposed to act toward it. Meanings 
are "stable relationships between an organism and a class 
of objects" (Shibutani, 1968:332). If our hypotheses prove 
to be invalid, meanings will be changed.
Bandura takes essentially the same approach. Motor 
reproduction involves the cognitive reorganization of pos­
sible responses, their initiation, monitoring and refine­
ment on the basis of feedback. Rewarded responses, either 
ours or others, or their anticipation will lead to in­
creased motivation to respond in a similar manner. Motiva­
tion to respond is likely to be higher for valued outcomes. 
Mead says that outcomes that prove to be especially 
gratifying will provide the basis of these values.
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In this schema, the responses of others have an effect 
on our motivation to behave. But rewarded behavior, wheth­
er direct or vicarious, only motivates behavior through a 
process in which rewards are used as cues to anticipate 
foreseeable outcomes. This cognitive process, inherent in 
symbolic interaction and social learning theory, implicitly 
recognizes the importance of feedback in the development of 
our expectations and orientations. Our actions have cer­
tain outcomes which become inputs at later points in time. 
This is essential to any understanding of purposeful, goal- 
oriented systems. It also helps us to recognize how a 
diversity of behavior arises.
Mead, of course, is famous for his emphasis on the way 
in which social control is inherent in socialization. The 
meanings which we have are subject to control through the 
anticipated responses of others. Yet, what actions are 
taken varies from one culture to another as well as from 
one situation to another, depending upon the opportunities 
and the resources that are available. Shibutani says that 
"individuality is usually manifest only in situations where 
there are sanctioned alternatives" (1968: 334).
Bandura is more concerned with the development of 
novel forms of behavior and selection from among sanctioned 
alternatives. In contrast to classical S-R theory, in­
strumental learning should be regarded as response selec­
tion rather than response acquisition. Miller and Dollard 
(in Giewitz, 1969) prefer to speak in terras of response
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hierarchies. Cues may be linked to several different re­
sponses. A person will respond in the way which had un­
dergone the greatest amount of learning.
This implies an active process in which the subjective 
characteristics an individual possesses may serve as deter­
minants of any response disposition. In addition, a diver­
sity of role models may also lead to creativity and innova­
tion. The observer acquires novel responses through cogni­
tive integration of a variety of cues (Shaw and Costanzo, 
1970).
Up to this point we have been concerned primarily with 
what Mead termed reflective thought or what we might call 
response. We must also be concerned with the non-reflec- 
tive determinants of behavior. Mead sees emotions coming 
into play when the consummation of an act is prevented.
But Mowrer (1956) emphasizes the role of learned drives 
such as fear. Once fear, or any other learned drive, be­
comes connected to a particular situation or stimulus, any 
response which lessens the fear will be reinforced.
Actors may simply react to these emotions or they may 
return to reflective thought to select from among a number 
of alternative routes through imaginal and verbal rehears­
ing. Bandura also sees modeling influences as important 
emotion arousers. The affective responses of a model may 
elicit the same responses in an observer if the latter is 
confronted with the same cues (Shaw and Costanzo, 1970).
This framework sensitizes us to the variety of factors
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which may constrain behavior. Perception, values, expecta­
tions, and modeling all play a role in shaping responses. 
Price, information and other market considerations, are ac­
tually special cases of cues to which people respond.
There is, however, one final area of explanation to which 
we should now tur",
Attitudes and Behavior
We must also be concerned with the relationship be­
tween attitudes and behavior since the grass roots movement 
surrounding decentralized technologies seems to rely heavi­
ly on changing attitudes in order to facilitate adoption.
In this section we will briefly discuss the methodological 
and theoretical issues associated with studies of attitude 
and behavior.
There are two countervailing tendencies in the social 
psychology literatures. On the one hand, there is a gener­
al agreement that the correlation between attitudes and be­
havior is very low. But there is also a notable lack of
consensus regarding the exact nature of attitudes. The two
issues are most likely interrelated.
There are also two basic approaches to the concept of
attitude, both of which assume that there is a large degree
of consistency between responses over time. The first of 
these has been referred to as a probability view {DeFleur 
and Westie, 1963). The basis of this approach is that if
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attitude responses are more or less consistent, then a 
large number of responses is likely to demonstrate some 
consistency or predictability. An attitude, then is no 
more than the probability of the occurrence of a certain 
behavior. It is simply inferred from the behaviors.
The second approach, termed latent process by DeFleur 
and Westie (1963), also assumes that responses are con­
sistent but that this consistency is due to the operation 
of some underlying causal mechanism. According to this 
framework, an attitude is not just the probability of a 
response but, rather, a hypothetical variable intervening 
between stimulus and response. Attitudes mediate or con­
strain an actor's response to some attitude object.
If we assume that attitudes are no more than the prob­
ability of a response occurrence, then measurement is a 
straightforward process. However, if we assume that atti­
tudes are actually an unobservable inner mechanism, then we 
are faced with much greater difficulties of measurement. 
Partly this is due to ambiguity regarding exactly what con­
stitutes these inner mechanisms. Most theorists see them 
as having a number of components, including affective, cog­
nitive, etc. Others argue that attitudes are 
unidimensional. In either case, there are serious ques­
tions about the lack of correlation between verbal atti­
tudes and overt behavior.
To an extent, these observed inconsistencies may be 
due to methodological problems. Ehrlich (1969) says that
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while we have standardized procedures for scale construc­
tion, etc., we have not managed to develop any standardized 
means of observing behavior. More importantly, we tend to 
measure attitudes toward a class of people, but we make our 
predictions about the way in which people will behave 
toward an individual of that class. This may be, Ehrlich 
argues, a special case of fallacy of ecological correla­
tion.
Alwin (1973), says that because attitudes are not good 
predictors of behavior, researchers assume that attitudes 
are not stable, or that verbal attitudes do not measure un­
derlying attitudes, or that attitudes do not determine be­
havior. In a more sophisticated statistical analysis of 
the problem, he argues that our difficulties are due to the 
fact that our bivariate models of attitude-behavior rela­
tionships are under identified. We need to have observa­
tions of either a behavior at two points in time and an at­
titude at one point or a measurement of attitude at two 
points and behavior at one.
Sample and Warland (1973) also point out that many 
people who have weak or non-existent attitudes often 
respond as if they had a positive or negative attitude. By 
grouping these people with those who have strong attitudes, 
the observed correlations between attitude and behavior are 
weakened. They also imply that attempts to increase the 
reliability and validity of attitude measurements neces­
sitate a greater conceptual clarity.
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Whether we are concerned with the use of attitudes as 
predictors of behavior or simply with the nature of the re­
lationship between attitudes and behavior, it is essential 
that we face some important conceptual problems. The first 
is the fact that not all of the components of an attitude 
necessarily imply a behavior. Thus, as Ehrlich says, 
"without a direct assessment of the 'action potential' of 
an attitude component, the researcher's inference about the 
subject's behavior, or intentions, may be phenomenological- 
ly naive" (1969:29). To deal with this, we should empha­
size the measurement of the components of attitudes which 
do relate to behavior, such as direction and intensity. 
Furthermore, Ehrlich points out that the observed in­
consistencies may be the result of a failure on the part of 
the researcher to adequately specify the criteria which 
will be used to determine consistency. This implies the 
need to rely on concrete forms of behavior and rigorous 
statistical inference.
Perhaps most important, however, is the growing empha­
sis on intervening or moderator variables (Ehrlich, 1969; 
Sample and Warland, 1973). These include both psychologi­
cal and sociological factors: the degree to which an atti­
tude is capable of being expressed in a behavior, the will­
ingness of an individual to express an attitude, or the 
fact that the actor’s perspective or definition of the act 
may assume consistency while the researcher infers in­
consistency.
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Other extremely important considerations include the 
degree of learning, the accessibility of behavior and the 
extent of the respondent's competence. Some degree of in­
consistency may be due to the fact that while an actor may 
express a certain attitude, he or she may not know how to 
transfer this to action. To an extent, this may be due to 
"the level of direct or vicarious experience of the actor, 
if any, in such behavior situations" {Ehrlich, 1969:32). 
However, even if the subject is aware of the appropriate 
response, the opportunity, or the perceived opportunity, to 
express the behavior may not arise. Of course, even if the 
above situations are met, the actor may not be able to 
muster sufficient resources or have the skills that are 
necessary to perform the behavior.
Finally, we must also be aware of the compounding ef­
fect of situational factors. Many theorists (Fishbein, 
1965; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Triandis, 1971, 1975; Macey 
and Brown, 1983) feel that the influence of attitudes on 
behavior is mediated by structural considerations. It is 
to these more sociological models that we now turn.
A Sociological Model of Decision Making
For Fishbein (1965; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975,1976; Aj­
zen and Fishbein, 1970,1977), attitudes refer to the 
evaluation of some entity: a person, a physical object, a 
behavior, a policy, etc. (1977). An attitude "is highly
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correlated with the sum of beliefs each multiplied by its 
respective evaluation" (1970:467). Attitudes toward ac­
tions involve the evaluation of the potential outcomes of 
that action as well as the evaluation of those outcomes.
The attitude which a person holds toward an object 
will have an influence on the overall pattern of behavior 
which an individual will exhibit toward that object. On 
the other hand, it need not predict any particular action 
toward that object (1977). Rather, attitudes, in conjunc­
tion with normative beliefs, are better predictors of an 
individual's intent to perform an act, which may or may not 
be highly correlated with behavior.
Note that the attitude toward an act is also closely 
related to subjective Expected Utility. The SEU of a given 
alternative is a product of the assumed probability that a 
given act will have certain consequences multiplied by the 
value attached to that outcome. The problem with SEU as a 
theory is that it encourages one to assume that it is the 
most important precursor, and best predictor, of behavior. 
Here, in contrast, it is only one of the determinants of 
behavior (1970).
In Figure 3.1a, we see a synthesis of the basic 
Fishbein-Ajzen model. The precursors of behavioral intent 
are both the subjective attitudes which an actor holds and 
the subjective internalization of norms. Attitudes are a 
result of a person's affective orientation toward an object 
and his evaluation of that action. Subjective norms are
79
Figure 3.1


















Macey and Brown's Model
Attitude
Subjective Norm BehaviorBehavioral Intent
Past experienc
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the product of the actor's subjective understanding that 
others wish to act in a certain way as well as his motiva­
tion to comply with those wishes. Behavioral intent is 
only indirectly affected by these latter considerations.
The strength of an attitude-behavior relationship will 
depend to a large extent on the degree of correspondence, 
the intuitive consistency, between the attitude and the be­
havior on a variety of criteria: the action, the target, 
the context, and the time frame. For example, if a person 
holds an attitude toward a behavior such as the energy 
crisis, there may be general attitudes about the crisis, 
people may have very specific attitudes about specific en­
ergy systems, and these attitudes may vary with regard to 
the energy systems they would like to see in their own 
homes or the ones they would like to see for the society as 
a whole, etc.
Of course, as Fishbein and Ajzen consistently point 
out, what they are actually attempting to measure is behav­
ioral intent. The degree of correlation between intent and 
actual behavior will vary with a number of factors: the 
correspondence in the levels of specificity of measurement, 
the stability of the intention, the degree to which the be­
havior is under the control of the individual's wishes, and 
the amount of time elapsed between the measurement of the 
intent and the actual behavior (1976).
Triandis (1971; 1975) presents a more complicated 
model. He, too, argues that behavior intent is a better
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indicator of action, but behavior is also a product of past 
experience or habit and other facilitating factors. In­
tent, in turn, is a function of a) social determinants like 
norms and roles and values which develop in relationships 
with others, b) the affect attached to the behavior, and c) 
the expectations about the outcomes of the behavior. Other 
facilitating variables include the ability of the person to 
carry out the act and the perception of cues, which are 
filtered through expectations, values and needs. Cues are 
most likely to filter through if they are able to reduce 
uncertainty or if the behavior permits greater predict­
ability of the environment.
Macey and Brown (1983) attempt to incorporate aspects 
of both of these frameworks into a study of residential en­
ergy conservation practices (turning down a thermostat, 
changing the furnace filter, and exterior caulking). They 
propose to include past experience in Fishbein's model in 
order to increase its predictive capability (see figure 
3.1c). They find that intention offers little predictive 
power over and above past experience, at least for two of 
the three behaviors (nighttime setback and changing fil­
ters) . However, their model, which includes past experi­
ence, offered considerably more predictive power than the 
simpler Fishbein model.
What we need to do now is to begin to synthesize these 
variables into a model which will facilitate the organiza­
tion of our subsuquent analysis. Figure 3.2 presents such
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a model. Behavior is the product of individual character- 
stics, (e.g., attitudes, values, the subjective expected 
outcomes of specific behavior, and knowledge,), situational 
factors (general demographics), and the specific factors 
which people take into consideration in attempts to arrive 
at decisions.
Here we will argue that these latter factors include 
information from primary and secondary sources, subjective 
norms, and pricing considerations Since norms are the 
standards of behavior which people associate with situa­
tions, we will here assume that normative expectations are 
the result of the degree of exposure to behavior which an 
actor experiences. Habit or past experience can play a 
role, and the vicarious reinforcement associated with 
modeling behavior can affect specific decisions. In addi­
tion, knowledge about the viability of behaviors should af­
fect the development of novel actions.
There are strong parallels, however, between this
Figure 3.2 









model and the adoption of innovations framework. Subjec­
tive expected outcomes would include variables such as rel­
ative advantage and would be based upon communication 
(through information and modeling). Perceived complexity 
is one of a set of attitudes which may predispose persons 
to adopt an innovation. And compatibility illustrates the 
importance of values in the adoption of innovations. How­
ever, our model more directly sensitizes us to the impor­
tance of social norms for adoption. We also must be aware 
that a variety of attitudes other than just the perceived 
complexity of the innovation may be important. But most of 
all, we must be concerned with what initiates interest 
among adopters, i.e., what motivates them to be concerned 
in the first place, what cues prompt their behavior.
To test this model's explanatory capability, we should 
see how well each of these variables explains the adoption 
of innovative technologies. Before doing so, however, we 
should first determine how well other studies of the adop­





In this chapter we will survey the relevant studies on 
the adoption of energy technologies. First we will focus 
our attention on the market oriented models of adoption. 
While the majority of the research in the adoption litera­
ture has focused on the adoption of farm implements or 
similar technologies (Singh and Pareek, 1965), there has 
been a growing emphasis on the application of this frame­
work to the adoption of energy-conserving technologies, 
much of which has a direct bearing on our attempt to under­
stand the adoption of energy systems. However, as we shall 
see there are a number of drawbacks to this perspective 
which should be alleviated by the model developed in the 
previous chapter. The end of the chapter will demonstrate 
the way in which the model developed in this dissertation 
improves upon this previous work.
The Adoption of Energy Technologies
Decision Factors
Market Models and Energy Consumption. The belief 
that consumers will make rational decisions based on avail-
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able information forms the basis of many of our most promi­
nent studies of energy use. The reports of the Committee
on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems (CONAES, 1978), 
of the Harvard Business School (Stobaugh and Yergin, 1979), 
and the Mellon Foundation (Sant, 1979) all tend to assume 
that consumers are rational utility maximizers operating in 
a near perfect economic system. Others (Landsberg, 1979) 
recognize the need to reduce structural barriers and pro­
vide incentives, but these incentives are still reduceable 
to price signals.
According to Barzelay and Iusem (1984), the neoclas­
sical models of energy consumption, such as the Consumer
Energy Services Module on which they base their report, as­
sume both that consumers will attempt to strike a balance 
between their consumption of energy versus non-energy goods 
or services which is dependent on their level of income and 
that they will choose the energy system that is most likely 
to reduce the costs of energy. The model includes underly­
ing assumptions: that consumers have perfect knowledge
about fuel prices over the next 40 years; that consumers 
are able to accurately compare the operating and capital 
costs of alternatives; that consumers have all of the in­
formation about these alternatives; that consumers are able 
to calculate the utility-maximizing function for both the 
energy and non-energy services for different levels of in­
come; and that they can select a discount rate which will 
allow them to compare today's foregone consumption with the
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increased levels of consumption which they will be able to 
enjoy in the future {since investments made today can only 
bring returns in the future, they must be able to make 
utility levels comparable over time) (Barzelay and Iusem, 
1984:392) .
What Barzelay and Iusem do in order to compensate for 
what they view as extraordinary assumptions is to vary the 
values of different assumptions and run scenarios to test 
the sensitivity of the model. While this is insightful, it 
still does not really develop the "inner environment" that 
the economic behaviorists such as Simons prefer. It is 
still based on economic assumptions that are too seldom 
critically examined in the literature. These include the 
ideas that it is rational to conserve, that consumers will 
always act in a rational manner, and that the net effect of 
these micro-level decisions will be the increased welfare 
of the society.
Regarding the first point, Leik and Kolman (1978) 
point out that there are some situations where it is ac­
tually rational to not conserve. Specifically, in situa­
tions that involve relatively large costs and benefits, if 
there is a continual flow of information regarding both 
technological change and the introduction of new policies, 
and this potential information is quite likely to reduce 
the risks associated with decision making, then inaction is 
an appropriate response. They state that "if the utility 
of inaction equals the cost of undertaking an action, and
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the costs of inaction equal the loss that occurs if a 
crisis arises before some appropriate response has been 
chosen, then...the expected utility of waiting will exceed 
the expected utility of action" (1978:).
In contrast to the second assumption, consumers do not 
always appear to act in a rational manner. According to 
the CONAES report, energy consumption is not strongly 
linked to either the level of economic activity or the 
standard of living. But if we are to follow rational 
models, we would assume that levels of energy consumption 
should be linked to wealth and income. The marginal utili­
ty of savings due to energy consumption should decrease 
consistently with increasing levels of income. In other 
words, the poor should be conserving more than the wealthy. 
For those with higher incomes, there is less incentive to 
conserve since energy costs are a smaller percentage of 
disposable income. Yet we find that in many cases, in­
creases in income are associated with increased levels of 
energy conservation activity.
Furthermore, while we tend to assume some degree of 
elasticity in demand due to price, we find that many other 
factors affect decisions. Higher prices have not neces­
sarily driven people from cars to mass transit. The ease 
and comfort as well as the prestige associated with the 
automobile have all discouraged the switch. In addition, 
since markets are so unstable, producers are inclined to 
create demand. This leads to more reliable demand.
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Likewise, since continued production is essential, it is 
more rational to build in obsolescence. However, such at­
tempts draw us a long way from the original ideas of an in­
visible hand which guides production in such a way that the 
society's resources are used most efficiently and there is 
a maximum of individual and social prosperity.
Finally, some theorists assume that as energy supplies 
become scarcer, the rising cost of fuel, associated with 
the costs of reducing pollution, will result in a steady 
state economy with limited growth. But when land, air and 
water are no longer available in sufficient quantities, 
markets incur severe difficulties. The theories of Locke 
or of Smith require unlimited abundance. The invisible 
hand can operate invisibly only so long as the costs asso­
ciated with production do not impinge on the common good. 
Rational decisions on the micro level can eventually result 
in ecological destruction.
Market decisions are also incredibly short sighted.
As Ophuls (1977) illustrates, it is unusual for an economic 
decision maker to consider costs and benefits that extend 
more than 20 years into the future. In fact, these are 
usually discounted to zero. Development of energy 
resources which will be necessary over the long term are of 
no economic interest to rational decision makers. Further­
more, it is actually rational for a businessman to invest 
little in the development of alternatives since it is in 
his best interest to have people be as dependent upon him
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as possible. In conditions of extreme scarcity, the price 
that the businessman can charge is less limited. However, 
the market does not react well to conditions of extreme 
scarcity or when there is a large discrepancy between supp­
ly and demand. In these cases, there is a tendency for the 
market to exacerbate inequalities in the distribution of 
essential goods.
None of this is to argue that price is not a factor. 
But certainly, cost considerations must be associated with 
some rather compelling non-cost considerations (Gordon, 
1981). Values, attitudes and information may be more im­
portant in the diffusion of solar energy than in other 
types of technology. For example, the major barrier to 
passive solar innovation is not cost, since many elements 
of the decision involve no cost to builders (Jackson, 1981) 
and monthly payments may actually be reduced when both 
mortgage payments and monthly energy bills are added to­
gether. Thus, solar appears to be associated with some 
overt values implications (Unseld and Crews, 1981).
This leads us, then, to a consideration of the 
sociological variables that may be factors in the adoption 
process. Before dealing with the role of values, norms, or 
other sociological concepts, let us first turn to an analy­
sis of the general characteristics that might identify 
adopters.
Price. There is substantial evidence that material
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incentives can play a major role in influencing behavior. 
Winnet (1978) has demonstrated that large monetary rebates 
encouraged reduced electrical consumption (by 12%), but 
only over the short-term. The most effective strategy 
seemed to be to combine rebates with feedback and a conser­
vation strategy. Similarly, Becker (1978) reports that 
there is a joint effect between goal setting and feedback, 
with the greatest reduction in consumption occurring among 
those who had very difficult goals and feedback.
However, we face a different set of problems in trying 
to encourage the adoption of alternatives. Cunningham and 
Lopreato (1977) argue that price considerations are the 
major factor influencing energy conservation, especially 
among middle and lower income groups. But it is the per­
ception of cost which influences people's willingness to 
buy, and this is a complicated variable to attempt to un­
derstand .
Certainly the initial cost of a lot of solar equipment 
is high. But pricing considerations must include more than 
initial cost. Long-term savings and tax breaks (credits or 
deductions) also influence the overall price. Boaz-Allen 
says that recent owners install solar for economic reasons. 
The Solar Energy Research Institute finds that many people 
feel that solar can help to save money over the long term 
(84%) and that solar helps to reduce monthly utility bills 
(82%). A similar study conducted by SERI (1980) finds that 
respondents feel that solar will reduce monthly energy
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bills (85%) and increase the home’s resale value (75%).
All of this would imply that consumers should be en­
couraged to purchase solar by virtue of its economic ad­
vantages. But many consumers are not motivated by long­
term paybacks. They are not often motivated to invest a 
large sum in a product that has a payback period of 20 
years. They are also discouraged by large initial costs.
An investment of $40 in weather stripping and an investment 
of $4,000 in attic insulation may both have the same 
payback period, but consumers will be prompted to make the 
smaller investment. The large initial cost of solar fre­
quently leads to rejection (Shama, 1981).
To overcome this problem, a variety of tax incentives 
have been offered over the years. However, these have not 
proven to be a major factor in adoption. Marsden (1980) 
points out that relatively few home owners have taken ad­
vantage of these credits. SERI found that these tax incen­
tives ranked 10th among a general sample of homeowners.
Even among the actual users of solar, only half felt that 
tax credits were important.
It is specifically because of these types of problems 
that Darley and Beniger (1981) feel that the unassisted op­
erations of a free market will not result in a maximization 
of conservation behavior. While people may informally cal­
culate potential savings as a function of the interaction 
between cost and payback periods, they react very differ­
ently to the large variations in capital cost. They argue
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that one of the major barriers to adoption is the low de­
gree of certainty that savings will be obtained coupled 
with the fact that the costs must be paid prior to the ac­
tual demonstration of savings.
This illustrates the need to disseminate information 
regarding cost considerations to the public. Consumers 
cannot try out the innovation for a period before adopting. 
Therefore, in order to reduce uncertainty they must rely on 
information and the observed success of other adopters.
Let us turn next to these factors.
Norms, Information and Modeling. Undoubtedly one of 
the greatest barriers to the diffusion of energy alterna­
tives is the lack of information regarding both costing 
techniques (as we saw in the last section) and system per­
formance. Studies seem to demonstrate, however, that the 
problem is not that people believe solar systems to be un­
reliable. Rather, they simply do not have sufficient in­
formation to come to any conclusion. In a study by SERI, 1 
out of 8 respondents did not know of any use of solar ener­
gy. In other studies, lack of information is usually 
listed as the first or second greatest hindrance.
Here we argue that the perceived acceptability of 
solar should have an impact on diffusion. This perception 
could very well be the product of exposure —  the extent to 
which friends and neighbors are adopting solar. If solar 
is perceived as an acceptable standard of behavior, or is
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regarded as normative, then this should facilitate the 
spread of these technologies among later adopters.
The dissemination of information is strongly affected 
by communication patterns among individuals. Darley and 
Beniger (1981) argue that interpersonal networks play a 
strong role only for early adopters, however, and that 
areal diffusion (through modeling) is more important for 
later adopters. Similarly, Shama (1981) feels that the in­
novativeness is more important at the early stages, and im­
itation is more important later. In fact, he points out 
that most models of market penetration assume that adoption 
is a function of the number of previous adopters.
Lowe and Moryadas (1975) point out some of the factors 
which affect the communication process. They argue that 
the type of communication which is important may be depen­
dent upon the nature of the innovation. In addition, 
people will demonstrate different levels of resistance to 
innovations, depending partly on value, attitudinal and 
life-style compatibility. In the latter stages of diffu­
sion, which depend more heavily on areal diffusion pat­
terns, there is an inverse relationship between distance 
and the acceptance of a communication. Finally, institu­
tional and cultural considerations (e.g., social class) 
will affect communication by molding networks and the un­
even distribution of population will vary the opportunity 
to observe technologies.
The building industry itself may be a barrier to dif-
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fusion. The industry consists primarily of small con­
tractors who tend to be cost-conscious and conservative. 
However, there is some indication that they may be using 
solar in homes which they build for private investment pur­
poses. In any case, the impact of the builders is two­
fold: they advise consumers regarding the viability of
alternatives and the homes they build serve as models for 
later adopters. For this reason they are a crucial link in 
the adoption chain.
Finally, information, no matter how important or in 
which direction it heads, is still subject to interpreta­
tion by the potential adopter. Brock and Balloun (1967) 
report that experimental subjects were more likely to at­
tempt to clear static out of consonant than dissonant in­
formation. Frey and Wicklund, however, say that factors 
other than dissonance —  intellectual honesty, curiosity, 
usefulness, attractiveness, or confidence —  may affect se­
lective exposure, since selective exposure is the product 
of certain prior conditions (such as values, norms and at­
titudes), it is to these that we now turn our attention.
Individual Characteristics
Values. Values, like norms may frequently serve as 
incentives or constraints (Shoemaker, 1981). Many resear­
chers have, in fact, argued that values may be more impor­
tant in the adoption of energy alternatives than in any 
other form of innovation (Leonard-Barton, 1981a, 1981b;
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Warkov, 1981; Unseld and Crews, 1981). Sparrow (1978) 
argues that since early adopters are community leaders, 
then psychic satisfaction must act as an incentive. Unseld 
and Crew found that a desire to innovate and self-reliance 
were important characteristics of adopters. Many adopt 
solar because it is a clean, safe form of energy and they 
believe that use demonstrates social responsibility.
There is also evidence of an interaction between in­
novation and life patterns (Darley and Beniger, 1981). 
Leonard-Barton (1981b) has used a measure of voluntary 
simplicity (the degree to which people indicate performing 
a wide variety of conserving behaviors) and found that it 
was the second strongest predictor of adoption.
A wide variety of other values may also be correlated 
with adoption. Concerns for independence, family security, 
comfort, etc., all seem to be factors.
Cook and Berrenberg (1981) enumerate the variety of 
social incentives which can be employed to facilitate con­
servation, many of which apply to adoption. Providing so­
cial recognition and approval, seeking public commitments 
from individuals, or involving people in group decisions 
all facilitate conservation. To the extent that these con­
servation programs entail adopting energy-conserving tech­
nologies, all of these apply. But the provision of ap­
proval or social recognition should be a facilitating fac­
tor in any case.
Of course, the relationship between values or norms
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and adoption may be mediated by the fact that people are 
receiving conflicting signals. At times they hear that 
there is an energy crisis, at other times it no longer 
seems to exist. While there continue to be statements 
regarding the diminishing reserves of oil, the world faces 
an oil glut. Thus, the knowledge which people have about 
energy issues, the attitudes that people develop, and the 
cues that they perceive, should also be related to adop­
tion.
Knowledge. Attitudes and Cues. There is an obvious 
paradox with regard to the public's attitude about solar 
and the rate of adoption: the public at large is very pro­
solar, yet this promise is not translated into behavior. 
Most people like the idea of solar power and favor govern­
ment support. SERI (1980) reports that 2/3 of their 
respondents have named solar as one of the top energy 
sources of the future, and 1/3 actually say it is the most 
preferred. The Resources for the Future study says that 
solar is by far the energy source named most often as the 
one the U.S. should rely on by 2000 and a 1979 Roper study 
finds that only 16% of the respondents feel that solar will 
contribute very little to our energy needs (in Huttman and 
Graeven, 1982).
In spite of these favorable attitudes, most people in­
dicate that they are not about to adopt alternatives. They 
do not think that it will be widely used in the next 5-10
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years. Generally about 4% indicate that they either will 
or might purchase solar in the next 3-5 years (Huttman and 
Graeven, 1982).
Policies designed to encourage adoption could center 
on these considerations. Drawing on Bandura, the use of 
prestigious persons to model conservation behavior should 
facilitate this process. In keeping with the findings of 
Ehrlich (presented in Chapter 3), we should also increase 
the knowledge that people find necessary for both the 
recognition of and the implementation of appropriate behav­
iors (Cook and Berrenberg, 1981). Often, even if people 
are aware of actions, they will hesitate to take them if 
they feel that they lack competence. We should also in­
crease attempts to minimize the perceived negative con­
sequences of adoption (Cook and Berrenberg, 1981).
On the other hand, some studies, especially of conser­
vation behaviors, demonstrate a greater correlation between 
attitudes and behavior. In a study of summer electrical 
consumption, Seligman and his associates (Becker, et al, 
1981) found that attitudes concerning personal health and 
comfort, the relationship between effort and payoff, and 
the role of the individual in solving our energy problems 
account for 55% of the variance in summer electrical con­
sumption. They also conducted two follow-up studies using 
these variables (with health and comfort now loading on 
separate factors) as well as with attitudes regarding the 
legitimacy of the energy crisis, science and technology,
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and family finances. In the second study of summer elec­
trical consumption, 59% of the variance was explained. 
However, these same variables accounted for only 18% of the 
variance in winter heating. Surprisingly, the legitimacy 
of the energy crisis never seems to be a factor, and family 
finances did not contribute to the explanation of winter 
heating.
It would seem at first that the difference is probably 
due to the fact that one set of studies deals with a behav­
ior which does not demand as much sacrifice; that is, elec­
trical consumption in the summer is not as much of a con­
cern as heat in the winter. Certainly for some people air 
conditioners are extremely important to health and comfort. 
But the elasticity of the demand for heat is much lower 
than for cooling, so attitudes may not explain much of the 
variance. Yet in another study, Leonard-Barton (1981b) 
finds a number of attitudes associated with gas consump­
tion: norms of voluntary simplicity (-.18), beliefs about
the consequences of action (-.11), the belief in an energy 
crisis (-.15), and ecological activism (-.16).
This would seem to indicate that a number of mediating 
influences must be affecting the relationship between atti­
tudes and behavior. Heberlein and Black (1981) feel that 
people who practice non-normative behavior exhibit greater 
cognitive consistency. In their study of lead-free gaso­
line users (conducted before federal law required its use), 
they found that those who felt a personal obligation and
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believed that lead-free gasoline saved money were the most 
likely purchasers. They also argue that those who exhibit 
the greatest consistency between attitudes and behavior 
should have the greatest support from others, the most sup­
porting beliefs, and the greatest behavioral commitment.
The formation and change of attitudes is enhanced when 
these attitudes receive continual confirmation from a vari­
ety of sources (Darley and Beniger, 1981). This points to 
a compounding variable in the study of attitudes and behav­
ior. Especially with regard to energy conservation, the 
cues which people receive can be contradictory. Signals 
concerning the validity of the energy crisis, the amount of 
oil that remains, etc., may cause different reactions 
depending on how these cues are received.
If this is true, then people's perception of an im­
minent crisis may help to explain adoption. However, re­
search results on this topic are mixed. Certainly many 
people are aware of the seriousness of the energy problem. 
In surveys, 40-60% of the respondents generally agree that 
the energy problem is a serious one (Olsen, 1981), but they 
differ in their interpretation of the causes. Some see it 
as the result of excess demand over supply, others feel it 
is due to waste, U.S. dependence on foreign oil, or the 
depletion of natural resources. Demographic correlates of 
this belief include education, income and occupation.
But, with the exception of the Leonard-Barton study, 
attitudes about the reality of the crisis have little im-
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pact on behavior. Some studies (e.g. Sears, 1976; Hass, 
Bagley and Roger, 1975) find that perceived personal im­
pacts are related to conservation actions, but perception 
of crisis was not related. In fact, Hass, et al (1975) 
report that in a study of the interaction between the 
noxiousness of a potential energy crisis and its perceived 
probability of occurrence, intentions to reduce energy con­
sumption were affected only by noxiousness. It should be 
pointed out, however, that the third variable which was in­
cluded in the theoretical formulation of the study, the 
availability of and perceived viability of a coping 
response was not included in the final research design. It 
may also be that the perceived seriousness of the energy 
crisis must be strengthened by other attitudes: the aware­
ness of the overall ecological situation, felt personal re­
sponsibility, favorable attitudes toward the administra­
tion, issues of equity, voluntary versus mandatory 
measures, or the role of incentives over penalties (Olsen, 
1981).
Cook and Berrenberg (1981) point out that attempts to 
encourage conservation behavior through attitudes focus on 
two approaches: promoting pro-conservation attitudes
through persuasive communications and evoking attitude- 
consistent behaviors. Persuasive communications depend 
upon both the context in which the communication is 
received and the characteristics of the recipient. While 
there is obviously a great deal of disagreement over the
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success of such tactics, the development of pro­
conservation attitudes may facilitate the effectiveness of 
other conservation efforts.
The latter strategy may involve one of a number of ap­
proaches. Adoption may be encouraged by directing atten­
tion to conservation actions, by letting people with pro­
conservation attitudes know that opportunities are avail­
able or that the time is ripe to adopt. A second approach 
would be to make attitudes more salient to behaviors by as­
sociation with others or through the public statements of 
group leaders. In either case, the goal is to enhance the 
perception of the behavior as normative. The final ap­
proach would be to demonstrate that the adoption is con­
sistent with a pro-conservation attitude.
In any event, it is essential that we examine the rel­
ative impact of attitudes which are consistent with the be­
havior under question, of communications regarding the 
viability of the an energy system, and of normative percep­
tions.
Situational Characteristics of Adopters
We must first ask whether people who purchase solar 
equipment are a distinct group. In fact, innovators do 
differ from the general population on variety of character­
istics. They tend to be younger and from higher socio­
economic backgrounds (Shama, 1981). In terms of household
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income, solar adopters are above average, although there is 
a recent evidence of a shift to a more representative fam­
ily (Sparrow, 1978). They are generally from professional- 
managerial occupations. Their educational level is also 
above average.
But the important question is not whether solar adop­
ters differ from the general population but, rather, 
whether they differ in important ways from other new home 
purchasers. Fahrar-Pilgrim (1981) argues that demographic 
differences are not great enough to give us a good idea of 
who purchases solar. Warkov (1981), in a Connecticut study 
of solar retrofitting, finds that demographics correlate 
highly with initial interest but that they explain very 
little of the variance in adoption. Similarly, the Solar 
Energy Research Institute (1980) argues that education is 
more highly correlated with awareness than with positive 
attitudes toward adoption.
Thus, it would seem that the adoption process is not 
strongly influenced by situational characteristics. Still, 
we should be sensitized to the possible influences of 
demographic characteristics on attitudes and information 
networks, while not expecting them to explain a great deal 




Table 4.1 presents a summary of the variable which we 
should examine based on the discussions of this chapter and 
the previous two chapters. A variety of factors may act to 
influence people's decisions. Here, however, we will split 
these up into those factors which were specifically in­
volved in the decision, those attitudes and values which 
are more characteristics of the individual, and the situa­
tional (or demographic) variables which might constrain or 
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Under the category of decision factors, we must first 
examine the role of price. This could include a number of 
different factors. First of all, there is the initial cost 
of the energy system to consider. This could act to en­
courage or discourage purchases, but it may well be 
mitigated by other factors like the potential for long-term 
savings. Finally, we must also consider the possible ef­
fect of tax credits in influencing the potential economic 
viability of different energy systems.
Our next consideration is the effect of past experi­
ence or habit. In addition, we have also included the ef­
fect of subjective norms —  the perception that the use of 
an energy system is acceptable —  as a factor which is 
directly taken into consideration with regard to the pur­
chase decision. This variable might be regarded as a char­
acteristic of the individual, but because it relies 
primarily on the observed freguency of use by other people, 
we have decided that it is something over and above indi­
vidual characteristics.
Next, we turn to a groups of variables which might be 
classified as information and advice. Recall that advice 
may come from primary sources —  relative and friends —  or 
secondary sources —  in this case, engineers, builders, and 
salespeople. Information may also be derived from 
demonstration homes (which may or may not be established by 
salespeople) or from the media —  newspapers and magazines.
Turning to the characteristics of the individual, we
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must be sensitized to the potential role of general atti­
tudes about energy. While Fishbein might argue that these 
are not very good at explaining behavioral intent, much of 
the literature on energy adoption still sees them as impor­
tant. Specific attitudes —  those about the various types 
of energy systems that are available —  should be better 
able to help us distinguish between different types of 
adopters or nonadopters.
Values which a respondent might hold should also give 
us insights into the adoption process. While not specifi­
cally indicators of lifestyle, they should still 
demonstrate the general inclinations of adopters or non­
adopters .
Knowledge of energy issues should also play a key 
role. Without some awareness of energy, it is not likely 
that someone would purchase an alternative energy system. 
Finally in this category, many studies of adoption point to 
faults of the individual —  dogmatism in particular —  as 
slowing or hindering the adoption process.
Our next general category is that of situational or 
demographic characteristics. These may be of two types: 
the demographics of the respondent —  age, sex, marital 
status, occupation, education, or family income —  as well 
as the characteristics of the house —  the year in which 
the house was purchased (later for decentralized systems), 
the age of the home (younger for active or passive solar 
homes) and the size of the home (smaller for solar than for
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traditional homes). These, then, are the basic categories 
of variables which we will examine in subsequent chapters.
Unresolved Issues
Despite the number of studies which have been con­
ducted covering all the different aspects of adoption, 
there are still a number of unresolved questions. Unseld 
and Crew (1981), in fact, argue that our energy studies 
have raised more questions than they have answered.
To a large extent, this is due to methodological and 
theoretical shortcomings in this research. Down and Mohr 
(1976) blame the extreme variability in these findings on:
1) variations in the primary attributes of innovations 
(i.e., people compare very different types of innovations),
2) interaction effects, 3) ecological inference, and 4) 
varying operationalization of innovation. Similarly, 
Roessner (1981) argues: 1) that the narrow range of vari­
ables included in any particular study precludes the pos­
sibility of comparing the relative influence of these vari­
ables, 2) that comparisons of variables cannot be made 
across studies since different measure of innovations or 
different dependent variables have been employed, and 3) 
that since interactive models have not been employed, such 
effects remain hidden and hinder attempts to generalize 
across studies. For example, while no theory can predict 
the influence that cost will have in particular markets.
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studies have produced a variety of findings. However, it 
is not clear whether the most important factor is first 
cost, lack of a warranty, long payback periods, etc.
Many studies rely on self-reports of energy conserving 
behaviors, and these always involve methodological prob­
lems, especially in trying to relate these self reports to 
savings. People may underreport if they fail to realize 
that actions save energy. At other times, people may rate 
high on a scale of reported behaviors by virtue of report­
ing a large number of conservation behaviors, all of which 
save only small amounts of energy (Olsen, 1981). This 
should not be a serious drawback in some aspects of this 
dissertation, since in many cases the behavior is concrete 
—  people either have or have not purchased an energy sys­
tem. However, we are asking people to retroactively 
reconstruct their thinking regarding why they made their 
decisions, and the relative impact of variables can have 
changed over the years.
Unseld and Crew (1981) feel that the problems are also 
theoretical. They argue that the major drawback is the 
lack of any theoretical framework which can provide the 
basis for judging the validity of research results. They 
argue for more empirical knowledge derived from theoreti­
cally based research. Similarly, Shoemaker (1981) argues 
that attempts by diffusion researchers to develop broad 
classificatory schemes have not led to the development of a 
broad, explanatory theory.
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Among the more important of the methodological issues 
is the ability to make significant comparisons between 
groups on a number of elements. First of all, we need to 
compare adopters of innovations with adopters of tradi­
tional technologies rather than with only the general pub­
lic. Secondly, we need to be able to compare adopters of 
different types of alternatives. There will probably be 
different motivational considerations between people who 
adopt wood versus those who adopt active or passive solar, 
for example. Finally, we should also be able to compare 
those who think about adopting alternatives but decide 
against adoption with those who decide to adopt and with 
those who have never considered adoption in order to filter 
out motivational considerations as well as incentives and 
disincentives (Labay and Kinnear, 1981).
Implications for Research
These methodological approaches should also enable us 
to resolve some important theoretical issues which remain 
unanswered by virtue of our inability to compare groups 
across studies. First of all, do groups differ in their 
subjective expectations regarding the outcome of adoption 
(price, values) or in the sources of those expectations 
(information, modeling)? Do these variables seem to be ei­
ther more relevant or more influential in decisions reached 
by adopters of different types of innovations?
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Secondly, do adopters differ in any of a number of 
other characteristics? Does the amount of normative ex­
posure vary? That is, do people who see these systems work 
for their neighbors or friends tend to be more likely to 
adopt? Do adopters of different technologies differ in any 
significant ways in demographic characteristics?
Finally, since the perspective presented in this dis­
sertation emphasizes the importance of interaction effects, 
we should be able to answer some important theoretical 
questions. Why are people initially motivated to consider 
the adoption of innovations? Does the perception of crisis 
play an important role in motivation? More importantly, 
while attitudes do not seem to have a direct impact on 
adoption, do they have an indirect effect either through 
sensitizing people to cues or be mediating the impact of 
demographic variables?
In the following chapter, the basic methodological de­
sign of the dissertation will be presented and some 
preliminary questions will be addressed. In Chapter 5 we 
will begin to see how well the variables which we have in­




There are numerous methodological issues which must be 
addressed in this research. First, there is the problem of 
deciding who should be sampled in order to make the compar­
isons mentioned in the previous chapter. More importantly, 
there is the need to design a survey which will yield valu­
able information rather than simply replicate previous re­
search. While the latter approach certainly leads to in­
creased reliability of questions and increased validity of 
findings, if they do not expand upon our knowledge they 
seem to be less valuable.
In this chapter we will first examine the sample de­
sign. Following this, we will look at the construction of 
the questionnaire and see how the model is operationalized 
in this study.
Sample Design
The first step in the design of the sample was to 
select the population to be sampled. This dissertation is 
designed as an exploratory study geared toward determining 
the viability of the theoretical model presented earlier by
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comparing groups of people who do or do not adopt specific- 
types of energy systems for their homes. Because of this, 
the obvious choice for a population to sample was homeown­
ers rather than the general public. Due to financial con­
straints, the survey population was limited to the state of 
New Hampshire. The survey was distributed in 1984.
Two major criteria determined the specific process 
which was employed in selecting the actual cases to be 
sampled. First of all, the sample was designed in a way 
that allows it to represent as closely as possible the con­
ceptual universe. Secondly it was designed to facilitate 
the analysis which is to be conducted (Wilier, 1968).
The simplest way to meet the first criteria is through 
random sampling. However, simple random sampling neces­
sitates the identification of all of the elements in the, 
population. In order to make this sample more cost effi­
cient, a cluster sample was employed. While this intro­
duces the possibility of a much larger sampling error, it 
has the advantage of allowing the researcher to concentrate 
efforts on fewer geographic regions and the cluster can be 
designed on the basis of readily available information 
(Jaeger, 1984; Kalton, 1983).
The simplest means of identifying a sample of 
homeowners in the state is through town tax records. The 
primary sampling unit selected was counties, 10 of which 
are designated in the state. The sample size was limited 
to 500 due to the cost considerations mentioned above. The
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decision was made to sample the counties in proportion to 
their size in order to obtain as representative a sample as 
possible.
Because New Hampshire is such a small state, the pro­
portion of people found in cities is very high. Ten 
cities, accounting for 30% of the states 386,381 households 
(according to 1980 census data) were therefore designated 
as a certainty sample. 150 of the 500 surveys were dis­
tributed to these 10 cities in proportion to their size.
The selection of the remaining cities and towns was 
conducted in a random manner. First, a cumulative listing 
of the number of households in each city was compiled for 
each county. The number of cities or towns (the secondary 
sampling unit) to be selected in each of the counties was 
based on the percentage of the total households located in 
that county. Since ten names were to be drawn from each 
town, the total number of cities in each county was 
determined by the total number of households to be sampled 
in that county.
For example, Belknap County has 24,004 households, or 
9% of the state's total. Since there were 250 question­
naires to be distributed, Belknap County would receive 31. 
This meant that we would sample three towns in Belknap 
County. The towns were selected by first constructing a 
cumulative list. The sampling interval (S) was chosen by 
dividing the number of households by 3 (8001). Using a 
random start (R=5306), the first town to be selected was
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the town where the 5306th household was located. The sec­
ond town was determined by adding the sampling interval to 
the random start (5306 + 8001 = 13307). Other towns were 
selected in a similar manner (r+s, r+2s, r+3s...) until the 
total number of towns in the county were identified. Indi­
vidual households were then randomly selected from property 
tax lists in each of the towns throughout the state.
Unfortunately, a random sample of homeowners is not 
likely to turn up enough people who have adopted alterna­
tive energy systems to allow for significant comparisons. 
For this reason, a second batch of surveys was mailed to a 
subset of people who were identified as adopters of altern­
atives through letters sent to solar builders and archi­
tects throughout the state. This subset amounted to 149, 
making the total number of questionnaires mailed 649.
Of this total, 189 people participated in the survey. 
This gives us an overall response rate of 29%. Of course, 
149 of the potential respondents were people who had been 
identified as adopters. Of these 149 people, 72 of them 
(49%) chose to participate in the study. This number con­
stitutes 36% of the total number of respondents.
Questionnaire Construction 
Dependent Variables
Adopters. The first step was to identify those people who 
had actually purchased some form of energy system as their
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primary source of heat. Respondents were asked to name 
their primary source of heat (oil, coal, gas, wood, solar, 
etc.) and to give a description (forced hot air, forced hot 
water, etc.). As a check against misunderstanding, respon­
dents were also asked to estimate the amount of heat which 
comes from this source. These responses are tabulated in 
Table 5.1.
According to the 1980 census, based on a sample of the 
state we would expect to find 43% of households would be 
using oil. In our survey, oil represents 37% of the sys­
tems in all households. Natural gas, which according to 
the census is found in 32% of homes, is employed by only 6% 
of our respondents. Similarly, electric heat would be 
found in 21% of all households and here is limited to only 
11%. Conversely, wood, which should be found in about 4% 
of all homes, and other forms of heat, which were expected 
to be in insignificant numbers, here make up 34% and 11% 
respectively (if we total all alternatives together).
These differences are due to the fact that we specifically 
sought out owners of these alternatives. Thus they would 
make up a higher proportion of the respondents than the 
random sample in the census found.
Following this we had to identify which of these 
people were to be classified as adopters. Pre-tests of the 
questionnaire had demonstrated that just because people 
owned an energy system did not mean that they had actually 
made a decision to purchase this for their home. If they
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TABLE 5.1
ADOPTERS/NONADOPTERS BY TYPE OF 
PRIMARY HOME HEATING SOURCE
ADOPTERS NONADOPTERS
Built-in Installed Acquired Total
Oil 14 11 45 70
Coal 2 1 0 3
Electric 11 1 8 20
Natural Gas 1 5 5 11
Wood 16 47 1 64
Passive Solar 7 0 0 7
Active Solar 3 0 0 3
Wood and Oil 1 2 0 3
Active and Passive 1 2 0 3
Wood and Solar 3 1 1 5
Total 59 70 60 189
had not made the decision, then they cannot be classified 
as adopters.
To solve this predicament, all respondents were asked 
to check which of three statements applied to them: 1) Did
they have the system built into the design of the house, 2) 
Was the system installed after the house was purchased, or 
3) was the house simply acquired with the system already 
installed. For each situation, they were also asked to 
give the year of the purchase (which in situation 1 or 3 
would be the year that the house was purchased).
Persons who responded in the affirmative to either 
question 1 or 2 have been classified as adopters. These 
respondents made a conscious decision to purchase an energy 
system. It is possible that the type of energy system 
which is already found in a home that people purchase may
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act to influence those decisions, but that is not generally 
a determining factor in those purchases. It would seem to 
be most important for those people who purchase solar 
homes, but only one solar owner fell into this category.
Respondents were further classified as adopters of ei­
ther centralized or decentralized energy systems depending 
on their previous description of their primary energy sys­
tem. Those who has actually adopted oil, coal, natural 
gas, or electric heat have been designated as centralized 
adopters. As discussed in Chapter 1, while the distribu­
tion networks of some of these energy forms may be 
decentralized, the manufacture and, especially, the pricing 
of these sources is fairly centralized, especially in com­
parison to wood or active and passive solar systems.
Returning to Table 5.1, we see the distribution of 
these categories. Those individuals who either had some 
form of energy system built into the design of the house or 
installed after the home was built are classified as adop­
ters (N = 129). Those who acquired their house with a sys­
tem already installed are seen here as non-adopters (N =
60). These adopters are further subdivided into central­
ized adopters (above the line, N = 46) or decentralized 
adopters (below the line, N = 83).
Aware non-adopters. The best way to identify the var­
iables which actually discourage the purchase of decentral­
ized energy systems is to compare those who decide against
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the purchase with those who actually make the purchase.
So, we also asked people whether or not they had seriously 
considered the purchase of a decentralized energy system, 
either wood, active or passive solar, windmills, or 
photovoltaics. If they had seriously considered such a 
system, we then asked them to answer a series of questions 
(see below) for the system that they had most seriously 
considered. These respondents are labeled aware non­
adopters.
For purposes of this dissertation, we will have isola­
ted only two groups of aware nonadopters: those who consid­
ered solar alternative and those who considered wood alter­
natives. These comparisons make the most sense because we 
can then compare them with solar adopters and wood adop­
ters, both of which are subcategories of all decentralized 
adopters. In terms of our attempts to understand what 
might discourage adoption, it makes more sense to compare 
people who have considered and rejected an alternative with 
those who actually purchase it than it does to compare 
adopters with some general category of people who have 
never gone through the same type of decision process. For 
example, wood adopters probably talk to different people 
than solar adopters, look for information in different 
places, etc.
Among our respondents, we have 17 people who have 
adopted some form of solar energy (active or passive solar, 
active and passive combined, and wood and solar combined).
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We will compare these 17 people with all of the people 
(other than these 17) who thought about but rejected a 
solar system of some sort (photovoltaics, solar hot water, 
passive solar, or a greenhouse). This latter group con­
tains 65 people. Our other dependent variable will include 
all of those people who indicated that they had purchased 
some form of wood heat (70) compared to those who thought 
about wood but decided not to adopt (23) and were not in 
the category of wood adopters.
Unaware Nonadopters. Finally, it might also be in­
formative to compare adopters with nonadopters. Here we 
will first compare all of our nonadopters (59) with all of 
our adopters (111). We lose a few people from our total 
number of respondents because in order to construct the 
variable it was necessary to select from two separate vari­
ables, and some of the respondents were missing in one or 
the other. For example, someone who might have been an 
adopter might not have answered the question that asked 
whether or not they had ever considered a decentralized 
alternative. For this reason, in any of the analyses, they 
would be dropped as missing, even though they had answered 
the question about the type of energy system they had pur­
chased. If we examine a cross tabulation of these two vari­
ables (Table 5.2), we can see that there were 72 people who 
never considered a decentralized system and 98 people had 
considered it at some point.
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TABLE 5.2
BREAKDOWN OF ADOPTERS/NONADOPTERS BY 
CONSIDERED/DID NOT CONSIDER AN ALTERNATIVE
Did Not Consider 
Considered Alternative
Nonadopter Adopter
1 25 47 |





We can also use this table to sort out those people 
who would be identified as unaware nonadopters —  those 
respondents who have never purchased and never thought 
about purchasing a decentralized energy system. Such 
people would be classified as unaware nonadopters. In 
Table 5.2 we see that the number of people who fit this 
category is only 25. While this is a limited number of 
people, we can still make adequate comparisons with solar 
and wood adopters.
Another way of summarizing these breakdowns is evident 
in the tree presented in Figure 5.1. Beginning at the top 
of the table, we see that we started out with 189 respon­
dents. Of that number, 128 were adopters and 61 were non­
adopters. We can further break the adopters down into 45 
people who adopted a centralized system and 83 who adopted 
a decentralized system. The 83 decentralized adopters can 
be further broken down into 17 solar adopters and 70 who
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Figure 5.1 







Centralized Decentralized Aware Solar Aware Wood Unaware
N=45(1) N=83(1) N=47(2) N=23(3) N=24(5,6)
Solar** Wood**
N=17 (2,5) N=70 (3,6)
* Numbers in parentheses indicate the comparison in which 
this group is used.
**Four cases (combined wood/solar) are included in both of 
these comparisons.
purchased wood. (There are actually 4 respondents who 
adopted a wood/solar combination. They have been included 
in both comparisons, since the comparison groups are total 
ly separate and these two groups are never compared to each 
other.)
Our aware nonadopters (those who thought about some 
decentralized alternative but subsequently decided not to 
adopt) are drawn from either the adopters or the non­
adopters (i.e., they may or may not have subsequently pur­
chased some system other than the one under consideration).
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We see in Figure 5.1 that there are 47 people who consider­
ed solar and did not adopt. These people will be compared 
to those who did adopt some form of solar. There are also 
23 respondents who considered adopting wood and then de­
cided against the purchase. These people will be compared 
with those who purchaed wood systems. All of this leaves 
us with only 24 people who have never thought about adopt­
ing any form of decentralized system and also never pur­
chased any centralized system.
We need to look now at the independent variables which 
we will be using to search for differences between these 
groups. Let us turn to these variables as they were pre­
sented in our model.
Independent Variables
Situational Variables. Much of the design of the 
questionnaire was rather straight-forward. Because there 
is such a marked relationship between demographic variables 
and the belief in an energy crisis, the beginning of the 
survey asked respondents to answer a series of demographic 
questions. Age has been coded as a continuous variable.
Sex has been coded as a nominal variable (0 = male, 1 = fe­
male). Similarly, marital status is a dummy variable (0 = 
married, 1 = not currently married). Education ranges from 
8 through 15 (13 = some college, 14 = BA/BS, 15 = some 
graduate school). Duncan SEI is derived from a description
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TABLE 5.3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR 
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
NON-MISSING RANGE
N LOWER UPPER MEAN STDEV
AGE..................  188 27 81 48.46 13.29
SEX  188 0 1 .31
MARITAL STATUS......  188 0 1 .16
EDUCATION  187 8 15 13.78 1.34
DUNCAN SEX..........  157 15 96 60.11 19.87
FAMILY INCOME.......  179 1 12 6.69 2.34
HOUSE AGE  189 1 225 39.63 50.05
HOUSE SIZE........... 188 3 15 7.27 1.96
YEAR PURCHASED......  187 41 83 72.89 8.39
of their occupation as coded in the Duncan socio-economic 
index. Income is a categorical variable that has been de­
veloped by breaking down the reported income of each member 
of the family according to the following scale: 0 to 6,000 
= 1; 6,001 to 12,000 = 2; 12,001 to 18,000 = 3; 18,001 to
24.000 = 4; 24,001 to 36,000 = 5; 36,000 to 48,000 = 6;
48.000 to 72,0000 = 7; and 72,001 and up = 8. Family in­
come has been derived by adding the scores for the respon­
dent and the respondent's spouse together, giving a poten­
tial score of 1 to 16.
In addition, respondents were asked to answer a few 
questions regarding their home: the year in which it was 
purchased (only the last two digits of the year have been 
used, thus 69 = 1969), the approximate age of the house, 
and the house size (number of rooms). All of these are 
continuous variables. The descriptive statistics are pre­
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sented in Table 5.3.
The median age of the respondents to this study is 45. 
This seems quite high in comparison to the median age for 
the state, which in the 1980 Census was 30.1. This is un­
derstandable to some extent since the survey was sent only 
to homeowners who would tend, on average, to be older than 
renters.
Most of the other characteristics are not so readily 
comparable to the census data. The median education for 
the state (people 25 years and older) is 12.6 years. In 
this study, where the youngest respondent is 22, the median 
years of education is 14. This means that we have a some­
what more educated sample, but that would tend to be the 
case with a mailed survey, especially one that was limited 
to homeowners.
The median family income for the state is $22,132.
The data in the survey were coded on a scale, the median of 
which is 7. This would correspond to much higher income 
level (in the range of 36,000 to as high as 72,000 and 
above). One might also expect that this would be the case, 
since homeowners will tend to have higher than average in­
comes, but this factor combined with the higher education 
would lead us to conclude that this sample is a higher 
class segment of the population than we might expect to 
find in a truly random sample of the entire population.
This is also borne out in the analysis of the homes. 
The median number of rooms in the state is 5.2. Here we
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find that houses are larger, with a median of 7.0. Given 
the higher incomes, we might expect larger houses. On the 
other hand, passive solar homes, especially those of post 
and beam construction, tend to have fewer rooms and more 
open space for air to circulate well from room to room. A 
better indicator might have been square footage, but data 
of this type are usually much more difficult for people to 
obtain. Similarly, data on house values, subject to dif­
fering appraisals, etc., is difficult to obtain and com­
pare.
Those respondents who indicated that they had made an 
active decision to adopt were then asked to respond to a 
series of questions about what factors were important in 
helping them to arrive at their decision. It is to these 
questions that we now turn.
Decision Factors
People attempting to make the best decisions they can 
under difficult circumstances may take a wide variety of 
factors into consideration. Here, people were asked to in­
dicate not only whether a certain factor entered into their 
decision but also the degree and the direction of that in­
fluence (i.e., whether these variables encouraged or dis­
couraged their purchase). This was an intended to com­
pensate for what was perceived to be a serious flaw in pre­
vious studies. Most of the studies of this type will at­
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tempt to discover whether or not people who adopt an in­
novation were influenced by certain variables. However, 
this influence may be either positive or negative. Fre­
quently a second set of questions is designed to determine 
if people approve or disapprove of different types of in­
centives. A comparison of responses among people who adopt 
specific alternatives is then made in order to determine 
whether incentives tend, on the average, to encourage or 
discourage adoption.
In this study, such a comparison was made in only one 
step and the effect of these decision factors can be tied 
more readily to adoption. The range of these variables is 
from 1 to 5 (1 = very discouraging, 5 = very encouraging). 
Respondents were given the option of saying that a variable 
has no impact. Such responses have been coded here as 
neutral (3). This is a subjective interpretation and it 
may be seen as an arbitrary means of coding this variable. 
However, it is probably no less arbitrary than to attempt 
to break the variable down into a nominal variable, coding 
discouraging as 0 and encouraging as 1. In the latter 
case, there would still be a subjective decision regarding 
how to classify the no impact response. Not only is the 
method chosen as reliable as any other, it helps to 
preserve more of the original data. The (non-missing) 
responses to these factors are presented in Table 5.4. For 
purposes of discussion, we shall break these variables down 
into groups of similar variables.
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TABLE 5.4
ADJUSTED FREQUENCIES OF 
DECISION VARIABLES
DISCOURAGING NEUTRAL ENCOURAGING 
Some Some
Very what what Very TOTAL
Initial Cost......... 3.3 15.0 22.5 25.8 33.3 99.9% 
(N=120)
Long-term Savings.... 3.3 2.5 11.7 20.8 61.7 100.0 
(N=120)
Tax Credits.......... 6.1 2.6 69.6 13.0 8.7 100.0 
(N=115)
Owned One Before..... 0.8 0.0 71.2 12.7 15.3 100.0 
(N=118)
Relative Owned One.. .. 0.0 3.5 57.5 22.1 16.8 99.9 
(N=113)
Relative's Advice.... 0.0 4.5 57.1 23.2 15.2 100.0 
(N=112)
Salesperson1s Advice.. 1.8 0.0 79.6 15.9 2.7 100.0 
(N=113)
Engineer1 s Advice.... 0.0 0.9 73.0 15.7 10.4 100.0 
(N=115)
Builder's Advice..... 0.0 1.8 73.0 10.8 14.4 100.0 
(N=lll)
Demonstration Home.... 0.9 0.0 87.5 8.0 3.6 100.0 
(N=109)
Newspapers............ 0.0 3.7 46.8 34.9 14.7 100.1 
(N=109)
Price Factors
Three variables are concerned primarily with price: 
the initial cost, the long-term savings, and the tax 
credits. Cunningham and Lopreato (1977) have argued that 
price is a major factor, especially among low and middle 
income purchasers. Similarly, Boaz-Allen says that recent 
owners install for economic reasons. But we felt here that 
price should be examined in different ways. Shama (1981) 
says that it is high first cost that leads to rejection.
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According to this data, the vast majority of people found 
this factor to be either encouraging (59.1%) or neutral 
(27%). This is to be somewhat expected since these people 
actually adopted the energy system that they considered. 
What is interesting, however, is that so many people would 
actually adopt an energy system that they found discourag­
ing because of its large initial cost (18.5%).
Darley and Beniger say that people may informally cal­
culate the potential savings prior to adoption and that 
this perceived savings is an important consideration in 
their purchase. Here, only 5.8% were discouraged by the 
possibility of long-term savings (or the lack of long-term 
savings).
Tax credits have never been a very important factor. 
The SERI study found that it only ranked 10th among adop­
ters of solar equipment, and that only 1/2 of their respon­
dents thought that it was important. Similarly, Marsden 
(1980) says that relatively few homeowners have taken ad­
vantage of these credits. Here we see that for nearly 70% 
of those who actually adopt some system, tax breaks had no 
impact. When they do have an impact, it is more often en­
couraging (21.7%) than discouraging (8.7%).
Norms and Habits
People need detailed, first-hand experience. For that 
reason, we decided to see how many people had purchased an 
energy system because they had owned one before. The
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largest response is for those who people who say that hav­
ing owned one before had no real impact on their decision 
(44.4%), which, of course, is not to say that they had not 
owned one previously. Again, when it does play a role, it 
tends to be encouraging (28% of the total, 97% of the non­
neutral responses). Of course we would not expect people 
to adopt an energy system that they were unhappy with in 
the past.
We defined norms earlier as expected patterns of be­
havior. Those behaviors which are most often observed and 
which are enforced through positive and negative sanctions 
will become accepted as standards. Models of market pene­
tration assume that the probability of adoption at time T 
is a function of the number of previous adopters (Shama, 
1981b). Lowe and Moryadas state that the uneven distribu­
tion of the population varies the opportunities to observe 
successful adoptions. In this study we have two different 
measures of normative perception. First of all, Table 5.4 
gives us the impact of the ownership by relatives of sys­
tems similar to those which had been purchased by the 
respondent. This is our variable Relative Owned.
We have also been able to develop a measure of the 
number of adopters that our respondents may know, but we 
are not able to tell whether or not they knew them prior to 
making a decision about their own energy systems. To 
measure the degree of normative exposure, respondents were 
asked how many people they knew who owned certain types of
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energy systems, including photovoltaics, solar hot water, 
passive solar homes, greenhouses, windmills or wood stoves.
This set of responses posed more problems than other 
variables in the study. First of all, many of the respon­
ses were ambiguous: "many", "lots", "everybody I know".
These responses have been given the mean score of all 
responses.
The next difficulty was the extreme outliers of the 
responses: 1000, 2000, etc. In order to deal with these 
scores, a new variable was created for each of the six 
types of energy systems by taking the log of the variable. 
By adding together these logged variables, we have created 
a new variable which we shall call TOTAL EXPOSURE. The 
mean values of these logged responses and the newly created 
variable are reported in Table 5.5.
Information
Lack of information is usually the 1st or 2nd greatest 
hindrance to adoption. According to our model as well as 
previous research, we must also recognize that information 
can come from a variety of networks. Darley and Beniger 
point out that decisions are affected by interpersonal 
networks. We see these as being of two types, those that 
reflect input from primary reference groups versus those of 
secondary groups. Lowe and Moryadas say that the type of 
contact depends on the nature of the innovation. Here we 
shall just consider all adopters.
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TABLE 5.5
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR 
EXPOSURE VARIABLES
NON-MISSING RANGE
N LOWER UPPER MEAN STDEV
Photovotaics...... 14 0 6.66 .81 1.75
Solar hot water.... 0 3.00 .72 .79
Passive solar home. 94 0 3.40 .76 .78
Greenhouse........ 0 2.49 .72 .73
Wood stove........ 0 7.60 2.64 1.22
Windmill.......... 0 1.61 .25 .47
TOTAL EXPOSURE.... 189 0 7.61 2.82 1.26
To measure the impact of primary groups, we asked 
people what influence relatives had on their decision, ei­
ther through the advice that relatives gave them or through 
their experiences with similar systems (Relative Owned 
One). Returning to Table 5.4, we find once again that in 
the majority of cases this was not a factor (57.1% and 
57.5% respectively). On the other hand, the advice that 
relatives gave them and the experiences that they had were 
never very discouraging. In fact, they tended to be en­
couraging to about the same degree in both cases. You 
might expect these to fluctuate together since the advice 
that the relative's give should coincide with the experi­
ences that they have with these systems. On the other 
hand, such an expectation assumes that these relatives are 
always happy with the energy systems that they are using. 
Certainly, that would seem to be the case based on this 
data, but it is an empirical question that can only be ex­
amined by looking at both of these variables together.
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What we have referred to here as secondary group in­
formation can come from a variety of resources: builders, 
engineers, salespeople, demonstration homes, or newspapers. 
The building industry may often be a barrier. Builders are 
likely to want to build the sort of homes that they are 
used to building, which means that they will tend to recom­
mend traditional systems. In this survey, the advice of 
builders usually had no impact (73%). In only 2 cases 
(1.8%) was it a negative factor. In another 25.2% of the 
cases it was encouraging. It would seem from this that 
most people have made decisions prior to talking to builder 
or, if the home is already built, without talking to a 
builder or contractor.
On the other hand, the advice of both salespeople and 
engineers, the obvious alternatives to builders, was also 
overwhelmingly neutral, as was the last category that might 
be included with the building trades, demonstration homes. 
As with other variables, when they do have an impact it 
tends to be encouraging. On the other hand, they either 
offer a lot of contradictory evidence and are thus dis­
counted or they simply do not enter into people's decisions 
at an early enough point to really affect their considera­
tions .
The final variable in this category is newspapers.
Here we find more evidence of an impact, and one which 
again is overwhelmingly positive when it enters into deci­
sions. It was encouraging for 49.6% of the respondents and
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neutral for another 46.8%.
Individual Characteristics
Attitude Variables. All of the respondents were next 
asked to answer a series of questions designed to determine 
their attitudes about a variety of energy issues. These 
questions (see Table 5.6) fell into a few broad categories: 
the degree to which people favored solar power, the percep­
tion of an energy crisis, the degree to which people feel 
personally affected, the types of solutions that people 
felt were viable, and the degree of support for the govern­
ment’s policies. Table 5.6 gives the adjusted (non­
missing) responses to these questions.
As stated before, many people tend to think favorably 
of solar power. Huttman and Graeven state that 2/3 of the 
general public think that solar is one of our top energy 
sources. 1/3 even say that it is the most preferred energy 
source. They like it for homes and they tend to favor gov­
ernment support.
Here we find support for these earlier findings. We 
have tried, however, to itemize some of the characteristics 
of solar power in order to find our what it is that they 
find appealing and what might lead them to be disillusioned 
with this energy source. First of all, our respondents 
seem to find solar to be a viable alternative. People dis­
agree with the statements that solar will not contribute to
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TABLE 5.6
ADJUSTED FREQUENCIES OF 
ATTITUDE RESPONSES
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Very Some Some Very
much what what much
BIG INVESTMENT:The biggest 
problem with solar power is 
that it requires such a
large initial investment  7.6 8.1 9.3 44.2 30.1
(N=172)
SOLAR NO HELP:Solar power will 
never make a significant 
contribution to our energy
needs.........................  52.5 28.7 8.3 6.6 3.9
(N=181)
SCIENCE HELPS: Scientists
will be able to develop new 
forms of energy before we
have another crisis..........  27.0 32.5 20.2 13.5 6.1
(N=163)
TOO MECHANICAL: Only people 
with a lot of mechanical 
ability should own a solar
home..........................  61.2 24.2 6.7 6.7 1.1
(N=178)
CAN’T MEET ENDS: Energy
prices make it extremely 
difficult for my family to
make ends meet................ 35.3 17.6 16.6 18.2 12.3
(N=187)
SOON OBSOLETE:The solar 
technology now on the market 
will probably be obsolete in
5-10 years  11.3 17.6 23.3 29.6 18.2
(N=159)
USE AS AFFORDABLE:People should 
be allowed to use as much
energy as they can afford  47.3 17.4 11.4 11.4 12.5
(N=184)
TOO COLD:While solar homes are 
great for warm, sunny climates, 
it is too cold and cloudy for
them where I live............  46.1 25.3 11.2 9.6 7.9
(N=178)
NUKES SAFE:While some may dis­
agree, I think that nuclear pow­
er is safe and we should be put­




ADJUSTED FREQUENCIES OF 
ATTITUDE RESPONSES
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Very Some Some Very
much what what much
NO SHORTAGES:We need not worry 
about future energy shortages 
because America has a wide
variety of resources.........  67.8 20.8 6.6 2.7 2.2
(N=183)
RAISE TAXES:The government 
should place higher taxes on 
gas and oil in order to
discourage consumption.......  44.3 21.9 16.9 12.0 4.9
(N=183)
DOUBLE SOLAR FUNDS:The govern­
ment should immediately begin 
to at least double its funding 
for solar research and
development  8.2 7.7 14.3 22.5 46.2
(N=182)
ENOUGH OIL:This country still 
has plenty of oil, we just
need to find it............... 49.7 26.6 10.7 9.5 3.6
(N=169)
STOP NUKES:We should immediately 
put a stop to the building of
all nuclear power plants.....  38.3 11.1 12.2 10.0 28.3
(N—180)
SHORTAGE INEVITABLE:Another 
energy shortage seems to be
almost inevitable.............. 5.1 10.9 18.9 38.9 26.3
(N=175)
our energy needs (81.2%). And they do not think that it is 
too cold where they live for solar to be practical (71.4% 
disagree).
On the other hand, we must ask some questions about 
how much trust they have in the systems. Shama says that- 
people do not necessarily find systems unreliable. In this
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study we see that people tend to disagree that only mechan­
ical people should own a solar home (59.5%). Darley and 
Beniger, on the other hand, say that the experimental na­
ture of the technology leads people to question its 
viability. Here we find that a large number (47.8%) feel 
that the technology now on the market will soon be ob­
solete.
Finally, we must explore people's opinions about cost 
considerations. Again, Darley and Beniger sensitize us to 
the fact that perceived savings are important. This study 
indicates that people believe that solar requires a large 
initial investment (74.3%). This and the concerns about 
the technology would appear to be the biggest deterrents to 
adoption. These ideas, which we shall explore more fully 
in later sections (especially the issue of initial cost), 
may point to a need for more information (Shama, 1981a).
We must also see if there is some way to change this 
generally positive support for solar power into a more ac­
tive support. One way might be to convince people of the 
existence of a crisis. Becker says that the perceived 
legitimacy of the crisis is important. Similarly, Leonard- 
Barton and Rogers correlate the perception of a crisis with 
the amount of gas consumed. Here, though, we find that 
people already tend to think that there is a serious prob­
lem. The majority disagree that we have plenty of oil 
(76.3%) and that there is no problem because we have so 
many resources (88.6%). Furthermore, they tend to agree
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(65.2%) that another shortage is inevitable. This would 
tend to undermine Shoemaker's assumption that people are 
getting confusing signals about the energy crisis, the 
amount of oil, etc. and to provide support for Olsen's 
statement that most people are already aware of the 
seriousness of the problem. But we find that this is not 
enough to translate their support into action.
Another factor might be the extent to which they sup­
port the government's policies. We find here that they are 
against nuclear power. 71.4% disagree that nuclear power 
is safe. But they certainly do not want to put an immedi­
ate stop to the building on nuclear plants (49.4% dis­
agree) . Furthermore, they would like to see the funding of 
solar research doubled (68.7%).
Becker says that the degree of belief in science and 
technology as a solution to our problems helps to explain 
the amount of electrical consumption. If people think that 
science will solve our problems they are more likely to 
continue on their old paths now. Here we find that they 
do not see science as a solution (59.5% disagree that 
science helps). This is in contrast to their belief that 
the government should double the amount of solar funding, 
which would seem to imply that research and development ef­
forts would lead to success.
Perhaps the best explanation of why general support is 
not translated into action is that people do not feel per­
sonally affected by the perceived crisis. Hass, Bagley,
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and Rogers argue that it is not the perceived seriousness 
of the problem but the anticipated personal inconvenience 
which is important in explaining people's behavior. In 
this study we find that people do not think that things are 
so bad that they can't make ends meet (52.9% disagree). And 
they do not favor actions by the government which would 
make things more difficult for them. Most (66.2%) disagree 
that the government should raise taxes to discourage con­
sumption. Similarly, many (47.8%) feel that people should 
be able to use as much energy as they can afford.
We are left, then, with a need to consider why people 
might be inclined toward the adoption of alternatives such 
as solar and yet fail to make a commitment to purchase an 
alternative system. Two partial explanations may be indi­
cated by these preliminary findings: they believe that
solar is too costly and the technology is tentative.
Due to the large number of variables that were in­
cluded in this section, we also decided to factor analyze 
these variables to see if any of them would cluster togeth­
er in ways other than we had originally intended. Using 
SPSS with an oblique rotation, we found that there were a 
few underlying factors that seem to make sense and which 
were also distinctly different at times from the way that 
we had originally designed the questions. The rotated pat­
tern matrix appears in Table 5.7.
The first four of these factors seem to go together 
theoretically. In Factor 1 we find 3 variables which would
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appear to deal with attitudes toward the viability of solar 
power and one variable which deals with solutions to our 
energy problems. Since the last variable does not seem to 
make any theoretical sense and since it loads on this fac­
tor much less heavily than the other three variables, we
TABLE 5.7
ROTATED PATTERN MATRIX FOR 
ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES
SOLAR NO HELP 







































have opted to exclude it from this factor. By reversing 
the coding on the variable Double Solar Funds and adding 
these three variables together, we have developed a new 
variable which we shall refer to in subsequent analyses as 
NOSOLAR. It has a range of 3 to 15.
The second factor might not appear at first glance to
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make theoretical sense. Certainly the variables do not 
cluster together in the way that we had anticipated. The 
first two of the variables deal with the technology of 
solar power while the final variable was designed to 
measure price considerations. However, the initial invest­
ment may appear to be large because of the tenuous nature 
of the technology. These variables also seem to load on 
this factor to about the same degree, so we have added them 
together creating another variable which we shall call 
TOOTECHY.
In Factor 3 we find three variables which would appear 
to be concerned with the seriousness of the energy crisis. 
The first two of these variables deal with whether or not 
people think that there are enough energy resources for us 
to survive. Both of these questions load heavily on this 
factor. We might also assume that the third variable would 
be included in this factor, since it seems to theoretically 
cluster with the other two. However, it does not load 
heavily on this factor (or any other factor) and does not 
meet any minimum criteria for inclusion. Thus, we will add 
together the first two variables —  No Shortage and Enough 
Oil —  to create a new variable called PLENTY.
Factor 4 is the most obvious of the group. Both of 
the variables deal with nuclear power. Here we have 
reversed the order of Nukes Safe and created a variable 
called NONUKES.
The last factor creates some problems. They all load
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at above the .5 level on this factor but they do not make 
any theoretical sense. Raising taxes was a policy issue. 
The belief that science will solve our problems does not 
seem to go well with this variable. Finally, Can't Meet 
Ends deals with feelings of being personally affected.
Some sense could be made of the first or third variables, 
but the second one does not fit in at all. Since it does 
not seem logical to leave out the middle variable in a 
cluster, we have decided that this factor is simply an 
artifact (i.e. these variables are explaining a large part 
of the remaining variance) and we will not use it. We will 
also continue to use all of the other variables which have 
not been included in these composite variables.
In keeping with the model presented in the last chap­
ter, we will divide these attitude variables into two 
groups. The first is the General Attitudes: Science Helps, 
Can’t Meet Ends, Use As Affordable, Raise taxes, Shortage 
Inevitable, and PLENTY. We also have three specific atti­
tudes: NONUKES, NOSOLAR, and TOOTECHY.
Lowe and Moryadas argue that value compatibility will 
tend to moderate these other influences. Shoemaker says 
that values may serve as incentives or constraints to adop­
tion. For that reason, we will now turn to a consideration 
of the impacts of values on decisions.
Values
’ The idea of voluntary simplicity has been shown to be
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a strong predictor of adoption of solar alternatives. 
Leonard-Barton and Rogers said that it was the second 
strongest predictor of adoption. Here we have measured 
only one aspect of simplicity, that of independence. This 
seems to be an important variable for almost anyone who 
adopts. In Table 5.8 we see that 78.1% of the respondents 
were encouraged by the desire for independence. For 20% it 
was not an impact, but that seems low in comparison to many
TABLE 5.8 
ADJUSTED FREQUENCIES FOR VALUES
DISCOURAGING NEUTRAL ENCOURAGING
Some Some
Very what what Very TOTAL
Independence.........  1.7 0.0 20.0 19.1 59.1 99.9%
(115)
Clean Energy.........  3.5 19.1 13.9 28.7 34.8 100.0
(115)
Innovative Technology. 0.0 6.3 55.9 25.2 12.6 100.0
(111)
of the other variables we have examined.
The second of these variables, Clean Energy, shows 
much more variation. While 63.5% found this to be en­
couraging, 22.6% were discouraged by the fact that the type 
of system they adopted was not very clean. There could be 
some confusion here (which failed to show up in the pre­
test) about what is meant by clean energy. "Clean energy" 
could imply energy that is clean either in its use (like 
electricity in the home) or in terms of its impact on the
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environment (unlike electric energy generated from eoal 
fired power plants). If people are interpreting this in 
entirely different ways, then this could be more of a prob­
lem in later analyses.
Finally, we need to consider the importance of innova­
tiveness in people's decisions to adopt. Unseld and Crew 
state that adopters are interested in technology and desire 
to innovate. Lowe and Moryadas say that each individual 
has a different level of resistance to innovation. Final­
ly, Darley and Beniger believe that there is an interaction 
between innovation and life-pattern interaction. In any 
event, this would seem to be an important variable for 
adopters. In this study, we find that for half of the 
adopters this variable had no impact. On the other hand, 
it was only a discouraging aspect of the technology for 
6.3% of the respondents and acted to encourage 37.8%,
Knowledge
On the basis of the findings presented in Chapter 4, 
it was also anticipated that the amount of knowledge people 
have about energy matters might be an important factor in 
their decisions to adopt alternatives. Let us turn now to 
the indicators developed to measure these factors.
Arbuthnot (1977) says the environmental knowledge is 
the 2nd best overall predictor of adoption. Here we have 
designed a series of questions to test people’s knowledge 





TRUE FALSE DK TOTAL
TURN DOWN HEAT:Turning down the 
heat at night saves less energy 
than it takes to reheat it in
the morning......................  23.4 70.2 6.4 100.0%
(N=188)
CONSUMPTION:On a per person 
basis, energy consumption in the 
United States is still the same
as it was in 1960................ 4.2 73.0 22.8 100.0%
(N=188)
PASSIVE COSTS:When you consider 
both energy costs and mortgage 
payments, passive solar homes
cost more than traditional homes. 17.0 46.8 36.2 100.0%
(N=188)
TABLE 5.9b
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES FOR 
VARIABLE KNOWLEDGE
ABSOLUTE ADJUSTED






are not regarded here as subjective in nature but are 
verifiable in terms of their content. The majority of- 
people gave the correct response to each of the questions 
(Table 5.9a).
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The first question, regarding whether or not it is 
more efficient to turn down the heat at night, is false. 
While certainly there can be some individual variation 
(depending on the mass of the house, the general house de­
sign, etc.), in general as long as the heat is down for 8 
hours or more you save more heat than you use to reheat the 
house in the morning (thus the proliferation of thermostats 
that do exactly this on a regular basis, thereby saving the 
homeowner the need to worry about always remembering to 
turn it down at night).
The second question is also false. Per capita energy 
consumption in the United States is about twice as high as 
it was in 1960. Here we see that 132 people actually got 
this correct.
The final question was apparently the most difficult. 
For the average solar home, the actual monthly payments are 
less than for traditional homes because the energy costs 
are so high for the latter (New Hampshire Governor's Energy 
Council, 1981).
The next step was to change these into dichotomous 
variables. For this purpose, correct responses have been 
coded as 1 and all incorrect responses (including don't 
knows) have been coded 0.
Finally, rather than using each of these variables in 
the analysis, the decision was made to develop a cumulative 
index by adding together the scores on the individual ques­
tions. The result is a new variable, KNOWLEDGE, with a
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range of 0 to 3. The distribution of Knowledge is reported 
in Table 5.9b. Only a few people (15) got all of the ans­
wers wrong. The mode is 2 and the mean is 1.97.
Dogmatism
Finally, it would seem that the degree of openness 
possessed by individuals could be an important considera­
tion in terms of its effect on people's willingness to try 
out new ideas or even in their receptivity to novel in­
formation. The approach which we have developed here 
sensitizes us to the fact that people will be differential­
ly receptive to information. Following Bandura (1976) we 
must try to measure the amount of openness of people to new 
information. Here we actually measure the obverse of open­
ness, dogmatism. This variable has been explored through­
out the social psychological literature, but here we have 
chosen to use four of the top five questions of a scale de­
veloped by Triandis (1971). The actual questions are 
reported in Table 5.10.
These variables, like the attitude questions, were 
coded on a scale of 1 (disagree very much) to 5 (agree very 
much). The distributions are reported in Table 5.10.
These questions were asked of all respondents so the total 
N would again be 189.
In the first question we see that the majority of 
respondents disagree that the best way to learn what is 
going on is to rely on leaders or experts. It would seem
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from this that our respondents trust their ability to make 
decisions and form opinions.
In the second question, the majority of people either 
are neutral or agree that they tend to get angry when other 
people refuse to admit that they are wrong. This would be
TABLE 5.10
ADJUSTED FREQUENCIES OF RESPONSES 
TO DOGMATISM QUESTIONS
DISAGREE NEUTRAL AGREE TOTAL
RELY ON LEADERS:In this 
complicated world or ours, 
the only way to know what 
is going on is to rely on 
leaders who can be
trusted.................. 32.6 25.5 12.5 20.1 9.2 99.9%
(N=184)
GET ANGRY:I get really 
angry when a person 
stubbornly refuses to 
admit that they are
wrong....................  11.0 10.4 28.0 28.0 22.5 99.9%
{N=182)
TWO TYPES:There are two 
kinds of people in this 
world: those who are for 
the truth and those who
are against it  47.8 20.2 14.6 10.1 7.3 100.0%
(N=178)
ONE PHILOSOPHY:Of all the 
different philosophies 
which exist in the world, 
there is probably only
one which is correct..... 72.4 13.8 9.9 0.6 3.3 100.0%
(N=181)
an indicator of dogmatism based on earlier studies. In 
contrast, for the third and fourth question we find that 
the majority of respondents are answering in what would ap-
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pear to be a non-dogmatic manner.
As with the earlier sets of questions, we decided to 
create one new variable for subsequent analysis. In an 
SPSS factor analysis all of the variables loaded onto one 
factor. Thus, we decided that it was legitimate to simply 
add them up to create a variable which we will call DOG­
MATISM. People who rank high on this variable will more 
dogmatic. Those who rank low will be less more open and 
should be more receptive to new information and more likely 
to adopt innovations.
Summary
We began this chapter with a discussion of the sample 
design and then proceeded to a presentation of the con­
struction of the questionnaire. Out of the questionnaire 
we have developed a few groups of variables that fit into 
the model developed in Chapter 4: situational variables; 
decision factors (including price, information and norms); 
and individual characteristics (attitudinal variables; 
values, overall knowledge, and dogmatism).
Up to this point we have only looked at how the 
responses to these variables are distributed among all of 
the participants in the survey. Drawing on LaBay and Kin- 
near, however, we recognize that we must examine the dif­
ferences among those who adopt various types of energy sys­
tems. In the next chapter we shall begin to look for any
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between group differences and then see how well our model 





In Chapter 5 we looked at how the theoretical issues 
which we had elaborated upon in the previous chapters have 
been operationalized for this dissertation. In this chapter 
we will conduct one way analysis of variance to look for 
differences between the groups for each of our dependent 
variables: centralized versus decentralized adopters; solar 
non-adopters versus solar adopters; wood non-adopters versus 
wood adopters; non-adopters versus all adopters; unaware 
adopters versus solar adopters;, and, finally, unaware non­
adopters versus wood adopters. This should help to inform 
our discussion in the next chapter in which we will employ 
logit analysis to decide which variables to include in a 
model which will best predict our various dependent vari­
ables. Let us turn now to the comparisons for each of our 
groups of independent variables.
Centralized v. Decentralized Adopters
Situational Variables
In Table 6.1 we see first the breakdown of our demo­




MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL 
BY CENTRALIZED/DECENTRALIZED ADOPTER
Centralized Decentralized P-value

















Duncan SEI........ 61.57 16.73 60.55 19.38 .792 .920
Family Income..... 7.25 2.18 6.61 2.27 .136 .096
Education......... 13.91 1.10 13.86 1.31 .817 . 924
Year Purchased.... 69.56 10.51 74.48 7.40 .003 .007
House Age......... 38.62 46.04 34.17 53.86 .640 .018
House Size........ 7.62 2.50 6.97 1.74 .084 .177
DECISION FACTORS
Initial Cost...... 3.62 1.09 3.75 1.22 .551 .424
Long-term Savings.. 3.62 1.29 4.70 .58 .000 .000
Tax Credits....... 3.08 .65 3.19 .94 .537 .289
TOTAL EXPOSURE.... 2. 82 1.32 3.23 1.14 .072 .058
Relative Owned One. 3.34 .73 3.60 .84 .117 .092
Owned One Before. .. 2.62 .99 2.73 .82 .529 .760
Relative * s Advice.. 3.31 .68 3.57 .85 .118 .106
Salesperson’s Advice 
Engineer’s Advice..
3.29 .70 3.13 .47 .188 .128
3.44 .77 3.32 .63 .350 .342
Builder's Advice... 3.53 .83 3.31 .71 .160 .169
Demonstration Home. 3.12 .41 3.14 .53 .819 .683
Newspapers........ 3.28 .58 3.74 .82 .005 .001
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
Science Helps..... 2.73 1.04 2.23 1.26 .049 .013
Can’t Meet Ends.... 2.40 1.42 2.59 1.47 .505 .578
Use As Affordable.. 2.74 1.54 1.95 1.33 .003 .005
Raise Taxes....... 1.74 .98 2.22 1.27 .035 .051
Shortage Inevitable 3.37 1.28 3.92 1.05 .014 .023
PLENTY............. 3.23 1.61 3.17 1.37 .829 .926
NOSOLAR........... 8.77 3.34 7.34 3.34 .037 .021
NONUKES........... 5.07 3.27 6.68 3.02 .008 .004
TOOTECHY.......... 8.81 2.93 8.55 2.22 .623 .556
Independence...... 3.34 .91 4.78 .48 .000 .000
Clean Energy...... 4.28 .85 3.47 1.29 .001 .002
Innovative Tech.... 3.50 .71 3.42 .83 .608 .598
DOGMATIC.......... 10.20 3.21 9.15 2.97 .001 .096
KNOWLEDGE......... 1.58 .94 2.05 .95 .009 .006
151
variance, two of these variables show significant dif­
ferences between the means —  Age and Year Purchased.
House Size, however, had a highly skewed distribution. Be­
cause this could be characteristic of many of our variables, 
we have also conducted a Kruskall Wallis test for dif­
ferences between the groups. The Kruskall Wallis test com­
pensates for the skewed nature of the distribution because 
it is based on the median rather than the mean. The results 
of this test (reported in the last column), demonstrate that 
House Size is also significant. We will discuss each of 
these in turn.
The age of the centralized adopters is nearly 5 years 
higher on average than that of the decentralized adopters. 
This is to a certain extent understandable. Adopters of all 
innovations generally tend to be younger than those who con­
tinue to use traditional technologies. But here we would 
expect it to be the case because the older respondents would 
have been more likely to purchase their homes prior to the 
era when knowledge and information about alternative systems 
was widely available.
This seems to be borne out by the fact that the other 
significant variable is the year in which the house is pur­
chased. The homes of the centralized adopters tend to have 
been purchased about 5 years earlier than the homes of the 
decentralized adopters. We would also expect, then, for the 
age of the homes with centralized systems to be greater than 
the age of decentralized homes. Such is the case here, but
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the difference does not appear to be significant. Finally 
with respect to the final housing characteristic,the size of 
the homes with decentralized systems is slightly smaller 
than those with centralized energy systems.
One would not expect there to be significant dif­
ferences between these two groups in terms of their sex or 
their marital status. But the fact that there is no dif­
ference in education seems somewhat surprising. The problem 
may arise from two different points. One, it is the wood 
adopters who dominate this decentralized category. Perhaps 
women are less inclined to use wood because of the effort 
involved. The other is the fact that both groups are ac­
tually adopters, just of different types of systems, so per­
haps we should not expect there to be as much difference be­
tween them as between adopters and nonadopters.
Decision Factors
Price Considerations. In this section we find that 
there is only one variable which demonstrates significant 
differences between the means. From the price-related vari­
ables we find that only the possibility of long-term savings 
was significantly different for these two groups. It had a 
much more positive impact for the group that adopted the 
decentralized alternative. It is surprising that the ini­
tial cost was not a stronger deterrent for the decentralized 
adopters. Perhaps this, too, is a product of the wood adop­
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ters1 domination of this category. Tax credits appears to 
be neutral for both groups, as we would expect based on the 
results of other studies mentioned in the last chapter.
Normative Exposure and Habit. We might very well ex­
pect that the people who have adopted decentralized alterna­
tives are more likely to have seen such systems in operation 
than those who adopt the centralized alternatives. This is 
not borne out in this data, however. While there is a 
slight difference, with decentralized adopters stating that 
they knew more people who had decentralized systems, this 
difference is not significant using either of our tests. On 
the other hand, the Kruskall Wallis test is very close to 
showing a significant difference.
The fact that relatives may have owned a system similar 
to the one which the respondent purchased seems to have 
played no role here. For both groups, the impact was 
neutral and there was no difference between them. Similar­
ly, the fact that there the respondent had owned the same 
type of system which was subsequently purchased shows no 
significant differences. It was odd, though, that for both 
sets of respondents, this variable had a negative affect on 
their decision. Only .8% of our respondents answered in 
this manner, but apparently those few people who answered 
that it was a very discouraging factor in their decision was 
enough to bring down the mean. These respondents who were 
discouraged but purchased a system again in spite of this
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may have simply perceived no alternative.
Information. Among the information variables, we find 
that information from primary reference groups (relatives 
advice) fails to show any difference between these two 
groups. And from among the secondary information variables, 
the only significant difference is for newspapers. Here we 
find that the information was more positive for the 
decentralized adopters. This is not the sort of result we 
would have expected given the earlier assumption that in­
formation networks are primarily controlled by those who 
wish to perpetuate centralized alternatives. It may be that 
since the original category was newspapers or magazines, 
what people have done is seek out magazines that deal with 
non-traditional alternatives prior to making their decision.
Individual Characteristics
Attitudes. Recall that in the previous chapter we de­
veloped new variables based on a factor analysis of the at­
titude variables used in the survey. Here we will employ 
those new variables (which we will designate by using capi­
tal letters) as well as the other attitude variables which 
were not included in the scales. We will not discuss the 
differences between the means for the individual variables 
included in each of the scales since they are not going to 
be used in our analyses on a separate basis. That leaves us
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with 5 remaining variables and 4 attitude scales.
We see, first, that those who have adopted the central­
ized alternatives are more likely to believe that science 
will be able to solve our energy problems. This would seem 
to tie in well with their greater trust in nuclear power, 
since we see that they are less likely to argue that it is 
dangerous or that it should be stopped immediately. On the 
other hand, while they like science, they do not think that 
science in the form of solar power offers much of a solu­
tion. Here we see that they are more likely than the 
decentralized adopters to be against solar alternatives. 
Finally, as we would expect, those who believe that science 
will solve our problems and that nuclear power is a solution 
are also less likely to think that another energy shortage 
is inevitable.
Turning to the other variables that have significant 
differences, we see that the centralized adopters are more 
inclined to agree that people should be able to use as much 
energy as they can afford. They are also against raising 
taxes in order to encourage conservation.
The other variables do not show significant dif­
ferences. It is a little uprising in a few of these cases 
since so much of the literature seems to present an opposite 
viewpoint on these attitudes. For example, the only vari­
able to measure felt personal impact (Can’t Meet Ends) does 
not show a significant difference. Perhaps this was too 
strong a statement since most people tended to disagree.
PLEASE NOTE
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respondents has more to do with the cleanliness of the sys­
tem at the point of use rather than a larger environmental 
concern, since that would seem to be what the responses dic­
tate.
Knowledge and Dogmatism. Finally, the centralized 
adopters seem to know less about energy issues in general. 
They score significantly lower on the knowledge variable 
than do the decentralized adopters. They also tend to be 
more dogmatic although this latter variable is not sig­
nificant at the .05 level.
Solar Nonadopters versus Solar Adopters 
Situational Variables
In Table 6.2 we find that House Age and Year Purchased 
show significant differences if we account for the fact that 
they have skewed distributions by using the Kruskall Wallis 
statistic. The fact that solar homes tend to be much 
younger is not at all surprising. However, we find little 
difference between adopters and non-adopters on other 
demographic variables. This is probably due to the fact 
that while solar adopters may not be the same as the general 
population, those who consider it at all in the first place 
tend to have similar characteristics.
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TABLE 6.2
MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS 
BY AWARE SOLAR NONADOPTERS/SOLAR ADOPTERS
Solar Solar
NonAdopters Adopters P-value
Mean StDev Mean StDev ANOVA K-W
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES
Age................ 47.92 12.54 48.29 15.02 .916 .931
Sex................ .31 .29 .915 .914
Marital Status.... .09 .24 .111 • 111
Duncan SEI........ 60.53 20.19 60.69 24.28 .981 .842
Family Income..... 7.31 2.09 6.25 2.38 .084 .080
Education......... 13. 98 1.34 13.82 1.63 .675 .946
Year Purchased.... 73.77 7.82 76.29 10.20 .270 .017
House Age......... 38. 99 49.77 8.59 10.27 .015 .000
House Size........ 7. 43 1.87 6.88 1.54 .275 .228
DECISION FACTORS
Initial Cost...... 1.57 .90 3.25 1.29 .000 .000
Long-term Savings.. 3.47 1.24 4.75 .58 .000 .000
Tax Credits....... 3.55 1.03 3.81 1.05 .367 .396
TOTAL EXPOSURE.... 3.02 1.18 3.63 1.19 .060 .062
Relative Owned One. 3.19 .52 3.53 .74 .046 .048
Owned One Before... 3.00 .00 3.24 .56 .003 .002
Salesperson’s Advice 3.01 .54 3.13 .35 .439 .335
Relative1s Advice.. 3.17 .47 3.60 .63 .006 .002
Engineer’s Advice.. 2.96 .44 4.06 .77 .000 .000
Builder's Advice... 2.92 .33 3.86 1.03 .000 .000
Demonstration Home. 3.24 .69 3.53 .74 .159 .221
Newspapers........ 3.54 1.07 4.07 .80 .082 .068
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
Science Helps..... 2.19 .95 2.25 1.53 .855 .606
Can' t Meet Ends.... 2.62 1.43 1.71 1.21 .019 .014
Use As Affordable.. 2.33 1.53 1.41 .71 .019 .031
Raise Taxes....... 2.25 1.31 2.41 1.37 .655 .655
Shortage Inevitable 3.71 1.06 4.00 1.28 .342 .173
PLENTY............ 3.03 1.59 3.50 1.36 .286 .065
NOSOLAR........... 8.14 3.52 6.24 3.35 .051 .015
NONUKES........... 6.66 2.98 6.38 3.14 .739 .869
TOOTECHY.......... 8.09 2.17 8.06 2.22 .951 .927
Independence...... 4.16 1.00 4.82 .39 .010 .005
Clean Energy...... 4.28 .79 4.63 .81 .132 .052
Innovative Tech.... 3.75 1.16 4.07 .70 .314 .484
DOGMATIC.......... 8.91 2.44 9.93 3.75 .203 .400
KNOWLEDGE......... 2.09 .86 2.18 .81 .724 .795
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Decision Factors
Price Considerations. Initial cost and long-term 
savings were both more discouraging for those who at first 
considered solar power and then decided not to adopt. The 
difference for initial cost is especially large, and would 
seem to be playing a major role in people's decisions.
Normative Exposure and Habit. There is very little 
difference between these groups with regard to how many 
people they know who have such systems. This is not sur­
prising since they would tend to know other solar owners 
prior to even considering such a purchase.
There are significant differences however for our other 
two variables in this category. The fact that relatives had 
owned a similar system had a more positive impact on adop­
ters of solar alternatives. Similarly, having owned one be­
fore plays a positive role in the decisions of people who 
choose to adopt. We would not expect many people to have 
owned such a system before, because they are so rare. 
Certainly this is the case with the non-adopters. However, 
some of the owners state that they had owned a solar system 
before and the experience had a positive impact on their de­
cision to purchase a new system.
Information. Here we find that the advice of both pri­
mary reference groups (relatives) and secondary reference 
groups (engineers and builders) has tended to discourage
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people who decided against purchasing solar equipment and 
acted to encourage those who did adopt such systems. It 
would be interesting to be able to determine to whom these 
people had actually turned for advice. Certainly if this is 
characteristic of the entire population, then solar pur­
chases could be greatly enhance through the additional sup­
port of these categories of people.
Individual Characteristics
Since there are so few differences here, we shall discuss 
all of them together. It is not surprising that there are 
so few differences between the groups, since we would expect 
that anyone open to solar power would have similar back­
grounds and attitudes. Solar adopters are, however, much 
less likely than solar non-adopters to agree that people 
should be able to use as much energy as they can afford. 
There is also a difference with regard to their attitude 
toward solar power. Those who have adopted solar systems 
tend to be more likely to say that solar has a future (i.e., 
they score lower on the NOSOLAR scale). This should be ex­
pected given the advice they have received from people. The 
adopters are more likely to be pro-solar, but the difference 
is not significant at the .05 level. Finally, with regard 
to values, the solar adopters are more likely to say that 
independence played an positive role in their decision and 
that clean energy was also important for them.
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Wood Nonadopters versus Wood Adopters
Situational Variables
This was our largest category of adopters. We see in 
Table 6.3 that the only significant difference between these 
groups is on the variable House Age. Older homes are, of 
course, more difficult to retrofit than newer ones, so this 
could explain most of the difference. None of the other 
demographic variables showed any significant differences. 
This is probably to be expected. Many people from all walks 
of life have adopted wood, it is accessible to people in any 
income group, and houses of any age or size can be 
retrofitted to accommodate wood. To explore the differences 
here, we must turn to our other categories.
Decision Factors
Price Considerations. As in our other comparisons, both 
initial cost and long-term savings had a more positive in­
fluence on adopters than on non-adopters. In fact, both 
were discouraging factors for non-adopters. This fact is 
difficult to understand since wood is so often seen as re­
quiring very little investment and having a very fast 
payback period, oddly enough, the availability of tax 
credits plays the opposite role. Perhaps those who have ac­
tually adopted found the tax credits to be smaller than they
TABLE 6.3
MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL 
BY AWARE WOOD NON ADOPTERS/WOOD ADOPTERS
Wood Wood
Nonadopters Adopters P-value
Mean StDev Mean StDev ANOVA K-W
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES
Age................ 46.30 13.61 47.18 11.43 .760 .629
Sex................ .30 .22 .403 .399
Marital Status.... .17 .10 .359 .356
Duncan SEI........ 59.33 18.98 59.93 18.63 .908 1.000
Family Income..... 6.18 2.54 6.71 2.20 .356 .426
Education......... 13.27 1.64 13.86 1.25 .081 .105
Year Purchased.... 72.00 8.22 73.97 6.58 .254 .341
House Age......... 44.30 38.31 39.11 57.17 .686 .020
House Size........ 7.22 2.17 7.03 1.77 .676 .949
DECISION FACTORS
Initial Cost...... 2.25 1.02 3.83 1.21 .000 .000
Long-term Savings.. 2.72 1.32 4.69 .58 .000 .000
Tax Credits....... 3.24 .75 3.02 .83 .323 .233
TOTAL EXPOSURE.... 2.15 1.09 3.14 1.09 .000 .000
Relative Owned One. 3.31 1.02 3.59 .86 .265 .525
Owned One Before... 2.87 .35 3.46 .78 .006 .003
Salesperson's Advice: 3.25 .78 3.12 .48 .412 .472
Relative's Advice.. 3.25 .86 3.57 .88 .369 .511
Engineer's Advice.. 2.80 .56 3.17 .48 .012 .012
Builder's Advice... 2.93 .26 3.21 .57 .068 .051
Demonstration Home. 3.00 .38 3.06 .43 .613 .511
Newspapers........ 3.07 .88 3.69 .81 .011 .014
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
Science Helps..... 2.89 1.37 2.17 1.37 .029 .040
Can't Meet Ends.... 3.09 1.45 2.77 1.45 .370 .335
Use As Affordable.. 2.55 1.60 2.06 1.40 .175 .202
Raise Taxes....... 1.67 1.02 2.14 1.23 .110 .095
Shortage Inevitable 3.24 1.18 3.90 1.00 .014 .016
PLENTY............ 4.00 2.09 3.09 1.34 .029 .083
NOSOLAR........... 8.89 3.25 7.70 3.39 .179 .111
NONUKES........... 6.35 3.28 6.67 3.02 .686 .692
TOOTECHY.......... 9.47 2.64 8.67 2.19 .229 .152
Independence...... 3.50 .86 4.76 .50 .000 .000
Clean Energy...... 2.40 1.06 3.20 1.23 .023 .030
Innovative Tech.... 2.87 .92 3.29 .79 .070 .191
DOGMATIC.......... 11.65 2.94 9.07 2.85 .001 .001
KNOWLEDGE......... 1.50 .80 2.04 .99 .022 .010
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were originally perceived.
Normative Exposure and Habit. Wood adopters know more 
people who are using wood than do the non-adopters. They 
are also more likely to say that having owned one before had 
a positive impact on their decision to purchase this time 
around.
Information. Only three of these variables show any sig­
nificant differences. Again, engineer's advice plays a role 
in people's decision, but this time it is a positive role, 
although not strongly positive on average. Builders also 
prove to be more supportive of wood as an alternative. In 
addition, newspapers tend to have a more positive impact on 
adopters' decisions than they did for non-adopters.
Individual Characteristics
Attitudes. We see here that three of our attitude var­
iables show significant differences. The first of these is 
Science Helps. Wood users are significantly less likely to 
think that science will provide solutions to our problems. 
They are also more likely to think that a shortage in in­
evitable and less inclined to believe that we still have 
plenty of oil. Other attitudes, regarding solar power and 
nuclear power, tend to be about the same for both groups.
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Values. Once again, both Independence and Clean Energy 
show significant differences. As in other cases, the desire 
to be independent was a much more positive factor for adop­
ters than for non-adopters. In addition, in this com­
parison, a desire for clean energy discouraged the non­
adopters. In other words, nonadopters tend to see this as 
not a very clean source of energy, and they are discouraged 
on that account.
Dogmatism and Knowledge. The people who thought about 
wood and then decided against such a purchase have a much 
higher score on the dogmatism scale than do the adopters.
In fact, this group has the highest score of the entire set 
of comparisons we have made. Perhaps this is due to the 
fact that so many people have considered wood. Thus, the 
score is more indicative of the degree of dogmatism in the 
survey respondents as a whole. Finally, those who adopted 
wood demonstrate much more knowledge about energy than the 
non-adopters.
Unaware Nonadopters versus All Adopters
Beginning with Table 6.4, we will only be able to make 
comparisons based on the responses to our demographic vari­
ables and respondents individual characteristics {not in­
cluding values). Since the questionnaire only allowed 
people to state the role that decision factors and values
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TABLE 6.4
MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS 
FOR ALL NON-ADOPTERS/ALL ADOPTERS
All
Nonadopters Adopters P-value
Mean StDev Mean StDev ANOVA K-W
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES
Age................ 48.26 14.29 48.57 12.71 .883 .589
Sex................ .43 .25 .015 .016
Marital Status.... .20 .14 .338 .336
Duncan SEI........ 58.55 22.57 60.90 18.42- .493 .806
Family Income..... 6.38 2.49 6.85 2.25 .209 .160
Education......... 13.58 1.53 13.87 1.23 .167 .284
Year Purchased.... 73.23 7.24 72.73 8.91 .704 .877
House Age......... 47.80 47.13 35.73 51.10 .122 .000
House Size........ 7.41 1.76 7.20 2.06 .488 .352
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
Science Helps..... 2.41 1.17 2.38 1.21 .870 .790
Can11 Meet Ends.... 2.58 1.42 2.53 1.45 .805 .737
Use As Affordable.. 2.28 1.47 2.23 1.45 .802 .751
Raise Taxes..... 2.25 1.33 2.06 1.20 .337 .451
Shortage Inevitable 3.61 1.06 3.75 1.16 .470 .308
PLENTY............. 3.73 2.00 3.19 1.45 .053 .160
NOSOLAR........... 8.51 3.53 7.79 3.39 .203 .206
NONUKES........... 6.43 3.16 6.14 3.18 .573 .591
TOOTECHY.......... 8.51 2.08 8.63 2.44 .794 .785
DOGMATIC.......... 9.41 3.33 9.51 3.08 .843 .673
KNOWLEDGE......... 1.92 .70 1.88 .97 .804 .907
TOTAL EXPOSURE.... 2.26 1.18 3.09 1.22 .000 .000
played in their adoption decisions, then since they had not 
even thought about adopting, the unaware non-adopters, by 
definition, have no responses to these variables. Since 
there are so few significant variables to discuss, we will 
simply discuss everything at once.
In Table 6.4 we see that Sex and House Age are the only 
situational variables to show a significant difference be­
tween the groups. Non-adopters are much more likely to be
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women. We might attribute this to the fact that women who 
live alone may be less likely to devote the energy to the 
installation of a new system. But there is no significant 
difference between the groups in terms of marital status or 
any other category that would help us to understand this 
difference. It could only be attributed to the fact that in 
families where the woman is more likely to respond to the 
questionnaire, some other factor is also at work. As in the 
past, the homes of nonadopters tend to be older.
The only other variable to show significant differences 
is Total Exposure. Here we see that the adopters know more 
people who have decentralized systems. Recall that this is 
all adopters, both centralized and decentralized. We need 
to look next at a more detailed breakdown.
Unaware Nonadopters versus Solar Adopters
In Table 6.5 we should first note that the age of the 
homes of solar adopters is again much less than the age of 
homes for unaware non-adopters. This is not surprising 
given that the solar technology is a relatively new innova­
tion, so older homes will not be likely to have it in­
corporated into their design. We see no other differences 
in the situational variables. Even the difference in the 
sex of respondents has disappeared.
Of the remaining variables, two now show significant 
differences. As we might expect, the solar adopters are
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TABLE 6.5
MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS 
FOR UNAWARE NON-ADOPTERS/SOLAR ADOPTERS
Solar
Nonadopters Adopters P-value
Mean StDev Mean StDev ANOVA K-W
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES
Age................ 50.21 15.74 48.29 15.02 .698 .643
Sex................ .42 .29 .435 .428
Marital Status.... .25 .24 .917 .915
Duncan SEX........ 56.50 24.23 60.69 24.28 .638 .748
Family Income..... 6.08 2.36 6.25 2.38 .828 .759
Education.......... 13.91 1.16 13.82 1.63 .840 .816
Year Purchased.... 72.50 7.58 76.29 10.20 .179 .028
House Age......... 33.38 27.67 8.59 10.27 .001 .000
House Size......... 6.71 1.57 6.88 1.54 .743 .828
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
Science Helps..... 2.06 .90 2.25 1.53 .662 .880
Can't Meet Ends.... 2.09 1.20 1.71 1.21 .329 .265
Use As Affordable.. 2.08 1.31 1.41 .71 .062 .074
Raise Taxes....... 2.45 1.41 2.41 1.37 .925 .930
Shortage Inevitable 4.00 .76 4.00 1.28 1.000 .446
PLENTY............ 3.75 2.12 3.50 1.37 .686 .869
NOSOLAR........... 8.50 3.73 6.24 3.35 .057 .009
NONUKES........... 5.81 3.47 6.38 3.14 .612 .462
TOOTECHY.......... 8.38 2.25 8.06 2.22 .687 .839
DOGMATIC.......... 8.09 3.06 9.93 3.75 .109 .086
KNOWLEDGE......... 1.96 .75 2.18 .81 .380 .382
TOTAL EXPOSURE.... 2.30 1.18 3.64 1.19 .001 .002
more likely to be pro-solar. They are less likely to think 
that solar technology is too difficult or that it will soon 
be replaced. Finally, they also know more people with 
decentralized systems. Finally, those people who have 
adopted solar know more people who have also purchased such 
system.
According to our Kruskall Wallis test, two other vari­
ables —  Use as Affordable and Dogmatic -- tend to show some
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difference, but it is not significant at the .05 level. As 
might be expected, solar adopters are less likely to think 
that people should be able to use as much energy as they can 
afford. They also tend to be more dogmatic, a result which 
is highly unexpected according to our earlier theoretical 
discussions. We should pay attention to these in our logit 
analysis.
Unaware Nonadopters versus Wood Adopters
In our last table of between group comparisons. Table 
6.6, we see that wood adopters are much more likely to be 
men, although this is not really significant. This might be 
due to the fact that women find wood use to be too labor- 
intensive, but they are no more likely to be single than the 
unaware group. Of course, the fact that the wood adopters 
make up most of the decentralized category explains why the 
difference occurred in our earlier comparison between those 
adopters and the unaware non-adopters.
In the other categories, we find that there is only one 
significant difference. Once again, wood adopters are much 
more likely to know people who have purchased decentralized 
systems than are the unaware nonadopters.
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TABLE 6.6
MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS 
FOR UNAWARE NON-ADOPTERS/WOOD ADOPTERS
wood
Nonadopters Adopters P-value
Mean StDev Mean StDev ANOVA K-W
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES
Age................ 50.21 15.74 47.19 11.43 .317 .735
Sex................ .42 .22 .059 .059
Marital Status.... .25 .10 .072 .072
Duncan SEI........ 56.50 24.23 59.93 18.48 .530 .622
Family Income..... 6.08 2.36 6.71 2.20 .249 .229
Education......... 13.91 1.16 13.86 1.25 .851 .933
Year Purchased.... 72.50 7.58 73.97 6.58 .367 .463
House Age......... 33.37 27.66 39.11 57.17 .638 .090
House Size........ 6.72 1.57 7.03 1.77 .434 .436
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
Science Helps..... 2.06 .90 2.17 1.18 .727 .966
Can't Meet Ends.... 2.08 1.20 2.77 1.46 .045 .050
Use As Affordable.. 2.08 1.31 2.06 1.40 .933 .675
Raise Taxes....... 2.46 1.40 2.14 1.23 .319 .384
Shortage Inevitable 4.00 .76 3.90 1.00 .655 .890
PLENTY............. 3.75 2.12 3.09 1.34 .102 .313
NOSOLAR........... 8.50 3.72 7.70 3.39 .357 .452
NONUKES........... 5.81 3.47 6.67 3.02 .274 .259
TOOTECHY.......... 8.37 2.25 8.67 2.19 .639 .777
DOGMATIC.......... 8.09 3.06 9.08 2.85 .165 .063
KNOWLEDGE......... 1.95 .75 2.04 .99 .702 .420
TOTAL EXPOSURE.... 2.30 1.18 3.14 1.09 .002 .002
Summary and Discussion
Table 6.7 gives a brief summary of which variables have 
proven to be significant in all of our comparisons to this 
point. The asterisk represents simply that the variable was 
significant without regard to the level of significance.
There are two ways of looking at this table. One is to
Table 6.7 
Summary of Significant Variables
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examine each comparison to see which variables show 
signifi-cant differences between the groups. Rather than 
simply reiterating that earlier discussion, however, we can 
also begin to examine which variables seem to be most 
consistent-ly involved across comparisons.
The first item that stands out is the fact that there 
are quite a few variables which are involved in most of the 
comparisons between different adopters or between aware non­
adopters and adopters. One of the value variables —  Inde­
pendence —  shows up in all three of these comparisons, and 
Clean Energy is significant in two an has a Kruskall Wallis 
of .052 in the third, and these were the only three com­
parisons in which these variables were included. Savings 
and House Age also show up in all three of these com­
parisons. A number of other variables show up in two of the 
first three comparisons: Year Purchased, Initial Cost,
Owned One Before, the advice of builders and engineers. 
Science Helps, Use as Affordable, Shortage Inevitable, 
NOSOLAR, DOGMATIC, and KNOWLEDGE.
On the other hand, if we look at the comparisons be­
tween adopters and nonadopters or unaware nonadopters, the 
only variable that seems to stand out is TOTAL EXPOSURE. Of 
course, that finding is important, since it means that the 
very first step, the one which must be included before the 
other variable come into play, is that people be aware of 
the alternatives.
This seems to demonstrate that the our theoretical for-
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mulations have sensitized us to a wide variety of variables, 
many of which should help us to understand the process of 
adoption. On the other hand, we could also begin to con­
clude that the demographic considerations do not really help 
us to understand this phenomenon. But to answer that ques­




There are a variety of strategies that can be followed 
in this analysis. Here we shall choose to combine two dif­
ferent approaches. First, we shall compare the different 
groups of variables which we have been using to see which 
of these sets best help us to understand the difference be­
tween the groups in our various comparisons. Here we are 
limited by the size of our sample. In running our logit 
analyses, we will eliminate cases that have missing data 
on any of the included variables. In order to retain 
enough cases for meaningful comparisons, we will include 
only variables that have significant bivariate effects, as 
seen in Chapter 6. Although different variables will be 
used in each of our logit analyses, we can still examine 
the effects of the major groups of variables (situational 
variables, decision variables, and individual character­
istics) by comparing the chi square statistics for all of 
the relevant variables in each of these major groups.
Following this comparison between the major subgroups 
of variables, we will take those variables which show sig­
nificant t statistics in these analyses and employ them in 
a second analysis where we will decide which collection of
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variables gives us the best model. Here we have entered 
into the logit analysis all of the variables which had sig­
nificant t's in our first set of analyses. Subsequently, 
we remove, one by one, the variables with the smallest t's 
until we end up with a model where all of the remaining 
variables are significant at ot=.l or until the withdrawal 
of a variable makes a significant difference in our chi 
square.
Centralized Versus Decentralized Adopters
Table 7.1 shows the log likelihood, the chi square and 
the significance of the chi square for each category of 
variables when we run a logit with our centralized/decent­
ralized dependent variable. The first comparison we will 
make is between these major sets of variables.
Here it is readily apparent that the largest chi 
square, and the best set of predictors is the set of indi­
vidual characteristics which we have identified. Recall 
that in this analysis, we are using only the individual 
characteristics which demonstrated significant differences 
between the means (Science Helps, Use as Affordable, Raise 
Taxes, Shortage Inevitable, Nosolar, Nonukes, Independence, 
Clean Energy, Dogmatic, and Knowledge). The chi square for 
our decision variables (Long-term savings and Newspapers) 
is also significant. The situational variables (Age, Year 
Purchases, and House Age) have little predictive value.
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Table 7.1
SUMMARY OF SEPARATE LOGIT ANALYSeS FOR
CENTRALIZED/DECENTRALIZED ADOPTERS
Log Likelihood Chi Sg Siq
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES......  -40.0989 2.46 .4818
DECISION FACTORS...........  -32.8778 16.91 .0002
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS.. -12.4176 57.83 .0000
Table 7.2




Number of obs = 75
chi2(2) = 51.50
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
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We can also examine these major groups of variables to see 
whether or not the addition of either of the other subsets 
to the Individual Characteristics yields a significant in­
crease in our chi square. If we test a model which in­
cludes the Decision Factors with the Individual Character­
istics, we obtain an increase in our chi square of only 
3.35 with 2 degrees of freedom, an insignificant increase. 
The addition of the Situational Variables yields a similar­
ly insignificant increase (2.10 with 3 degrees of freedom). 
Thus, we find that the Individual Characteristics are the 
best predictors.
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This is further supported by our second analysis.
Here we have taken only those variables from the earlier 
analysis which demonstrated a significant bivariate rela­
tionship with adoption. This included Independence, Use as 
Affordable, and Long-term Savings. Since Savings was unre­
lated to adoption, we dropped it from our model; the 
decrease in Chi-square was insignificant (1.54 with 1 de­
gree of freedom). Table 7.2 presents this final model for 
centralized/ decentralized adopters. The final model in­
cludes only individual characteristics —  Independence and 
Use as Affordable (Log Odds of Decentralized Adoption = 
-10.642 + 3.243 Independence - .685 Use as Afford).
Most of the predictive power of this model comes from 
the Independence. As the desire to be independent in­
creases, so does the likelihood that the respondent will 
have purchased a decentralized energy system. In addition, 
people who believe that we should be able to use as much 
energy as we can afford are less likely to be decentralized 
adopters.
The chi square statistic tells us two things. First, 
the coefficients in this model are significantly different 
from 0. In addition, we know that this model is also bet­
ter than the model which included Long-term savings, be­
cause the addition of that variable did not signicantly in­
crease the chi square. This supports our earlier theoreti­
cal reasoning. It is a bit surprising that none of the de­
cision factors showed up in this final model since we
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postulated earlier that price factors would play some role. 
The fact that Independence is a better predictor than the 
other variables lends additional support to our hypothesis 
that price considerations, while important, play only a 
limited role in the adoption of alternative energy systems.
Solar Nonadopters versus Solar Adopters
Here we can make a more specific comparison. One of 
our criticisms of earlier studies has been that it is in
Table 7.3
SUMMARY OF SEPARATE LOGIT ANALYSES FOR 
AWARE SOLAR NONADOPTERS/SOLAR ADOPTERS
Log Likelihood Chi Sq Sig
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES......  -25.9034 6.82 .0330
DECISION FACTORS...........  - 9.2023 40.23 .0000
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS.. -21.6567 15.32 .0091
Table 7.4
FINAL LOGIT MODEL FOR 
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appropriate to compare the general population with adop­
ters. If we hope to discover what discourages people, we 
need to look more closely at those who have considered 
adoption*
Table 7.3 shows us that in this case the Decision Fac­
tors are the best predictors. In contrast to the first 
logit analysis, we note here that both of the other groups 
of variables have significant chi squares, with that of the 
Individual Charactersitics being the larger.
If we add the five variables from our Individual Char­
acteristics (see Table 6.7), we get an increase of only 
7.94 in our chi square, which is not significant given the 
five degrees of freedom. Similarly, the Situational Vari­
ables are also insignficant. Thus, only the Decision Fac­
tors have clearly nonzero effects.
There were only three significant variables in these 
individual comparisons: Initial cost, Engineer's advice, 
and Can't Meet Ends. As it turns out, all of these had P- 
values below .1 (Table 7.4). Thus, our final model is Log 
Odds of Solar Adoption = -15.654 + 1.034 Initial Cost + 
4.709 Engineer's Advice - 1.619 Can't Meet Ends. The vari­
able which stands out the most here is the advice of 
engineers. When their advice is deemed more positive, 
respondents are more likely to fall into the adopters 
category. In Chapter 6 we saw that the nonadopters tended 
to find engineer's advice discouraging, but now we see that 
as their advice becomes more positive, people are more
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likely to adopt.
The next most important variable is the belief that 
energy prices make it difficult to make ends meet which has 
a negative effect. Thus, as these attitudes increase, in­
dividuals are less likely to adopt decentralized systems. 
Initial cost, our last variable, is positively related to 
adoption. Those respondents who have adopted a decentral­
ized system are more likely to say that the initial cost 
had a positive impact on their decision.
In this particular model, we end up including all of 
the variables which had a significant bivariate relation­
ship with solar adoption because each one has a P-value be­
low .1. Thus, we will not test alternative models.
Wood Nonadopters versus Wood Adopters
In Table 7.5 we see that the chi sguare for the situa­
tional variables is not significant. We cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that these variables are unrelated. On the 
other hand, the chi sguare for the decision variables is 
much higher and significant. But the highest chi sguare is 
associated with the Individual Characteristics. If we add 
either of the other sets of variables to the Individual 
Characteristics, we get an insignificant increase in our 
chi sguare.
The analysis of the three individual variables which 
had P-values below .1 —  Long-term savings, Knowledge, and
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Table 7.5
SUMMARY OF SEPARATE LOGIT ANALYSES FOR
AWARE WOOD NONADOPTERS/WOOD ADOPTERS
Log Likelihood Chi Sq Sig
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES......  -14.0942 .02 .9018
DECISION FACTORS...........  - 5.0292 18.15 .0028
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS.. - 1.581e-08 28.20 .0000
Table 7.6
FINAL LOGIT MODEL FOR 
AWARE WOOD NONADOPTERS/WOOD ADOPTERS
Logit Estimates
Log Likelihood =-5.470e-08
Number of obs = 52
chi2(2) = 28.20


















Independence —  was less straightforward than the previous 
comparisons. None of the coefficients had P-values below 
.1, so the emphasis was placed on the testing of models 
with different sets of variables. Long-term savings with 
Knowledge yielded the highest chi sguare (Table 7.6). The 
combination of Long-term savings with Independence or of 
Independence with Knowledge gave much smaller chi squares. 
Thus the model presented in Table 7.6 (Log Odds of Wood 
Adoption = -227.712 + 52.494 Long-term Savings + 34.908 
Knowledge) would seem to be our strongest predictors. We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient for
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Independence is zero. Most of the predictive power of this 
model is associated with Long-term Savings.
Unaware Nonadopters versus All Adopters
We should note, first of all, that there are many 
fewer variables included in this set of analyses. This is 
due, as before, to the fact that the decision variables and 
the values were all developed as questions specifically for 
those who adopted sqme sort of energy system. From this 
entire set, we can only include one of the normative vari­
ables, Total Exposure. These comments hold for all of our 
subsequent analyses.
In Table 7.7 we see that the Individual Character­
istics are not even included. This is because there were 
no variables from this category which had signficant 
bivariate relationships with our Unaware Nonadopters/All 
Adopters dependent variable. On the other hand, both of 
the other sets of variables have significant chi squares.
To test whether the coefficients for the Situational Vari­
ables are zero, we have added them to the Decision Factors. 
This yields an insignificant increase of 6.21 with two de­
grees of freedom.
Our final model is Log Odds of Adoption = -.601 + .586 
Total exposure - .703 Sex. Total Exposure, the only one of 
the Decision Factors to be included in these last three 
comparisons, is the best predictor. Since its coefficient
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Table 7.7
SUMMARY OF SEPARATE LOGIT ANALYSES FOR
NONADOPTERS/ALL ADOPTERS
Log Likelihood Chi Sg Sig
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES...___ -114.5749 7.80 .0202
DECISION FACTORS...... . 19.60 .0000
Table 7.8
FINAL LOGIT MODEL FOR 
NONADOPTERS/ALL ADOPTERS
Logit Estimates Number of obs = 188
chi2(2) = 23.67
Log Likelihood =-106.64302 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t Prob>ItI
Total Expos .586205 .149287 3.927 0.000
Sex -.702606 .347502 -2.022 0.045
constant -.600850 .437882 -1.372 0.172
is positive, as the amount of exposure increases, so does 
the likelihood of adoption. It would appear that women are 
more likely to be nonadopters, since this variable is nega­
tively related to our dependent variable.
Unaware Nonadopters versus Solar Adopters
In Chapter 6, we did find significant bivariate rela­
tionships between some of the Individual Characteristics 
and our Unaware Nonadopters/Solar Adopters dependent vari­
able. However, in Table 7.9 we see that once again we can­
not reject our null hypothesis that the coefficients for
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these Individual Characteristics are zero. On the other 
hand, the Situational Variables have the highest chi sguare 
for the first time. If we add to them the Decision Fac­
tors, we see only a small, insignificant increase in our 
chi sguare. Thus, here we would conclude that the Situa-
Table 7.9
SUMMARY OF SEPARATE LOGIT ANALYSES FOR 
UNAWARE NONADOPTERS/SOLAR ADOPTERS
Loq Likelihood Chi Sq Sig
SITUATIONAL VARIABLES......  -18.0070 17.41 .0002
DECISION FACTORS...........  -21.5337 10.36 .0013
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS.. -26.0736 1.28 .2587
Table 7.10
FINAL LOGIT MODEL FOR 
UNAWARE NONADOPTERS/SOLAR ADOPTERS
Logit Estimates 
Log Likelihood =-15.627978 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Number of obs = 39
chi2(2) = 22.17














tional Variables are our best predictors.
Table 7.10 shows that only two variables are included 
in our final model (Log Odds of Solar Adoption = 2.497 + 
1.244 Total Exposure - .085 House Age). This time, most of 
the predictive power, as evidenced by the size of the coef-
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ficients, is from Total Exposure. As the amount of ex­
posure to decent-ralized alternatives increases, there is a 
greater like-lihood that the respondent will be a solar 
adopter. House Age also meets our basic standard for in­
clusion in the model. As the age of the home decreases, 
the respondent is more likely to be a wood adopter.
Table 7.11 shows us that once again the Decision Fac­
tors have the highest chi square. But considered seperate 
ly, the Individual Characteristics are also significantly
Unaware Nonadopters versus Wood Adopters
Table 7.11




Log Likelihood Chi Sg Sig 
. -47.9370 8.17 .0043
. -49.9199 4.20 .0404
Table 7.12
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chi2(2)

















different from zero. Our best set of predictors is the De­
cision Factors. The addition of the Individual Character­
istics results in an insignificant increase in the chi 
sguare. None of the Situational Variables had significant 
bivariate relationships in Chapter 6, so they have not been 
included in this analysis.
Turning to Table 7.12, we see that our best model in­
corporates Total Exposure and Can't Meet Ends (Log Odds of 
Wood Adoption = -1.450 + .642 Total Exposure + .322 Can't 
Meet Ends). The degree of exposure to decentralized 
alternatives increases the likelihood that the respondent 
will be a decentralized adopter. Similarly, as the feeling 
that energy prices makes it difficult to meet ends in­
creases, so does the likelihood that the respondent will be 
a wood adopter.
Summary
Table 7.13 provides two separate summaries. First of 
all, if we look at the major groups of variables, we can 
see which of these groups have significant chi-squares.
From this we know only that their coefficients are not zero 
(i.e., we reject the null hypothesis in these instances). 
This does not imply that the group of variables was neces­
sarily the best set of predictors. In looking at the anal­
ysis this way, we see that the Decision Factors play a 
role in every one of our analyses. The Situational Var-
Table 7.13 














































iables and the Individual Characteristics were significant­
ly different from zero in four out of the six analyses.
The second way of looking at this table is to look at 
the variables singly. We have starred the variables which 
had P-values below .1. There are generally only one or two 
variables in each analysis which contribute most of the 
predictive power (given the size of their coefficients).
The results are inconclusive. When we are comparing 
different types of adopters (our first three comparisons), 
price considerations played a role while they were entered 
into the analyses. In addition, some of the attitudes 
remained in the models and Independence was included in the 
first comparison.
In our latter three comparisons, there is a clearer 
pattern. Here we see that Total Exposure is included in 
every final model. We also note that the situational char­
acteristics had more predictive power in these comparisons 
between adopters and unaware nonadopters. We shall discuss 




This study has been presented as purely exploratory in 
nature. The sample is small, non-random, and limited both 
temporally and geographically. Because of this, we cannot 
generalize from this study to other situations. However, 
we can make some broad conclusions regarding the ap­
plicability of the general model which we have developed 
and its relationship to our theoretical formulations.
In this chapter we will discuss three separate issues. 
The first of these is the way in which our findings might 
support or weaken previous research. Since the development 
of our model was informed by such a wide variety of prior 
research, we will discuss the relevance of our findings for 
these studies as they relate to our different subset of 
variables. Our second task in this chapter will be to dis­
cuss the relevance of this study to the numerous theoreti­
cal approaches to the adoption of energy alternatives. 




Relevance to Prior Studies 
Situational Characteristics
The primary question which needs to be addressed in 
this context is whether or not solar and wood adopters are 
distinctly different from other groups. Many past studies 
have argued that solar adopters, in comparison to the gen­
eral population, are younger, have an above average income, 
are generally from professional and managerial positions, 
have a higher socio-economic status, and have an above 
average education. In keeping with criticisms which state 
that this comparisons of adopters to the general population 
will be innaccurate because not everyone owns a home, we 
have been comparing our decentralized adopters with other 
homeowners.
The results here suggest that our solar and wood adop­
ters are not distinctly different from other homeowners. 
When we look at the situational characteristics of individ­
uals, we see only two significant bivariate relationships. 
There was a significant difference between the centralized 
adopters and the decentralized adopters in terms of age. 
There was also a significant difference in gender between 
unaware nonadopters and adopters. Sex was the only one of 
these individual demographics to be included in our final 
logit models.
We find many more significant differences between the
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means when we look at the characteristics of houses. The 
age of the home had a significant bivariate relationship 
with all of our dependent variables except the unaware non- 
adopters/wood adopters comparison. We would be less likely 
to find differences here since homes are more readily 
retrofitted with wood. The year in which the home was pur­
chased showed significant differences in both of our solar 
comparisons as well as in our comparison of different types 
of adopters. In our logit comparisons, we find that only 
house age shows up in our final models, and that only once 
—  in comparing solar adopters with unaware solar adopters.
All of his would tend to support the Fahrar-Pilgrim 
findings, which state that demographic differences are not 
great enough to give us a real idea of purchasers. More to 
the point, Warkov says that demographics correlate highly 
with initial interest but explain little of the difference 
between adopters. Here we might qualify that statement by 
saying that the demographic characteristics of the respon­
dents explain little of the difference between adopters and 
our other categories. Thus, in order to really understand 
the differences between these groups, we need to look at 
other characteristics as well as the way in which people 
make decisions.
Decision Factors
Price Factors. One of the more important issues we
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have had to address in this dissertation is the fact that 
while there is general support for solar among the popula­
tion, this is not readily translated into adoption of solar 
alternatives. A variety of reasons have been offered: 
people are not motivated to invest for the long term, ini­
tial costs are too high, and the marginal utility of long­
term savings decreases with increasing levels of income.
We have found some support for the first two of these con­
siderations, but little evidence to support the latter.
In all of the bivariate comparisons which we made 
where long-term savings could be included as a variable 
(the first three comparisons), there was a significant dif­
ference between the groups. In our logit analyses, it was 
included in our final model for the solar adopters/aware 
solar nonadopters comparison. Of course, sometimes it 
acted to encourage people, and sometimes it tended to dis­
courage them. We shall discuss the implications of this 
further in the next section.
Initial cost never played as big a role as long-term 
savings, but it has shown up in many of our comparisons.
It did tend to discourage those people who thought about 
solar or wood and then decided not to adopt. On the other 
hand, it was a positive factor in the decisions of those 
who did decide to adopt these alternatives.
This lack of consistency in both of these variables 
points to two different possibilities: either decisions
are also being affected by income levels, and nonadopters
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have higher discount rates or reduced marginal utility due 
to their higher income, or the subjective perception of the 
cost factors differs greatly for the adopters and the aware 
nonadopters. We have found little evidence to support the 
contention that income plays an important mediating role. 
There have been no significant differences on this variable 
in any of our comparisons. The effect of a higher discount 
rate might be in evidence (given the role of long-term 
savings) but this should not be a factor for groups of ap­
proximately equal income. Similarly, while the marginal 
utility of savings might decrease as income levels in­
crease, this should not vary for people of similar income 
levels. Thus, to fully understand this phenomenon, we will 
have to eventually look at a variety of other non-cost con­
siderations .
Norms and Habit. The main question which we were ad­
dressing in this section was whether or not the perceived 
acceptability of an alternative energy system affects the 
rate of adoption. As we mentioned in earlier chapters, 
models of market penetration as well as the adoption of in­
novation literature both assume that purchase is a function 
of the number of previous adopters. We employed two vari­
ables to tap into this issue: the influence of relatives
who owned similar systems and the total number of people 
the respondent knew who owned decentralized systems (assum­
ing that knowing more people with any type of decentralized
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system would make the adoption of any decentralized system 
seem more acceptable).
In our comparison of centralized and decentralized 
adopters, we found no difference between the groups with 
regard to either of these variables. From this we can con­
clude that both groups know about the same number of 
decent-ralized adopters {actually, decentralized adopters 
knew more, but the level of significance was .058) and that 
the relatives had a positive influence on adoption, but the 
adopters of decentralized systems may have been the only 
ones with relatives who had also adopted. We can make this 
latter assumption because for both groups the influence of 
relatives was slightly positive, thus the purchasers of 
centralized systems were being influenced positively by 
relatives who ownepl centralized systems and the purchasers 
of decentralized systems were likewise being influenced by 
owners of similar systems.
On the other hand, we need to also ask whether or not 
people could be discouraged by knowing someone who had a 
decentralized system. This would not seem to be the case 
since for aware nonadopters of both wood and solar, this 
variable still had a positive impact, although it was less 
positive than for the adopters. At least it was not dis­
couraging .
One of the findings which seems to stand out the most 
is the fact that nonadopters know significantly fewer 
decentralized adopters than is the case for the adopters.
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This would lend considerable support to the adoption of in­
novation literature, although the contention in the litera­
ture is that selective exposure, resulting from past expe­
rience, has an effect on adoption. Here we can argue that 
exposure has an effect on adoption. It would seem to be 
what sensitizes people to possibilities associated with 
alternatives since we found significant bivariate rela­
tionships in all of the comparisons between adopters and 
unaware nonadopters but not when we compared different 
types of adopters and aware nonadopters. We have not ad­
dressed whether or not that exposure is the product of past 
experience, values, or psychological characteristics.
Of course, we do have a measure of past experience —  
the impact of having previously owned a system of the type 
under consideration. This was slightly discouraging for 
both centralized and decentralized adopters, yet, obvious­
ly, both groups decided to adopt again in spite of this 
fact. For the aware nonadopter comparisons, this was dis­
couraging for nonadopters (and may have deterred their 
adoption) and it was a significantly more positive in­
fluence on those who adopted (especially in the wood com­
parison) .
All of this evidence would lead us to the early con­
clusion that prior ownership by relatives or friends or 
having owned one before is a strong determinant of sub­
sequent action, but that other variables must be interven­
ing. On the other hand, one of those intervening variables
195
might well be total exposure, given its apparent importance 
in sensitizing people to available alternative. If people 
are even adopting systems which they had some dissatisfac­
tion with previously, then it may well be that they do not 
know about other options. It may, of course, also be due 
to the information which they receive about those options, 
an issue to which we now must turn.
Information. We argued earlier that the dissemination 
of information was strongly influenced by communication 
patterns. Darley and Beniger have said that interpersonal 
networks are important early and the modeling plays a more 
important role in the later stages of the adoption process. 
Similarly, Shama says that imitation spurs later adopters.
Here we have not addressed the temporal aspects of 
this question. However, we can discuss the relative impor­
tance of primary contacts (relatives), secondary informa­
tion (salespersons, builders, and engineers), the media 
(newspapers and magazines), and modeling (demonstration 
homes).
Dealing with the latter first, demonstration homes are 
probably not very widespread at this point. Responses 
hovered around the no impact score and were not very dif­
ferent for our various groups.
Newspapers played a role in two out of our first three 
comparisons. Newspapers positively influenced both cen­
tralized and decentralized adopters. Of course, once again
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that may be the result of selective exposure. There were 
also significant differences between aware wood nonadopters 
and wood adopters, but no real difference between solar 
adopters and nonadopters. On the other hand, both solar 
adopters and solar nonadopters said that newspapers posi­
tively influenced their decisions, and their responses were 
higher than for the wood adopters and nonadopters. It was 
the difference between the groups which was significant in 
the wood comparison, not the size of the impact. This 
means that people who look into solar are finding informa­
tion in the media and that information tends to positive.
We must also look at the impact of primary and 
secondary groups on this decision process. Our first ques­
tion was whether or not the information from primary groups 
would have more of an impact than that from secondary 
groups. Relative's advice was positive for all groups of 
adopters as well as generally positive for all nonadopters. 
The only significant difference was found between the solar 
adopters and nonadopters.
On the other hand, one of our major concerns is that 
the building industry is a major deterrent to the adoption 
of decentralized alternatives. This would appear to be the 
case since those who decided not to adopt said that the in­
formation from these people was decidedly negative. The 
information was positive for those who decided to adopt ei­
ther wood or solar, implying that there are some builders 
and engineers who are supportive of the alternatives. Ad­
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vice from engineers was the only variable from this group 
to be included in any logit model. Given the decentralized 
nature of the industry, it might be very difficult to find 
supportive engineers and builders even if one is inclined 
to adopt a decentralized alternative.
From this we might conclude that the secondary sources 
are an important aspect of this adoption process. Their 
advice is deemed as important as the advice of relatives, 
but it is often deters the adoption of decentralized 
alternatives.
To summarize to this point, much of what we have 
looked at could be seen as confusing. Frequently, even 
though there have been differences between the means for 
many variables, most variables still encourage adoption.
The ones which do not are the price factors (in particular 
long-term savings) and information from secondary sources. 
In our logit analysis, these are the same variables which 
show up in our comparisons of specific subgroups. The 
solar logit showed us the importance of engineers advice 
and savings. Thus, it would seem that any model of the 
adoption process must include these factors. Of course, 
there is also a compelling case for the inclusion of other 
non-cost considerations like attitudes and values. We turn 
to these in the next section.
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Individual Characteristics
Values. In numerous studies, it has been argued that 
values may be incentives or constraints. Leonard-Barton, 
Warkov, and Unseld and Crews have all argued that this mav 
be especially true in the adoption of energy alternatives. 
We tend to find some support for these contentions in the 
results of this study (although we cannot discuss the 
results of this study in comparison to the adoption of 
technologies other than energy).
We have found significant differences between adopters 
and aware nonadopters, as well as between centralized and 
decentralized adopters, on both the desire to be indepen­
dent as well as the value of clean energy. Independence 
was included in the final logit model for the central- 
ized/decent-ralized comparison. In addition, independence 
was the last variable removed in the solar comparison.
On the other hand, we find no evidence to support the 
idea that innovativeness is an important consideration. 
Perhaps we have moved beyond the early adopters stage, and 
those who are adopting now are relying more on modeling 
(which supports the conclusions of the previous section).
Of course, we cannot answer this question, but the conclu­
sion seems reasonable given our findings so far.
All of this, then, would lead us to believe that 
values play an important role in this process. But there 
may be important mediating factors found in the conflicting
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signals which people get regarding the energy crisis it­
self. Let us now turn to those variables.
Attitudes. There were many attitudes which could af­
fect the process of adoption. Let us deal with them one at 
a time. First, Leonard-Barton says that a belief in the 
seriousness of the energy crisis is an important motivating 
factor. Similarly, others have argued that perceptions 
concerning amount of oil that remains may also be determin­
ing factor. We had three different measures of this: 
Shortage, Science Helps (because this belief would mitigate 
the seriousness of the energy problem), and PLENTY.
We have found that, at least in some instances, these 
have shown significant differences between the means in our 
bivariate comparisons. All three had significant dif­
ferences in our comparison between centralized and 
decentralized adopters. Science Helps and PLENTY also had 
signficant relationships in our aware nonadopter/wood adop­
ter comparison. However, none of them show up in any of 
our final logit models, thus their predictive power is 
limited.
It has also been argued that a belief in environmental 
activism may affect adoption of energy alternatives. Here 
we examined two related variables: the belief that people 
should use as much energy as they can afford (a low score 
implying that people should act to conserve) and raising 
taxes as a means of forcing people to become environmental-
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ly active. Again, both of these show up in various com­
parisons, but not in any of the logit analyses, implying 
that they contribute relatively little predictive power.
We could also argue here that we find little support 
for Olsen's contention that favoring of voluntary versus 
mandatory measures could also be linked to adoption. We 
find here that there is equally little support for either 
of these alternatives, although the degree of nonsupport 
may vary from group to group.
Along the same lines, it has been argued that feeling 
personally affected would increase the likelihood of adop­
tion. Our measure of this, energy prices make it difficult 
to make ends meet, shows up only in our comparison of solar 
adopters and solar nonadopters. It would seem that those 
people who have adopted solar alternatives now feel that 
they are less vulnerable to price increases.
Along a different line, the argument has also been 
made that these general attitudes would probably have less 
relevance to the actual purchase of a decentralized 
alternative than would specific attitudes regarding the 
viability of, or support for, various energy alternatives. 
To examine this, we have developed three different scales: 
one measuring support for nuclear (the ideal typical cen­
tralized alternative), one measuring attitudes about the 
viability of solar, and one measuring whether or not people 
thought that solar was just too technical for them to use.
NOSOLAR showed significant differences between groups
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in both of the solar comparisons, as might be expected.
Both NOSOLAR and NONUKES had signficant differences between 
the means in the centralized/decentralized comparison.
These are the only bivariate relationships where these var­
iables played a role, and none of the specific attitudes 
were included in any of the final logit models. This 
result could demonstrate one of two things: either the
theoretical assumption is wrong and the general attitudes 
are more closely tied to adoption than the specific ones, 
or, alternatively, these are measures are actually still 
too general or they have low validity. The latter is as­
sumed here to be the case.
Knowledge and Dogmatism. We had assumed that the 
amount of knowledge about energy issues would affect the 
rate of adoption. We find that there are significant dif­
ference between centralized adopters and decentralized 
adopters as well as between wood adopters and nonadopters, 
but not in any other comparisons. Apparently the solar 
nonadopters are very similar to adopters on a variety of 
characteristics, including their knowledge of energy is­
sues. It is a little more difficult to explain the lack of 
difference between nonadopters and adopters. Perhaps this 
is indicative of the fact that the general population is 
knowledgeable about energy, they just need to see it work­
ing somewhere to become sensitized to its viability.
There were significant differences between groups on
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our dogmatism scale in only two comparisons: centralized/ 
decentralized and wood adopters/wood nonadopters. The cen­
tralized adopters and the wood nonadopters both 
demonstrated higher scores on this scale, lending some 
credence to the claim that nonadoption may be due as much 
to individual idiosyncrasies as it is to failures of the 
system.
To summarize to this point, there were numerous at- 
titudinal and value variables which appear to contribute to 
our understanding of the differences between decentralized 
adopters and nonadopters. And in general, these sets of 
variables were better at distinguishing between groups than 
the decision factors which we had developed or the 
demographic characteristics of the adopters. To draw some 
of the implications for theory, we turn to our next sec­
tion.
Implications for Theory
Here we will discuss in turn the implications for the 
various theoretical approaches presented in Chapters 2 and 
3 as well as what this portends for the environmental move­
ment as a whole. First let us discuss some of the models 
of consumer behavior, including the underlying economic as­
sumptions, and then turn to the adoption of innovations 
literature.
We discussed three different models of consumer behav-
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ior in Chapter 2, The first of these was the model of con­
sumer sovereignty. In this model the argument is made that 
consumers make independent decisions based on their values. 
At first glance, much of the evidence presented in this 
dissertation would tend to support this theory. Values, 
especially of those which favor independence or clean ener­
gy, played an important role. But we must recall that in 
this model, values are simply reflected in price factors; 
if people make a purchase, then it must fit into their 
values. Here we can point more specifically to the rela­
tive impact of values and prices. Price issues such as 
long-term savings and initial cost were major deterrents 
for those who decided not to purchase decentralized energy 
systems, but Independence was also a positive considertion 
for many who chose to ignore the drawbacks of the initial 
investment.
We need to examine the underlying assumptions of this 
approach in more detail. If we can make the assumption, as 
we do here, that our variable long-term savings is an in­
dicator of the respondents discount rate, we find that the 
discount rate would be higher for those who decide not to 
purchase decentralized systems. But since there were no 
real differences between our respondents in education, in­
come, or occupation, it would seem that this higher dis­
count rate is not the product of any objective considera­
tions but instead reflects the subjective non-cost consid­
erations which seem to inevitably affect the decisions of
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all purchasers. Certainly the risk is high if the price is 
high, the commitment is long in the purchase of most of 
these systems, but these considerations hold true as much 
for adopters as for nonadopters. Thus, as Simons has so 
eloquently argued, what we need to do is examine the "inner 
environment".
Thus we turn to our second model, manipulated consump­
tion. In this approach the assumption is that decisions 
are not simply influenced by prices but are also the result 
of example, custom, suggestion, etc. We find a great deal 
of support for this theory. The impact of TOTAL EXPOSURE 
or the fact that a relative may have owned a system has 
been consistent throughout the analyses. And regardless of 
what type of adoption was taking place, the decision maker 
was influenced by normative expectations.
Of course the role of the media in this would lead us 
to assume that consumption is not being manipulated since 
many adopters have been positively influenced by the in­
formation which they found in newspapers. This would imply 
that needs, at least, are not being shaped by the media. 
However, individuals are still more likely to have their 
needs met if they purchase systems that are in general use. 
Builders and engineers are more familiar with, and thus can 
more readily install and repair, conventional energy sys­
tems. This could lend more support to Scitovsky or it 
could be seen as relating to the final model of structured 
consumption.
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In structured consumption, purchasers make decision 
based on the perceived alternatives. Here we argue that 
nonadopters (aware nonadopters as well as unaware) perceive 
fewer alternatives because they are so difficult to come 
into contact with (so disperse) or because of the influence 
of "professionals" whom they trust. This is further 
reflected in the NOSOLAR findings. The fact that groups of 
such similar demographic characteristics can have such 
vastly different perceptions of the same energy systems 
must reflect the structure of the market -- not only prices 
but also information.
This leads us to a discussion of the adoption of 
alternatives literature. One of the cornerstones of this 
approach —  both in theory and in practice —  is that in­
formation, either personal or impersonal depending on the 
stage of adoption, is an important correlate of adoption. 
Certainly we find evidence of that in our data. We also 
can support the assumption that price considerations are 
important as well as that the innovation under considera­
tion must be compatible with the adopters values. Many of 
the other considerations we have not tested for, but one in 
particular remains unresolved.
Rogers has said that we should not be so quick to 
place blame for nonadoption on the failure of the individu­
al. Rather, we need to also look at the possibility of 
system failure. Here we see some indication of both. Dog­
matism played a role in our centralized/decentralized com-
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parison as well as in our wood adopters/nonadopters com­
parison. On the other hand, the fact that some builders 
and engineers are so discouraging implies some problems 
with the industry. There is no way to resolve that issue 
here.
There is also some support, although tentative, for 
continuing to examine the relationship between attitudes 
and behavior. Here we have many significant bivariate re­
lationships between either general or specific attitudes 
and some of our dependent variables. This would tend to 
support Simons’ criticisms of neoclassical economic theory. 
With regard to Fishbein’s argument that there will only be 
a connection between specific attitudes and a specific be­
havioral intent, we can only argue that here we have found 
some connections between general attitudes and a concrete 
behavior.
Finally, what does all of this imply for the environ­
mental movement. Recall that this study was initiated by 
Lovins* contention that the values necessary for the diffu­
sion of decentralized energy systems currently exist and 
that what is necessary is that we begin to substitute one 
technology for the other. We now have two comments to make 
with regard to this claim. Certainly the values that he 
mentions exist, but it would seem that the assertion is 
limited (as we stated in the first chapter). While the 
values may exist, they are not necessarily of equal impor­
tance for all people. And there are considerable dif­
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ferences of opinion regarding a variety of attitudes which 
might also be connected with adoption.
Our second comment concerns his implicit faith in the 
effectiveness of markets. It would seem that here the con­
cerns of Darley and Beniger carry the day. They have 
argued that the unassisted operations of a free market will 
not result in the maximization of environmentally sound be­
havior because of high discount rates, high initial costs, 
etc. In addition, we would argue here that the market will 
continue to be biased due to the information disseminated 
by builders and engineers (regardless of how we feel about 
the accuracy of that information).
So, what should be done? Cook and Berenberg have 
argued that attempts to encourage conservation (or, we 
could argue, the adoption of energy alternatives) have 
focused on two approaches: promoting pro-conservation atti­
tudes through persuasive communication or evoking attitude 
consistent behaviors. It would seem that, given this data, 
the former would be more important. The main problem seems 
to be that nonadopters attitudes do not support solar adop­
tion (in contrast, once again, to Lovins’ claim).
Of course, we should also begin to look at the broader 
context of adoption. For example, we should begin to see 
how politics affects the adoption process. But that will 
have to be left for future research.
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Implications for Future Research
Our primary task in this dissertation was to sort 
through the various theories of behavior which seemed to 
apply to the adoption of energy systems in order to develop 
a model which would sensitize us to the variety of factors 
which might affect people's decisions regarding whether or 
not they should purchase a conventional energy system or a 
nonconventional, decentralized system. To help us in this 
task, we also organized the findings of other pertinent 
studies in the context of the general model. In this way, 
we could look for specific values, attitudes, information 
channels, etc. which seemed relevant to our study.
We could conclude here that the model has generally 
held up fairly well. By this, we mean not that all of the 
variables in the model have significant relationships to 
our dependent variables. This was never expected. Rather, 
we mean that the model forced us to include variables from 
many different areas, and the results have demonstrated 
that the narrow reliance on any one type of variable -- 
demographics, price variables, attitudes, or values —  is 
an inadequate approach. What we apparently need to do is 
rely on variables from all of these areas to enrich our un­
derstanding of this process. That, of course, was also the 
fundamental theoretical approach. Furthermore, few studies 
have drawn the links between values and energy systems in 
such a specific manner.
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The first step in following up on this study would be 
to try to gain further support for the general approach 
taken with this model by conducting a truly random sample 
of homeowners in different regions of the country. Having 
a sample that is not truly random and is limited to the 
state of New Hampshire at a time when energy issues were 
still on the minds of many people means that we cannot 
generalize from this study to any other group of people.
In this follow up study, some specific changes might 
also be made in measurement. The most obvious is the 
measure of family income. By relying on general categories 
of income rather than the real dollar value, this variable 
became clouded. It would seem to be more prudent to retain 
as much information about the variables as possible.
Second, some of the attitudes might be measured with 
more clarity. There is a strong possibility that the vari­
able TOOTECHY had no impact because of the fact that very 
different kinds of attitudes showed up on this factor 
(i.e., the inclusion of Big Investment with questions 
oriented more to the technology). Clearer measures of at­
titudes may only enhance what already appears to be an im­
portant group of variables.
Some links still need to be drawn between this model, 
which focuses on the behavior of people on the micro level, 
and the more macro level behavior of political and social 
systems. Originally, we were going to also look at some in­
dicators of macro level variables —  federal support for
research and development, the absolute price of oil (not 
the perceived price), the number of solar homes in the 
state, etc. This became an unwieldy process at this point, 
but it might be easier to make some judgment about the sub­
jective interpretations of individuals if they were 
balanced by objective facts.
Finally, it might also be instructive to compare the 
results of this approach as it applies to energy systems 
with the results if it were applied to other innovations. 
The validity of any model is enhanced if it can be applied 
to a wide variety of situations.
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3. Your sex: M F
4. Marital status: Married Single Divorced Separated Widowed
5. Nun tier of children:_____
6. Your occupation:_______________
7. Your approximate annual inacme: (circle one)
0- $6,000 $6,001-$12,000 $12,001-$18,000 $18,001-524,000
$24,001-$36,000 $36,001-548,000 $48,001-572,000 over $72,000
8. Spouse's age:__
9. Spouse1s occupation:_________________
10. Spouse's approximate annual income: (circle one)
0- $6,000 $6,001-512,000 512,001-518,000 $18,001-$24,000
$24,001-$36,000 $36,001-548,000 $48,001-572,000 over $72,000
11. Please circle the highest level of education which you have completed:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11 12 Seme college B.A./B.S. Sate graduate vork
12. Do you share responsibility for this household with someone other than a spouse?
YES  NO
If yes, please answer the following questions regarding this person:
13. Age:___
14. Sex: M F
15. Occupation:_______________
16. Approximate annual income: (circle one)
0- $6,000 $6,001-512,000 $12,001-$18,000 $18,001-524,000
$24,001-536,000 536,001-548,000 548,001-572,000 over 572,000
17. Do you own your heme or are you a renter?
Owner Renter (If you rent, skip to ntntoer 65, otherwise continue.)
IB. If you own your hone, in what year was it purchased?
19. Approximately hew old is the heme in which you are now living? years
20. Not including bathrooms, how many roans are in your hone?_____
In the following sections we would like to find out what type of hare heating you 
have (oil, coal, natural gas, electric, wood, active or passive solar, etc.) and ask 
you a few questions about that energy source. Next to nurber 21, write the name of 
your primary source of heat along with a description (forced hot air, hot water, super 
insulated or envelope heme, etc.) and then answer the questions which follow. If you 
own more than one home energy source, use the next section (beginning with question 43) 
in a similar manner,
21. PRIMARY B4ESGY SOURCE: DESCRIPTION:
22. Approximately how iruch of your heat cones from this source? %
23. Haw satisfied have you been with this heat source? (circle one)
very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Somewhat dissatisfied Very dissatisfied 
How did you acquire this item?
24. Had it built into the design of the house.__ Year:___  (go to #27)
 25. Installed after the house was purchased.____ Year:___  (go to #27)
 26. Acquired with the house.___________________ Year:___  (go to #43 or #65)
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27. Hew much of this did you build or install yourself? 0 10% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Many things may have influenced jour decision to purchase this form of heat. Sere 
may have tended to encourage your purchase, sane may have disaouraged you. Below is a 
partial list. Cn a scale of 0 to 4 (0 = did not affect your decision, 1 ■ very 
discouraging, 4 = very encouraging), please indicate the anount of influence that each 











29. Potential long-term savings......... 1 2 3 4
30. Tax credits........................ 1 2 3 4
31. You owned one before ............... 1 2 3 4
32. Advice fran an equipment salesperson . . 0 1 2 3 4
33. Advice fran a relative or friend . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
34. A relative or friend owned one . . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
35. Advioe fran-an engineer or architect . . 0 1 2 3 4
36. Advice from a builder or contractor . . 0 1 2 3 4
37. A danonstration hone . ............. 1 2 3 4
38. Newspapers or magazines............. 1 2 3 4
39. Greater energy independence......... 1 2 3 4
40. Clean, safe energy ................. 1 2 3 4
41. Innovative technology............... 1 2 3 4
42. Other: ........... . 0 1 2 3 4
43. SECONDARY ENERGY SOURCE: DESCRIPTION:
%44. Approximately hew much of your heat canes fran this source?_____
45. How satisfied have you been with this item? (circle one)
Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Sanewhat dissatisfied Very dissatisfied 
How did you aaquire this item?
 46. Had it built into the design of the house. Year:____  (go to #49)





  (go to #65)
25% 50% 75% 100%
Acquired with the house.
How mich of this did you build or install yourself?
Many things nay have influenced your decision to purchase this form of heat. As 
above, on a scale of 0 to 4 please indicate the extent to which the following factors 
tended to encourage or discourage your purchase.
No _  DISCOURAGING ENCOURAGING 
Inpact Very Somewhat
50. Initial cost...................... . B 2 i 3 4
51. Potential long-term savings......... 2 I 3 4
52. Tax credits........................ 2 l 3 4
53. You owned one before ............... 2 l 3 4
54. Advice from an equipment salesperson . . 0 2 i 3 4
55. Advice from a relative or friend . . . . 0 2 i 3 4
56. A relative or friend owned one . . . . . 0 2 i 3 4
57. Advice fran an engineer or architect . - 0 2 ■ 3 4
58. Advice from a builder or contractor. . . 0 2 i 3 4
59. A demonstration hone . . . . . . . . . 2 i 3 4
60. Newspapers or magazines............. 2 ■ 3 4
61. Greater energy endependence......... . 0 2 ■ 3 4
62.
63.






64. Other: . "........ . 0 2 i 3 4
Somewhat Very
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Below are a few statements concerning energy consumption. For each statement, 
please indicate whether you think it is true or false.
65. Turning down the heat at night saves less energy than it
takes to reheat the house in the morning. TRUE FALSE DON’T KNOW
66. On a per person basis, energy oonsunption in the United
States is still the same as it was in 1960. ' TRUE FALSE DON'T KNCtv
67. When you consider both energy costs and mortgage payments,
passive solar hemes cost more than traditional homes. TRUE FALSE DCN'T KNCW
Next there are a few statanents about energy related matters. Please indicate your 
opinion according to the following scale.
5. Agree very much
4. Agree somewhat
3. Neutral
2. Disagree sanewhat 
1. Disagree very nuch 
DX Don't know DIS­
AGREE AGREE
68. The biggest problem with solar pcMer is that it requires
such a large initial investment.........................  5 4 3 2 1 DR
69. Solar power will never make a significant contribution
to our energy needs...................................  5 4 3 2 1 UK
70. Scientists will be able to develop new forms of energy
before we have another crisis..........................  5 4 3 2 1 DK
71. Only people with a lot of mechanical ability should own a
solar home.............................................. 5 4 3 2 1 DK
72. Energy prices make it extremely difficult for my family
to make ends meet....................................   5 4 3 2 1 DK
73. Hie solar technology new on the market will probably be
obsolete in 5-10 years...................................  5 4 3 2 1 DK
74. People should be allowed to use as much energy as they
can afford.............................................. 5 4 3 2 1 DK
75. While solar hemes are great for warm, sunny climates,
it is too cold and cloudy for them where I live...... 5 4 3 2 1 DK
76. While some may disagree, I think nuclear pcwer is safe
and we should be putting even more money into it.....  5 4 3 2 1 DK
77. We need not worry about future energy shortages because
America has such a wide variety of resources.......... 5 4 3 2 1 DK
78. The government should place higher taxes on gas and oil
in order to discourage consunption..................  5 4 3 2 1 DK
79. The government should immediately begin to at least
double its funding for solar research and development . . .  5 4 3 2 1 DK
80. This country probably has enough oil for centuries,
we just need to find i t ............................ 5 4 3 2 1 DK
81. We should immediately put a stop to the. building of all
nuclear pcwer plants............................    5 4 3 i 1 DK
82. Another energy shortage seems to be almost inevitable . . .  5 4 3 2 1 DK
Here are a few general statanents which people might rake.
Please indicate your opinion according to the same scale.
83. In this cenplicated world of ours, the only way to know 
what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can
be trusted...................................... . . . .  5 4 3 2 1 DK
84. I get really angry when a person stubbornly refuses to
admit that they are wrong............................... 5 4 3 2 1 DK
85. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who
are for the truth and those who are against it  5 4 3 2 1 DK
86. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world,
there is probably only one which is correct  5 4 3 2 1 DK
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Below is a list of items which you nay have seriously considered buying and then 
decided against. If so, please put a check next to that item.
_ _  87. Photovoltaic collectors
_ 88. Solar hot water equipment
89. A passive solar home: ____________________
  90. Greenhouse
  91. Wood stove/furnace
If you chocked any of the above items, please indicate how important the following 
factors were in your decision. If you checked more than one item, please answer for the 
one which you most seriously considered and indicate which one that is in the space below. 
As before, on a scale of 0 to 4 please indicate the degree of influence which each of these 
factors had on your decision. If you did not check an item, go to 107.
Item: NO DISCOURAGING ENCOURAGING
Irrpact Very sanewhat Sanewhat Vert_.
92. Initial cost ...................... 0 1 2 3 4
93. Potential long-term savings......... 0 1 2 3 4
94. Tax credits........................ 0 1 2 3 4
95. You owned one before ............... 0 1 2 3 4
96. Advice frum an equijnunt salesperson . 0 1 2 3 4
97. Advice from a relative or friend . . . 0 1 2 3 4
98. A relative or friend owned one . . . . 0 1 2 3 4
99. Advice from an engineer or architect . 0 1 . 2 3 4
100. Advice fit an a builder........... . . 0 1 2 3 4
101. A demonstration lionu . . . . ........ 0 1 2 3 4
102. News|iapcrs or mig.uincs............. 0 1 2 3 4
103. Greater energy in.le;jundcnce......... 0 1 2 3 4
104. Clean, safe energy ................. 0 1 2 3 4
105. Innovative tcelmology............... 0 1 2 3 4
106. Other: ............. 0 1 2 3 4
Next to each of the following items, please indicate how many people you know who 
cwn a product of this type. (For example, 2 Wood stove would mean that you know 2 
people who own a wood stove.)
  107. Photovoltaic collectors
  10B. Solar hot water equipment
  109. A passive solar hone: _________________
  110. Greenhouse
 111. Wood stove/fumace
  112. Windmill
There are many ways by which the federal and state governments can aid the spread of 
new energy systems. Below is a partial list. Please indicate how strongly you would 
support or op[x:se such actions by the government according to the following scale:
113.
5. Support very strongly 
4. Support a little 
3. Neutral 
2. Oppose a little 
1. Oppose very strongly 
DK Don't knew
SUPPORT
Tax crctli ts or deductions . . . .  5 4 3
OPPOSE 
2 l DK
114. Lew interest leans............. 5 4 3 2 1 DK
115. Guaranteed loans............... 5 4 3 2 1 DK
116. Property tax exenptions........ 5 4 3 2 1 DK
117. Research grants........... . 5 4 3 2 1 DK
118. Reduced property assessments. . . 5 4 3 2 1 DK
119. Energy seminars ............... 5 4 3 2 1 DK
120. Publications................... 5 4 3 2 1 DK
121. Demonstration homes ........... 5 4 3 2 1 • DK
122. Setting equipment standards . . . 5 4 3 2 1 DK
123. Requiring mininun warranties. . . 5 4 3 2 1 DK
124. Licensing installers........... 5 4 3 2 1 DK
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Following is an alphabetical list of 16 values. Ch a scale of 1 to 5 (1 ■ not at all 
important, 5 = very important), please indicate how important each of these values are to 
YOU in guiding YOUR life.
NOT AT ALL 
IMPORTANT
















A COMFORTABLE LIFE . . . .
AN EXCITING LIFE .......
A SENSE OF ACCCMPLISfMENT.








SOCIAL RECOGNITION . . . . 



















Below is another list of -13 personal characteristics, 
indicate how ijgjortant it is for YOU to be like this.




143. CAPABLE................... . . . . 1 2 3
144. CLET!. . ................. 3
145. DECISIVE ................. . . . . 1 2 3
146. HELPFUL................... J
147. IMAGINATIVE............... . . . . 1 2 3
148. INDEPENDENT............... 3
149. INFLUENTIAL............... . . . . 1 2 3
150. INNOVATIVE............... . . . . 1 2 3
151. T W T FT.TFCTOAI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3
152. LOVING........... . . . . . 1 2 3



































Using the same scale, please indicate belcw hew important each of the following 
factors would be if you ware to purchase a new heme in New Harp shire.












Attic insulation . . . .
Wall insulation.......
Storm windows and doors.
Fireplace.............
Wood stove/fumace . . . 
Southerly orientation. . 
















Thank you very much for your' cooperation. Feel free to use the remaining space to 
make whatever comrents you would like regarding this survey or our energy policies.
